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Abstract 
 
Despite the decades of concern and efforts, the forest cover of the world is more 
endangered than ever. Failure of international dialogues since the Rio Summit in 1992 
is an indication that inclusive coordinated approach with strict laws and policies 
needed to protect global forest cover and to fight against the transnational issue of 
illegal logging. The emerging transnational timber legality assurance regime and the 
experimentalist form of governance in the form of the European Union Timber 
Regulation (EUTR) aimed at controlling trade in illegally logged wood and wood 
products into the EU. This research critically examines the mechanisms of EUTR and 
performance of its legal instruments in eradicating the illegal timber from the EU 
market. This research helps in identifying the operational difficulties of implementing 
this regulation in the UK as the UK is one of the major importers of wood products 
from countries where illegal logging of timber is a massive issue. 
 
To achieve the research objectives, the black letter approach and empirical research 
method have been considered to analyse the potential of EUTR. The experimentalist 
governance theory to develop analytical framework and the empirical study with 
stakeholders including the timber industry in the UK, EUTR enforcement agency and 
research organisations including the environmental Non-government organisations 
are a significant part of this thesis. The experience and opinions of different 
stakeholders on EUTR components, collected through questionnaire and semi-
structured interviews, have been analysed qualitatively by using the computer 
software NVIVO 11 to conclude.  
 
This research shows that views of the stakeholders are very diverse and there are 
noticeable differences in opinions from the same category of stakeholders. The study 
finds that although EUTR is considered as a welcome initiative by most of the 
stakeholders, they are also of the opinion that EUTR has weaknesses which make it 
difficult to completely control illegal timber and timber products being placed in the UK 
market. From the data analysis, it is quite evident that implementation and 
enforcement of timber regulation, narrow product scope, ambiguous concept of 
monitoring organisation, lack of transparency from competent authority and coherent 
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approach across EU, technical issues within due diligence system are some of the 
significant challenges that affect the potential of EUTR in combating illegal timber 
trade.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the research 
 
Despite international recognition of how significant the role of forests in mitigating 
climate change is1, forests continue to disappear at an alarming rate.2 The causes of 
deforestation, both immediate and underlying, are diverse and often arises due to 
multiple factors. The immediate causes are agriculture expansion, wood harvesting, 
and infrastructure development such as road building.3 The most widely recognised 
fundamental causes are poverty, financial development, and other economic 
components; government strategies, innovative advances, statistic change and social 
variables.4  Agriculture is one of the proximate drivers for around 80% of deforestation 
globally.5 According to the new Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) report of 
2016, In Latin America, commercial agriculture is the foremost driver of deforestation, 
causing around 70% of the total deforested area.6 The commercial agriculture also 
accounts for 1/3 of deforestation in Africa and subtropical Asia.7  
 
The degradation of forests threatens the survival of many species and it reduces the 
capacity of forests to provide vital services.8 The increasing overseas demand for the 
commodities such as soy, beef/leather, palm oil, tropical timber, pulp and paper, and 
plantation-grown timber has played an essential role in the growing importance of 
                                                          
1Sam Adelman, 'Tropical Forests and Climate Change: A Critique of Green Governmentality' (2015) 
11 International Journal of Legal Context 195; Giacomo Grassi and others, ‘The Key Role of Forests in Meeting 
Climate Targets Requires Science for Credible Mitigation’ (2017) 7 Nature Climate Change 220 
2Sam Lawson and others, 'Consumer Goods and Deforestation: An Analysis of The Extent and Nature of Illegality 
in Forest Conversion for Agriculture and Timber Plantations' (Forest Trends Report Series, Forest Trade and 
Finance 2014)  
3Richard Houghton, ‘Deforestation’ (eds) Biological and Environmental Hazards, Risks and Disasters (Academic 
Press 2016) 
4David Hunter, James Salzman and Durwood Zaelke, International Environmental Law and Policy (Foundation 
Press 2015) 
5Gabrielle Kissinger, Martin Herold and Veronique De Sy, 'Drivers of Deforestation and Forest Degradation: A 
Synthesis Report for REDD+ Policymakers' (Lexeme Consulting 2012) 
<https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/DriversOfDeforestation.pdf_N_S.pdf> 
6Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), ‘State of the World’s Forests: Forests and Agriculture: Land-use 
Challenges and Opportunities (FAO 2016) < http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5588e.pdf> 
7John Francis Kessy and others, 'Analysis of Drivers and Agents of Deforestation and Forest Degradation in 
Masito Forests, Kigoma, Tanzania' (2016) 6 International Journal of Asian Social Science 
8International Union for Conservation of Nature, Issues Brief, November 2017 
<https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/deforestation-forest_degradation_issues_brief_final.pdf> 
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commercial agriculture and closely linked to the degradation of tropical forests.9 
Developing tropical countries face the challenge of meeting their development 
objectives by preserving natural capital without clearing forests.  For example, The 
palm oil industry has grown substantially across the globe and has made tangible 
contributions to poverty alleviation in Indonesia, Malaysia and Liberia. However, palm 
oil production is also associated with a range of environmental issues, including 
widespread deforestation.10 In Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia and Papa New Guinea 
forests are cleared for mining and infrastructure development and to expand the 
source of timber.11 Hence, the focus of international forests agreements for over the 
last two decades was on protecting tropical forests.12  
 
The forest issues have become more complex and need innovative solutions or 
strategies.13 Even where forest protection policies and laws exist, many countries 
cannot enforce them due to the complexity of the issue, leading to deforestation on a 
vast scale.14 Failure of international dialogues since the Rio Summit in 199215 is an 
indication that an inclusive coordinated approach with stringent laws and policies was 
needed to protect global forest cover. A combination of demand and supply policies, 
public and private initiatives, and cooperation between the developed and developing 
                                                          
9Dieter Cuypers and others, The Impact of EU Consumption on Deforestation: Comprehensive Analysis of the 
Impact of EU Consumption on Deforestation (European Union 2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/pdf/1.%20Report%20analysis%20of%20impact.pdf> 
10Sophie Bertazzo, ‘In Palm Oil, Liberia Sees Economic Boom But Forests May Loose’ (Conservation International 
2016) <https://www.conservation.org/blog/in-palm-oil-liberia-sees-economic-boom-but-forests-may-
lose/?_ga=2.33724515.339188500.1573812794-1589950684.1573812794> 
11Alison Hoare, ‘Tackling Illegal Logging and the Related Trade: What Progress and Where Next?’ (Chatham 
House 2015) 
<https://indicators.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/reports/Tackling%20Illegal%20Logging%20and%20Related%
20Trade_0.pdf> 
12Hunter (n 4) 
13Max Krott and Nicholas D Hasanagas, ‘Measuring Bridges Between Sectors: Causative Evaluation of Cross-
sectorality’ (2006) 8(5) Forest Policy and Economics 
14Luca Tacconi, Rafael J Rodrigues and Ahmad Maryudi, ‘Law Enforcement and Deforestation: Lessons for 
Indonesia From Brazil’ (2019) 108 Forest Policy and Economics; Food and Agriculture Organisation, 'Best 
Practices for Improving Law Compliance in The Forestry Sector' (2005) 
<http://ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/a0146e/a0146e00.pdf> 
15Jeremy Rayner, Alexander Buck and Pia Katila, ‘Embracing complexity: Meeting the Challenges of International 
Forest Governance’ A Global Assessment Report Prepared by the Global Forest Expert Panel on the International 
Forest Regime (IUFRO World Series 2010) 
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countries set the stage for the development of a transnational forest governance 
regime with many innovative features.16 
 
The European Union (EU) has built an innovative structure for transnational forest 
governance by bringing forward a combination of policy measures to encourage 
sustainable forestry and to prevent trade in illegal wood and timber products.17 The 
vision laid out initially in the 2003 Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade 
(FLEGT) Action Plan.18 The FLEGT action plan overall comprises:  
 
1) negotiating bilateral Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs)19 with the producer 
countries to achieve broad stakeholder participation in building institutions to promote 
sustainable forestry and assure the export of ‘legal’ timber 
2) Promoting initiatives by the private sector and civil society to promote sustainable 
forestry and timber legality in developing countries 
3) introduce legislation (EU Timber Regulation)20 that criminalises place illegal timber 
on the EU market and allowing trading firms to demonstrate ‘due diligence’ that they 
have not done so.  
 
Through its interactions with private certification schemes and public legal timber 
requirements in third countries such as the United States (US) and Australia, this EU-
based experimentalist architecture is likewise contributing to the stepwise construction 
of a broader transnational forest governance regime. The experimentalist 
governance21 which is based on extensive participation by civil society stakeholders 
                                                          
16Christine Overdevest and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Assembling an Experimentalist Regime: Transnational Governance 
Interactions in the Forest Sector’ (2014) 8 Regulation and Governance 22 
17Christine Overdevest and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Experimentalism in Transnational Forest Governance: 
Implementing European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership 
Agreements in Indonesia and Ghana’ (2018) 12 Regulation and Governance 64 
18Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament of 21 May 2003, Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT): Proposal for an 
EU Action Plan (EC 2003) <http://www.fao.org/forestry/33093-04ee4b3cc7232ef705169b9cc20c30850.pdf> 
19Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) are a central element of the EU's strategy in the fight against illegal 
logging. A VPA is a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and a timber-exporting country outside the EU. 
20Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 on laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber 
products on the market (2010) OJ 295/23 
21Overdevest (n 16) defined experimentalist governance as a recursive process of provisional goal setting and 
revision based on learning from comparison of alternative approaches to their advancement in different 
contexts  
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and revision of framework goals through continuous monitoring and regular review of 
implementation by countries and firms, underpinned by a penalty default mechanism. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement: Illegal logging and its global range 
 
Over the past years, there is an increasing interest among consumers, retailers, 
investors, communities and governments to be aware that their purchases and 
consumption of wood-based products have been making positive social and 
environmental contributions to the local environment and people.22 The products 
supply chain that brings products to final consumers start at producer country, 
processed in a different country and exported to many diverse consumer countries.23 
It is through trade and the demand for wood products in timber consuming developed 
countries that the issue of forest loss becomes a question of inter-regional and 
international policy, and the problem of illegal logging is at the centre of this trend.24 
 
Illegal logging can be broadly defined as logging in violation of relevant national and 
international laws.25 The East Asia Ministerial Conference on The Forest Law 
Enforcement and Governance (FLEG), held in Bali on 11-13 September 200126 states 
that forest ecosystems have been threatened “by negative effects on the rule of law 
by violations of forest law and forest crime, in particular, illegal logging and related 
trade”: This clearly defines illegal logging and related trade as subsets forest law 
violations. In another way, illegal logging is the harvest, transport, sale or purchase of 
timber in infringement to the laws of timber exporting and importing countries. Illegality 
is anything that takes place in violation of the legal framework of a country (Box 1).27 It 
                                                          
22Ruth Nogueron and Loretta Cheung, 'Sourcing Legally Produced Wood: A Guide For Businesses' (World 
Resource Institute 2014) 
<https://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/wri_report_4c_report_legalityguide_final320.pdf>; 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), ‘ Sustainable Consumption and Production: A Handbook for 
Policy makers (UNEP 2015) 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1951Sustainable%20Consumption.pdf>  
23Peter Hazell and Stanley Wood, 'Drivers of Change in Global Agriculture' (2007) 363 Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society Biological Sciences 
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2610166/pdf/rstb20072166.pdf> 
24Alexandru Giurca and others, 'Ambiguity in Timber Trade Regarding Efforts to Combat Illegal Logging: Potential 
Impacts on Trade Between South-East Asia and Europe' (2013) 4 Forests 
25Luca Tacconi, Illegal Logging: Law Enforcement, Livelihoods and The Timber Trade (Earthscan 2007) 
26The Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) East Asia Ministerial Conference , Ministerial Declaration 
See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFORESTS/Resources/Bali_ministerial_declaration.pdf 
27Nogueron (n 22) 
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includes timber taken without a license, timber taken from protected areas, timber 
stolen from the private property, timber taken without paying the correct taxes.28 Illegal 
logging and its associated trade is a significant problem for environmental, economic 
and social reasons, raising severe concerns about overexploitation and poor forest 
management.29 Chapter 2 discusses various existing illegal logging definitions and the 
impact of illegal logging in detail. 
 
Table 1: Examples of Illegal Logging 
Illegal origin (ownership, title, or source) 
Lack of compliance throughout the supply 
chain (harvesting, manufacturing, and trade) 
Logging trees in protected areas without proper 
permission (e.g. in national parks). 
Violations of workers’ rights (e.g. illegal labour, 
underpaying workers, etc.), labour laws and 
international standards, and violation of 
traditional rights of local populations and 
indigenous groups 
Logging protected species Violation of international human rights treaties 
Logging in prohibited areas such as steep slopes, 
riverbanks and water catchments. 
Wood transported or processed in defiance of 
local and national laws. 
Logging in non-compliance with specifications of 
the concession permit or harvesting license (e.g. 
harvesting volumes below or above the 
specifications, or before or after the period 
authorised for logging). 
Violations of international trade agreements 
(e.g., CITES species) 
Harvesting wood of size or species not covered 
by the concession permit. 
Failure to pay legally prescribed taxes, fees and 
royalties 
Trespass or theft, logging in forests without the 
legal right to do so 
Logging and trading logs and forest products 
despite logging and trade bans 
Violations, bribes and deception in the bidding 
process to acquire rights to a forest concession. 
Illegal transfer pricing (e.g. when it is to avoid 
duties and taxes), timber theft, and smuggling. 
Money laundering 
Illegal documentation (including trade 
documents). 
Failure to fully report volumes harvested or 
reporting different species for tax evasion 
purposes. 
Source: Global Forest and Trade Network (GFTN)30 
 
The different understandings of illegal logging give rise to many partly conflicting 
estimates about its consequences.31  A study described illegal logging as a hidden 
crime in an “abysmally regulated” forest sector32 and argued that illegal logging and 
                                                          
28ibid 
29Giurca (n 24) 
30Global Forest and Trade Network (GFTN), ‘Building a Better Business Through Responsible Purchasing: 
Developing and Implementing a Wood and Paper Purchasing Policy’ (WWF, 2005)  
31Lieselot Bisschop, 'Out of The Woods: The Illegal Trade in Tropical Timber and A European Trade Hub' (2012) 
13 Global Crime 
32Sina Leipold and others, 'Protecting First World Markets and Third World Nature: The Politics of Illegal Logging 
in Australia, The European Union and The United States' (2016) 39 Global Environmental Change 
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associated timber trade are supported by both large enterprises and the corrupt 
governments in the global South as well as some opportunist importers in the global 
North.33 The pattern of timber trade is generally, although not exclusively, 
characterised by a flow of wood and wood products from less-developed and 
transitional producer countries, to industrialised consumer countries.34 Initially, illegal 
logging was considered one of the severe issues in developing tropical countries, but 
the dynamics of timber market and growing demand for tropical timber in developed 
nations made this issue more complicated.35 
 
Internationally, the issue of Illegal logging and deforestation was discussed many 
times over the past 25 years towards developing a legally binding agreement, but all 
the efforts resulted in adopting the soft law on forest issues due to the divide within 
developing and developed countries.36 The scale of the illegal logging has prompted 
a range of political responses over the last five years. Meetings of the G8 group of 
major economies,37 the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)38 and the 
International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) have all seen announcements by 
nations of their intention to work to halt illegal logging and associated trade. At the 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, the United Nations pledged to “take 
immediate action on the violation of domestic forest law enforcement and illegal 
international trade in forest products”.39 Several bilateral agreements have since been 
signed.40 The mechanism forest certification, the multilateral efforts of the International 
                                                          
33Interpol and The World Bank, ’Chainsaw Project: An INTERPOL perspective on law enforcement in illegal 
logging’ Lyon and Washington DC: (Interpol and World Bank 2009) 
<https://www.illegallogging.info/sites/files/chlogging/uploads/WorldBankChainsawIllegalLoggingReport.pdf> 
34Laura Wellesley, ‘Trade in Illegal Timber: The Response in China, A Chatham House Assessment’ (Chatham 
House 2014) 
<https://indicators.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/reports/CHHJ2361_China_Logging_Research_Paper_FINAL.p
df> 
35Xiaobiao Zhang, ‘Eliminating Illegal Timber Consumption or Production: Which Is the More Economical Means 
to Reduce Illegal Logging?’ (2016) 7(9) Forests < https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4907/7/9/191/htm> 
36United Nations (UN), ‘Review of Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Rio Principles, Study Prepared by the 
Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future (UN 2012) 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/641Synthesis_report_Web.pdf> 
37Memorandum from the G8 Summit, Birmingham 1998 
38United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),’Report of the 6th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (UNEP 2002) <https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-
06/official/cop-06-20-en.pdf> 
39Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Revised) 23rd Sept 2002 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/milesstones/wssd 
40Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) were signed on the subject between the UK and Indonesia in April 2002, 
between Indonesia and China in December 2002, and between Indonesia and Japan in June 2003 
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Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) and responsible procurement policies of the 
government such as the UK timber procurement policy are some of the mechanisms 
applied to stop illegal timber trade. 
 
Unfortunately, these global and domestic efforts did not produce meaningful actions, 
and illegal timber trade continues. There is an apparent lack of international regulation 
controlling the trade in timber, although a few timber species do fall under the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES).41 A significant reason for the failure to act was that consuming countries did 
not have laws banning the import of illegally sourced wood. Consequently, as soon as 
vessels carrying stolen timber and wood products reach international waters, the cargo 
is effectively legalised and importing states cannot deny entry.  
 
Timber consuming developed countries are under constant pressure to regulate the 
flow of timber coming from countries that are at high risk of illegal logging.42 Different 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), conservation groups, international 
organisations, industries and governments have focused on promoting policies and 
incentives to address this issue.43 There have been several briefing notes and 
guidance published by NGOs frequently asking state Governments to take decisive 
action against illegal logging.44 The investigations carried out by some international 
NGOs on illegal logging have proved to be groundbreaking both for the governments 
                                                          
41CITES is an international agreement between governments. Its aim is to ensure that international trade in 
specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival 
42Giurca (n 24) 
43Ruhong Li and others, 'Long-Term Effects of Eliminating Illegal Logging on the World Forest Industries, Trade, 
and Inventory' (2008) 10 Forest Policy and Economics  
44NGO Statement, Tackling Deforestation and Forest Degradation: A Case for EU Action in 2017 See 
https://www.forestpeoples.org/sites/default/files/documents/deforestation-4.pdf; Briefing Notes, 
Healthy Forests = Equitable Livelihoods, Inclusive Development and A Resilient Climate, September 2019 See 
https://www.fern.org/news-resources/healthy-forests-equitable-livelihoods-inclusive-development-and-a-
resilient-climate-2009/ 
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and for the public.45 The supply change initiative46 and CDP’s47 disclosure programme 
are some of the examples which shows major companies have stepped forward with 
voluntary pledges to eliminate deforestation in their commodity supply chains.48  
 
However, these international discussions certainly helped in raising awareness about 
the problems of illegal logging. There have been some noted improvements observed 
in government responses to illegal logging and related trade in both producer (and 
processing) and consumer countries. National policies are deeply interconnected with 
and are supported by international political processes.49 The consumer countries have 
taken several unilateral measures designed to exclude the illegal timber products from 
their respective markets to strengthen the fight against illegal logging in the absence 
of legally binding international agreement. In 2008, the USA was first to address the 
issue of illegal logging and made amendments in the Lacey Act50 of 1900. Australia 
also introduced the illegal logging prohibition act51 in 2012 to curb down the illegal 
logging and associated trade.52 The EUTR entered into application on 3rd March 2013, 
making it illegal to place illegally logged timber and timber products on the EU market, 
which is legally binding on all 28 EU member states. 
 
                                                          
45Environmental Investigation Agency, ‘State of Corruption the Top-level Conspiracy Behind the Global Trade in 
Myanmar’s Stolen Teak’ (EIA 2019) < https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-report-State-of-
Corruption.pdf>; Denis Smirnov, ‘Assessment of Scope of Illegal Logging in Laos and Associated Trans-Boundary 
Timber Trade’ (WWF 2015); Greenpeace Brazil, ‘Imaginary Trees, Real Destruction: How Licensing Fraud and 
Illegal Logging of Ipe Trees are Causing Irreversible Damage to The Amazon Rainforest’ (Greenpeace 2017) 
<https://storage.googleapis.com/planet4-international-stateless/2018/03/b91d03c3-greenpeace 
report_imaginary-trees-real-destruction_march-2018.pdf> 
46Forest Trends introduces the Supply Change Initiative as a transformational resource for businesses, investors, 
governments, and the civil society organisations that support and hold them accountable; providing information 
on the extent and value of commitment-driven commodity production and demand.  See http://supply-
change.org/#remove 
47CDP is a not-for-profit charity that runs the global disclosure system for investors, companies, cities, states and 
regions to manage their environmental impacts. See https://www.cdp.net/en 
48Genevieve Bennett, ‘Companies Acting On Deforestation Have A Legality Issue’ Ecosystem Marketplace 2018) 
<https://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/articles/companies-acting-on-deforestation-have-a-legality-issue/> 
49Hoare (n 11) 
50Amendments to the Lacey Act from H.R.2419, Sec. 8204 
<https://www.aphis.usda.gov/plant_health/lacey_act/downloads/background--redlinedLaceyamndmnt--
forests--may08.pdf> 
51Australian Illegal prohibition Act No 166 of 2012 
52Duncan Brack, 'Controlling Illegal Logging: Consumer-Country Measures' (Chatham House 2010) 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and
%20Development/bp0110brack.pdf> 
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1.3  Research topic and theories of transnational timber legality verification and 
experimentalist governance 
 
This research is the attempt to analyse the effectiveness of the European Union 
Timber Regulation (EUTR)53 in eliminating the illegal timber and timber products 
entering from timber producer developing countries to timber consuming developed 
countries. The EUTR prohibits the sale of timber logged illegally as per the law of the 
country of origin.54 Furthermore, the legislation requires operators placing timber and 
timber products on the EU market to exercise due diligence, ensuring that the timber 
they sell in the EU is not harvested illegally.55 The thesis aims to identify technical and 
operational inadequacies of EUTR instruments in the UK.  
 
The fundamental research questions this dissertation explores is “Does EUTR has the 
potential to prohibit the import of illegal timber and timber products entering the UK 
market?” The empirical study with stakeholders, including the qualitative analysis 
using NVIVO 11 software is a methodological approach selected to achieve the 
objectives of the research. This study helps in assessing the impact of the regulation 
by collecting information from various stakeholders on their experiences with different 
aspects of EUTR such as enforcement efforts, implementation challenges for timber 
industry, due diligence system of EUTR, enforcement agency approach, timber 
products covered by the regulation, monitoring organisation set up under EUTR, role 
of forest certification bodies. This research also attempts to draw recommendations to 
overcome the identified flaws. This research contributes to the current debate of timber 
legality verification by exploring the effectiveness of EUTR in the UK. In the UK, the 
Timber and Timber Products (Placing on the Market) Regulations 201356 enforces the 
European Commission Regulation 995/2010.57  
 
As noted in the section above, since 1992, international negotiations have failed to 
produce a binding global forest convention due to divergent interests and values and 
                                                          
53Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 
54Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 Article 1 
55Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 Article 4 
56Timber and Timber Products (Placing on the Market) Regulations 2013 
57Council Regulation (EC) 995/2010  
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have created a weak international public regime.58 In response to this, the EU moved 
unilaterally to a different approach of transnational forest governance in the form of 
timber legality verification initiative. The timber legality verification, one of the most 
recent global instruments for forest governance, focuses on keeping track of the 
products along the supply chains, providing more significant reflection on the technical 
challenges.59 The transnational timber legality initiative comprises a set of interrelated 
policy instruments, both public and private, aimed at promoting sustainable forestry 
and controlling trade in illegally logged wood products. The potentially productive 
interactions between these instruments in developing forestry regime create prospects 
for learning through positive and negative demonstration effects, stimulating cross-
fertilisation, and enhancing accountability.60  
 
The emergence of timber legality verification regulations has spurred various debates 
among scholars and practitioners. The contributions from scholars to understand the 
timber legality regime have been noteworthy and has encouraged diverse views in the 
context of transnational governance initiative. The contributions by Overdevest and 
Zeitlin61 and Cashore and Stone62 is ground-breaking in understanding the timber 
legality regime and work by Bartley63 and Sotirov64 provides additional guidance for 
theorising private standards and public authority. These theories have been discussed 
in chapter 3. 
 
This thesis takes an approach that an effective timber legality regime may certainly be 
construed from distinct components, but the complexity may create a potential barrier 
to effectiveness. The scholars have predominantly analysed the interactions of timber 
legality regime only with private forest certification schemes that gave rise to several 
                                                          
58Richard G Tarasofsky, ‘Assessing the International Forest Regime’, IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper 
No. 37 
59Ragnar Jonsson and others, ‘Assessment of the EU Timber Regulation and FLEGT Action Plan’ (European Forest 
Institute 2015) <https://www.efi.int/sites/default/files/files/publication-bank/2018/efi_fstp_1_2015.pdf> 
60Overdevest (n 16) 
61ibid 
62Benjamin Cashore and Michael W Stone, ‘Can Legality Verification Rescue Global Forest Governance? 
Analyzing the Potential of Public and Private Policy Intersection to Ameliorate Forest Challenges in Southeast 
Asia.’ (2012) 18 Forest Policy and Economics 13 
63Tim Bartley, ‘Transnational Governance and the Re-centered State: Sustainability or Legality? (2014) 8 
Regulation and Governance 93 
64Metodi Sotirov, Maike Stelter and George Winkel, ‘The Emergence of the European Union Timber Regulation: 
How Baptists, Bootleggers, Devil Shifting and Moral Legitimacy Drive Change in The Environmental Governance 
of Global Timber Trade’ (2017) 81 Forest Policy Economics 69 
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possible theories between public and private standards within the forest governance. 
Many scholars have addressed the subject of transnational timber legality verification 
but the evidence regarding important questions is still limited. The studies have more 
hypotheses than empirically established causal links. It is to be noted that the quoted 
scholars conducted these studies when the timber legality verification initiatives 
started to transform in the form of legislation and therefore provide the foundation for 
this research to understand the implementation challenges and compliance issues of 
initiatives such as EUTR at a state level. This thesis helps in developing the forward-
looking theory by adding an implementation component at domestic level and 
theorises that approach of the state actors (private companies, enforcement authority, 
NGOs and other firms) play a significant role to eliminate the regime complexity that 
can be a barrier to achieve the objectives of the legislation, especially when adopting 
risk-based approach to enforcement. 
 
1.3.1 The transnational timber legality initiative and the EUTR 
 
The EU timber regulation prohibits the import of timber to the European market that 
infringes upon existing laws of the harvest country and provides that importers conduct 
due diligence to reduce the risk that their inventories contain illegal timber. Operators 
in Europe will be required to exercise “due diligence”, which means that they must 
minimise the risk of illegal timber in the supply chain and obtain information on the 
origin of their imports.65 The main objective of FLEGT is to ensure that only timber that 
comes from legal sources enters the EU market, whereas EUTR further strengthens 
these actions by requiring importers to demonstrate due diligence and prohibits timber 
imports if not covered by FLEGT or CITES permits.66  
 
The new emphasis on the legality of internationally traded timber as a demand-side 
measure recognises both the potential of consumer markets to influence industrial 
behaviour and the inability of earlier supply-side attempts in order to reform forest 
                                                          
65EU-FLEGT Facility, 'Guidance On The EU Timber Regulation' (European Forest Institute undated) 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/cameroon/documents/eu_cameroon/eutr_vpa_en.pdf> 
66Christopher Carden, Robbert Wijers and Paul Zambon, 'FLEGT, VPA, EUTR And Their Possible Impact On The 
Bolivian Timber Sector' (CBI: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands 2012) <http://www.illegal-
logging.info/sites/default/files/uploads/20120615finalreportcbibolengwithphotos.pdf>  
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governance.67 Legality verification has been endorsed in the United States and the EU 
for two main reasons. First, It is increasingly recognised that a legally binding 
international agreement, even if effective, will have little ground effect in those 
countries with insufficient capability, training and compliance. Second, efforts to certify 
the best forest practices in the forest prompted to simply separating markets rather 
than improving on the ground results. Consequently, legality verification originated by 
using similar ideas as a certification but stressing adherence to national laws and 
regulations. As rightly stated by Cashore and Stone68, the timber legality regime is an 
outcome of interaction, competition, and learning in the world of forestry standards, 
and it has the potential to transform future forms of transnational governance. 
 
The rise of binding timber legality rules, occurring amid private efforts to certify 
sustainability, leaves with an essential set of questions: How should we understand 
the co-existence of legality verification and sustainability certification with state 
legislation? Does complying with the legislation (meeting legality verification 
standards) decrease the acceptance of forest certification amongst the companies? 
Another variable which has been associated with shaping the impact of the legality 
regulation is the strength of civil society pressure in a country.69 The stronger the voice 
of civil society, the more effective it will be in compelling domestic governments to act.  
The question to be answered here is what influence do NGOs have on the government 
and on private companies to comply with UK legislation? As pointed out earlier, the 
timber legality verification can be complex to understand and can undermine 
effectiveness. It raises a very crucial question of how private companies comply with 
state regulation and what supports do they have to achieve the objectives of the 
EUTR? It can be a daunting task for the national enforcement authority to develop 
effective enforcement strategies for such regulation and visit the operators for checks 
which raise another critical question: Does the governmental enforcement authority 
                                                          
67David Brown and others, ‘Legal Timber: Verification and Governance in the Forest Sector’ (Centre for 
International forestry Research 2008) <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-
opinion-files/3472.pdf> 
68Cashore (n 62) 
69Clare Barnes, Frank Van Laerhoven and Peter Driessen, ‘Advocating for Change? How a Civil Society-led 
Coalition Influences the Implementation of the Forest Rights Act in India’ (2016) 84 World Development 162 
<https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/58462675/WD_3661.pdf>; Nafees Ahmad, ‘The Role of Civil 
Society Institutions in Environmental Governance in India: Post-Colonial Context and Human Rights Challenges 
in the Environmental Justice’ (2018) International Journal of Legal Studies and Research 16 
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possess required competence and resources, both financial and human, for effective 
enforcement? 
 
The EU’s import volume of tropical timber products over the past few years has 
decreased because of the economic downturn in Europe. Nevertheless, the value of 
these imports has risen over the same period. A report70 from the centre for the 
promotion of imports from developing countries claims that import volumes declined 
from 3.2 million m3 in 2010 to 2.1 million m3 in 2014. Nonetheless, the value of imports 
increased from € 4303 million in 2013 to € 4681 million in 2014. The FLEGT 
Independent Marketing Monitor (IMM) reports71 indicates that in 2017, imports of 
tropical wood products into the EU dropped by 3% to US$ 4.06 billion. The report also 
highlights that EU's share of global imports of wood products from tropical countries 
dropped from 12.4% in 2016 to 11.8% in 2017. There is not any conclusive evidence 
available that shows a FLEGT action plan or EUTR have affected the import of illegal 
timber or timber products in the EU. The import figures indicate that illegal timber and 
timber products are still being placed on the EU market even though the measures are 
in place to prohibit them. The figures clearly show that the rules in place are not 
sufficient enough to address the complexity attached to the illegal timber trade. 
 
EUTR is considered as secondary legislation to strengthen the FLEGT action plan, 
and it took ten years for EUTR to come into force after the introduction of FLGT action 
plan in 2003. The EU’s illegal import figures above indicate that even after adopting 
the ambitious FLEGT action plan in 2003, it was very challenging to control the flow of 
illegal timber through voluntary measures for EU. The EUTR is believed to have a 
significant impact on international trade in wood products.72 This study evaluates if 
EUTR, as a timber consumer country measure, has the potential to halt the illegal 
timber import by assessing its likely effects in the UK.  
 
                                                          
70CBI, Market Intelligence, 'Trade Statistics: Timber in Europe' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016) 
<https://www.cbi.eu/sites/default/files/market_information/researches/trade-statistics-timber-2016.pdf >  
71Sarah Strock and Rupert Oliver, ‘FLEGT VPA Partners in the EU Timber Trade 2017’ (International Tropical 
Timber Organisation / FLEGT Independent Market Monitor (IMM), 2018) 
<http://www.flegtimm.eu/images/annual_reports/VPA-Partners-in-EU-Timber-Trade-2017-1.pdf> 
72Jonsson (n 59) 
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The hypothesis to be tested here is that legality verification initiative in the form of 
EUTR does not achieve the intended objectives of prohibiting illegal logging and timber 
trade. The transnational timber legality verification initiative has added more 
complexity73 to the existing regime complexes of illegal logging and timber trade. The 
analytical approach taken to test the hypothesis is experimentalist in nature. According 
to Overdevest and Zeitlin74, the experimentalist approach provides an analytical 
framework for evaluating transnational governance interactions and its effectiveness 
in regime complexes. The experimentalist approach helps in determining whether 
progress is made towards achieving the desired performance goals and whether 
failures and the inevitable unintended consequences of specific institutional designs 
are recursively recognised and redressed. This developing transnational system has 
been described by policy experiments that lead to performance evaluation, learning 
from success and failure and broader stakeholder participation which is also the 
analytical framework for the thesis. 
 
1.4 Why the UK is vital to assess the effectiveness of EUTR? 
 
The UK is sparsely forested and the forest cover of the country is gradually increasing 
since 1990. The vast majority (over 80%) of these forests are plantations, and around 
70% are privately owned.75 The woodland covers the area of 3.16 million hectares in 
the UK at 31st March 2016 which is 13% of the total land area in the UK with 10% in 
England, 15% in Wales, 18% in Scotland and 8% in Northern Ireland.76 Hence, UK is 
one of the major importers of wood-based products and relies heavily on other 
countries to meet the demand of wood-based products especially hardwood timber; 
its import accounted for 76% of solid timber supply in 2011.77  
 
                                                          
73Sigrid Quack, ‘Regime Complexity and Expertise in Transnational Governance: Strategizing in the Face of 
Regulatory Uncertainty’, 3(4) (2013) Oñati Socio-legal Series 647 
74Overdevest (n 16) 
75FAO (n 6) 
76Forestry Commission, 'Forestry Statistics and Forestry Facts and Figures' (Forestry Commission 2017) 
<https://www.forestry.gov.uk/forestry/infd-7aqdgc>  
77Rupert Oliver, '2011 Statistics - UK Timber Trade Monitoring in Support of Effective, Efficient and Equitable 
Operation of the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR)' Department for International Development and Forest Industries 
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Chatham House estimated that in 2008 UK imports of illegal wood and timber products 
totalled 1.5 million m3 round wood equivalent. The per capita import of illegally sourced 
wood products of the UK was more than the US, France, China or Vietnam. The UK 
import of illegally sourced wood material increased in from 8% in 2000 to around 59% 
in 2010. This increase was primarily contributed to the wood arrived from the 
processing countries which are considered as the third party. The timber comes from 
processing countries are difficult to track due to the length of the supply chain which 
makes timber traceability very challenging.78  
 
The UK timber import volume from within and outside the EU has been significant. The 
UK timber import volume from within the EU was 15 million m3 Roundwood equivalent 
in 2013 and 7 million m3 from outside the EU for the same year. The import from EU 
was in the form of sawn woods, especially from Sweden, Finland and Latvia, with 
smaller volumes of furniture, panels and plywood. The timber imports from outside the 
EU were mostly in the form of plywood, particularly from China, Russia and Malaysia, 
and by furniture, mainly from China.79  
 
The import of timber and timber products from China has dominated the total timber 
import of the UK. In 2013, the timber import accounted for approximately half the RWE 
volume of total timber products imported into the UK from outside the EU, which was 
about 30% in 2007 and only 5% in 2000. Besides the UK, the other EU countries who 
imported timber from China in the large quantities were Germany (15%), France 
(14%), Netherlands (8%) and Belgium (7%). The UK is the largest importer from high-
risk countries in the region, accounting for 25% by value. WWF report shows that 
China is by far the most significant import partner country, providing 42% of all relevant 
UK furniture imports (€1.6 billion; 450,000 tonnes).80 
 
                                                          
78Sam Lawson and Larry MacFaul, 'Illegal Logging and Related Trade Indicators of the Global Response' (Chatham 
House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2010) 
<http://www.illegallogging.info/sites/default/files/uploads/CHillegalloggingpaperwebready1.pdf>  
79Brack (n 52) 
80Charles Drewe and Tim Barker, ‘Are You Sitting Comfortably? Sustainable Timber Sourcing and the UK Furniture 
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The Chatham House report81 indicated that share of illegal import in the processing 
and consumer countries, including the UK declined from 2000 to 2013. However, 
estimations for the scale of illegal logging are still highly uncertain82 , and illegal trade 
is not registered in the trade databases.83 It is challenging to estimate illegal timber 
trade partly because of the estimation difficulty linked with illegality nature and partly 
because of the differences in the scope of estimation (e.g. products and time covered), 
the definition of illegality, data sources and estimation methods used.84 Thus, the 
observed trend of decreasing tropical timber imports, to the EU in general and the UK 
in particular, can be associated to some extent with the decline of illegally sourced 
wood being placed on the market. One plausible cause of this decrease could be that 
the present regulation has created uncertainty in the timber trade market and due to 
this national and international timber trade companies are merely reluctant to trade. 
However, to what extent initiatives such as FLEGT or EUTR play a part in this decline 
of illegal exports is still unclear.85 
 
The UK has been actively engaged in addressing the trade in illegal timber. It became 
the first country to implement a timber public procurement policy and played an active 
role in the development of the EU’s FLEGT Action Plan.86 The UK has the range of 
stakeholders that can affect by EUTR including a massive number of timber importers, 
timber merchants, traders, timber trade associations, domestic woodland owners, civil 
society organisations, campaigning organisations, government bodies, independent 
researchers. The EUTR can also affect the international timber trade and volume of 
imports entering the UK. Being one of the major importers of the wood-based products 
both from within the EU and outside, UK provides a comprehensive setting to analyse 
the efficiency of EUTR and its components. The UK is and will continue to be a key 
consumer country in terms of timber imports and this research helps in evaluating how 
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EUTR is understood and implemented by different stakeholders and their experience 
and responses to the EUTR.87  
 
Although stakeholders appeared to have reached consensus on the issue of illegal 
logging and related trade, there remain concerns as to whether the EUTR is the 
appropriate instrument to deal with this issue. Some stakeholders view the EUTR as 
beneficial for the businesses; others see it as an impediment and raise questions such 
as law enforcement, lack of guidance and bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is a structural, or 
inevitable problem, as any legislation that seeks to curb the illegal timber trade will 
incur some cost and restrict free trade.88 However, concerns about whether the EUTR 
is the best mechanism to combat illegal logging and its associated trade is at the core 
of the discussion, which leads to different frames among actors.89 EUTR’s penalty 
system has also been criticised90 since each member states decide the level of fines 
that will be applied and that there is no consensus on the compatibility of fines within 
the EU. The uniformity in the penalty systems at a national level is necessary to 
increase the potential of the EUTR, as pointed out by Levashova.91 
 
A study92 pointed out that the EUTR as a mechanism has received criticism from non-
government organisations to private and small-medium enterprises. The same study 
also pointed out that EUTR is all about timber legality and it does not take into 
consideration timber sustainability. There is a reasonable argument that this approach 
represents an impermissible trade restrictions, which are likely to put the EU’s illegal 
logging efforts on risk.93 This research will help in identifying the regulation’s ability to 
reduce the incidence of timber illegality in the UK and to withstand challenges under 
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Regulation – Furniture Sector Focus' (Chatham House 2013) 
<http://www.illegallogging.info/sites/default/files/Oliver_EU_Imports_of_Composite_Wood_Products.pdf> 
88Dylan Geraets and Bregt Natens, 'The WTO Consistency of the European Union Timber Regulation' (Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance Studies 2013)  
89Alexandru Giurca and Ragnar Jonsson, ‘The Opinions of Some Stakeholders on the European Union Timber 
Regulation (EUTR): An Analysis of Secondary Sources’ 8 (2015) IForest: Biogeosciences and Forestry 681 
90ibid 
91Yulia Levashova, 'How Effective Is the New EU Timber Regulation in the Fight Against Illegal Logging?' (2011) 
20 Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 290 
92Giurca (n 89) 
93Akiva Fishman and Krystof Obidzinski, 'European Union Timber Regulation: Is It Legal?' (2014) 23 Review of 
European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 
<http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/articles/AObidzinski1402.pdf>  
29 
 
international trade law. As mentioned earlier, this research aims to assess the 
effectiveness of the EUTR as a piece of legislation and to analyse its potential in 
prohibiting illegal timber entering the UK. This thesis identifies the technical and 
operational difficulties of implementing this regulation in the UK. This research critically 
analyses the approach of UK enforcement agency, the EU recognised monitoring 
organisations under EUTR, the due diligence system, the product scope of the EUTR, 
role of forest certification, penalty system, the implementation by timber industry by 
the empirical survey. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
The methodology adopted to achieve the research objectives are the combination of 
two different research methods, namely the black letter law and empirical research 
method.94 The black letter law is necessary to understand the different mechanisms 
described under EUTR. The primary sources of data for doctrinal research are the 
legal instruments of EUTR itself, in this case, various reports and articles that are 
available when the regulation was drafted and after it came into force. (See Chapter 
4) 
 
The black letter approach allows to critically analyse the implications of EUTR and the 
principles which support the legislation. The provisions of the EUTR have been 
examined to answer the research questions. However, the research questions of this 
thesis require more than a law in books kind of approach and therefore, empirical 
research method has been identified as a suitable method to attain the research 
objectives. An examination of various components of EUTR and the nature of illegal 
timber trade inevitably leads the research to look beyond the black letter law. However, 
that is not to say that the thesis is interdisciplinary, it does not seek to answer the 
research questions from a socio-legal perspective; instead, the dissertation is 
assessing the functionality of EUTR using an empirical research method. Legal 
empirical research can enable us to find out the deficiencies in EUTR enactments and 
the problems of its implementation. 
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For empirical research, the methods such as observation, interview, questionnaire, 
survey and case study are applied for the collection of data in empirical legal studies.95 
Empirical research helps in evaluating the application of the law. It helps in 
understanding the actual effects law produces when translated into reality and keeping 
this in mind this research has also opted for empirical research to understand how 
EUTR has been applied and impacted the associated stakeholders and the timber 
trade overall.96 It is utmost important to know how a law or legal decision-making or 
enforcement works outside the statute or textbook.97 Therefore, a purely doctrinal 
analysis may prove insufficient in confronting some of the contemporary issues with 
illegal timber trade such as the approach of enforcement authority and implementation 
challenges.  
 
This research characteristically falls under the branch of environmental law as the 
EUTR deals with one of the major drivers of deforestation and is expected to have a 
significant impact on the global forest. Even though environmental lawyers are 
probably the lawyers most interested in research on the effectiveness of law and 
policy, empirical legal work in this domain remains relatively limited.98 For example, 
Professor Michael Faure99 had raised the issue of limited usage of empirical research 
in environmental law. He opined regarding the empirical evidence for studying the 
impact of environmental laws, an important dimension of environmental governance, 
and explained that to a large extent, this evidence is not provided by lawyers. 
Furthermore, he questioned that when making environmental law and choosing 
environmental instruments, how well do the environmental lawyers know the effects 
of the chosen instruments are? In other words, what do we know empirically? This 
study contributes to the limited literature of empirical legal research on environmental 
law and attempts to assess the practical side of the EUTR emphasising on 
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implementation and enforcement which has received little attention in the field of 
environmental law even though patterns of environmental monitoring and enforcement 
are of crucial importance to assess changes in actual environmental quality. 
 
The empirical approach can help identify gaps between theory and practise and 
similarly, it can help in finding a new area within the timber regulation where issues 
are not yet understood or adequately identified.100 The empirical data has been 
collected by survey questionnaires and semi-structured interviews to understand the 
enforcement of a law, difficulties of timber industry or issues of implementation and to 
comply with the regulation. The data collected from the concern stakeholders within 
the UK is analysed qualitatively by using a computer software programme NVIVO 11 
by the coding method to identify the patterns in responses. Chapter 4 explains the 
empirical research methodology, survey participants and qualitative analysis in detail. 
 
1.5.1 Stakeholders analysis to assess the potential of EUTR 
 
The involvement of stakeholders is very vital in planning or decision-making 
process.101 For instance, a stakeholder study recommended for a process of 
governance that enable control and coordination across a multiple stakeholder arena 
of decision-making for the disposal of the toxic waste.102 The stakeholders can be 
anyone from an individual to the government organisations, for example locally 
affected communities, national or local government authorities, politicians, civil society 
organisations and businesses. The participants for empirical research include the UK 
timber industry, regulatory organisations, EUTR enforcement agency and research 
organisations, including non-government organisations. Their participation in the 
research can enhance the credibility of information, which involves the scientific 
adequacy of the technical evidence and arguments.103 One of the research objectives 
                                                          
100Sofie Molin and Annie Sjöberg, ‘Addressing the Gap Between Theory and Practice: A Marketing-as-Practice 
Approach’ (2017) Lund University, School of Economics and Management 
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8650/bb46f303d6160302ed1e1f0e423cfdd1181f.pdf> 
101Neema Mori, ‘Roles of Stakeholders in Strategic Decision-Making of Microfinance Organisations’, (2010) 9(7) 
International Business & Economics Research Journal 
102Suzanne Benn, Dexter Dunphy and Andrew Martin, ‘Governance of Environmental Risk: New Approaches to 
Managing Stakeholder Involvement’ (2009) 90 Journal of Environmental Management 1567 
103Jennifer Hauck and others, ‘Stakeholder Involvement in Ecosystem Service Decision-Making and Research’ 
(eds) Ecosystem Services Reference Book (2016) Openness 
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of the study is to understand how different stakeholders contribute to the development 
and implementation of EU timber regulation, legislation which has a global impact on 
the forests and timber trade. 
 
In the global environmental governance, it is difficult to define stakeholders and it is 
not a straightforward legal concept104, so for this research, the scope of the 
stakeholders has been considered and essentially divided two classes. First, are those 
stakeholders who are involved in the course of action such as for this research, the 
enforcement agency and timber industry. Second are those stakeholders who are 
affected by a course of action such as UK government bodies, monitoring 
organisations and UK timber trade federations. Each category of stakeholder is equally 
important to evaluate the EUTR as each category has vastly different concerns and 
objectives. While focussing on stakeholders’ views will not resolve some of the 
intricate legal issues for example, building legal compliance along the supply chains, 
forest governance of timber-producing countries, impact of import policies of timber 
processing countries such as China on global supply chain – a stakeholder analysis 
helps in assessing the practical issues that illegal timber trade may present in 
achieving the objectives of EUTR.  
 
The stakeholder perspective is considered sufficiently broad enough to provide a lens 
for investigating issues that are dominant in the mainstream literature.105 Hence, in this 
research, stakeholder analysis presents an opportunity to examine problem areas 
within EUTR from differing stakeholder viewpoints. It helps to understand what 
regulatory enhancements would enable better outcomes when assessing EUTR 
instruments. Thus, the stakeholder analysis helps in determining the strongest and 
feeblest mechanisms within EUTR and depict necessary adjustments required to 
regulatory processes that may result in improved outcomes.106 
 
                                                          
104Marc Pallemaerts and Marlène Moreau, ‘The role of stakeholders in international environmental governance’ 
(Institute for sustainable development and international relations 2004) 
105Caitlin Andersen, 'Who Cares? A Stakeholder Analysis of Nitrous Oxide Emissions from Agricultural Soils' 
(2016) 21 Drake Journal of Agricultural Law 
106Nigel Martin and others, 'Using Offsets to Mitigate Environmental Impacts of Major Projects: A Stakeholder 
Analysis' (2016) 179 Journal of Environmental Management 
33 
 
Findings from this study can help regulatory authorities to understand the weaknesses 
of the EUTR and possible suggestions to rectify the system loopholes to make the 
timber regulation effective and better implemented. This piece of research contributes 
to the literature on using empirical data to evaluate the effects of policies and 
procedures. One of the research objectives of the study is to understand how different 
stakeholders contribute to the development and implementation of EU timber 
regulation, legislation which has a global impact on the forests and timber trade. The 
overall aim of this research is to determine if EUTR has the mechanism to fight against 
the complex issue of the illegal timber trade.  
 
1.6 The current scenario on Brexit and Implications of Brexit on timber trade 
 
The public in the UK voted to leave the European Union in a referendum on 23 June 
2016. On 29 March 2017, the Prime Minister officially triggered Article 50 in writing to 
European Council President Donald Tusk and launched the two-year countdown to 
the UK formally leaving the EU, generally referred to as 'Brexit'. The UK had to leave 
the European Union on March 29, 2019. Nevertheless, after a vote on 14 March 2019 
by the House of Commons, the government sought permission from the EU to prolong 
Article 50 and commit to a later Brexit date.107 
 
The Prime Minister wrote to President Donald Tusk of the European Council on 20 
March 2019, asking that Article 50 be extended until 30 June 2019. After a European 
Council meeting the next day, EU27 leaders agreed to give an extension comprising 
two possible dates: 22 May 2019, should the Withdrawal Agreement gain approval 
from MPs; or 12 April 2019, should the Withdrawal Agreement not be approved by the 
House of Commons. At a meeting of the European Council on 10 April 2019, the UK 
and EU27 agreed to extend Article 50 until 31 October 2019. 
 
On 19 October 2019, the Prime Minister’s new Brexit deal has been lost on the 
amendment in the Commons.  Under the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act108 
                                                          
107Nigel Walker, ‘Brexit timeline: events leading to the UK’s exit from the European Union’ Briefing Paper 
Number 7960 (House of Commons Library 2019) 
108European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019  
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2019 – commonly known as the ‘Benn Act’ – the Prime Minister wrote to the President 
Donald Tusk of European Council requesting an extension to the Brexit process. On 
28 October 2019, EU Ambassadors agreed on further Brexit expansion up to 31 
January 2020 and the Prime Minister confirmed the UK’s agreement to this. 
 
The UK’s decision to leave the EU has created a cloud of uncertainty over the global 
economy.109 This uncertainty will have an impact on imports of wood products from 
tropical countries and related stakeholders as the UK is the largest importer of tropical 
timber in the EU with around 25% of the total value imported into the EU from tropical 
countries.110 Environmental law and policy in the UK are well founded, for the most 
part, on EU legislation and UK environmental law involves the implementation of EU 
directives.111 It will be a considerable task for Defra and other ministries, along with 
their counterparts in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, given the volume of 
legislation. The research by the House of Commons library has identified over 1100 
pieces of EU environmental legislation that are DEFRA owned.112  
 
Trade deals are one of the most effective ways of enforcing common environmental 
standards. The UK Government has formed a new Department for International Trade 
(DIT) to seek new trade opportunities for Britain and planning to establish a separate 
working group on forestry to discuss the implications of Brexit for the sector.113 The 
UK Government’s trade and customs white paper114 published in October 2017 has 
                                                          
109Therese Raphael, ‘Brexit Knocks the Wind Out of the U.K. Economy’ Bloomberg Opinion 
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Sampson, ‘Brexit: The Economics of International Disintegration’ (2017) 31(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 
163 <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/sampsont/BrexitDisintegration.pdf>; Gemma Tetlow and Alex Stojanovic, 
‘Understanding the Economic Impact of Brexit’ (Institute for Government 2018) 
<https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/2018%20IfG%20%20Brexit%20i
mpact%20%5Bfinal%20for%20web%5D.pdf> 
110EU-FLEGT Facility, ‘ITTO analysis of Brexit implications for timber trade and FLEGT’ (EUFLEGT 2016) 
http://www.flegt.org/news/content/viewItem/itto-analysis-of-brexit-implications-for-timber-trade-and 
flegt/13-07-2016/15 
111Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange and Eloise Scotford, Environmental Law: Text Cases and Materials (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2019)  
112Caroline Lucas, MP, Brighton Pavilion & Green Party Co-leader, ‘Exiting the EU, Not the Environment’ (2017) 
<https://www.carolinelucas.com/sites/carolinelucas.com/files/Safe%20Guarding%20Environment%20after%2
0Brexit.pdf>  
113Confor Welcomes New Forestry Working Group on Brexit (Confor 2017) 
<http://www.confor.org.uk/news/latest-news/confor-welcomes-new-forestry-working-group-on-brexit/>  
114Department for International Trade, ‘Preparing for our future UK trade policy’ (Crown Copyright 2017) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/651192/CCS207_CCS09170
00298-1_Preparing_for_our_future_UK_trade_policy_Report_H....pdf > 
35 
 
indicated that the UK is preparing to attract new trade partners and has already started 
trade deal talks with USA, Australia and many others. As the European Commission’s 
own ‘Trade for All Strategy’115 suggests, 90% of global economic growth in the next 
two decades will come from outside the EU, so a more significant proportion of UK 
trade will likely be with non-EU countries.  
 
The white paper also mentioned that the UK will develop a trading framework that 
supports the foreign and domestic policy, sustainability, security, environmental and 
development goals in line with World Trade Organisation (WTO) commitments. The 
UK will also set up a trade remedies framework to protect domestic industry against 
unfair trading practices or unforeseen surges in imports by allowing for measures to 
be placed on imports of specific products. The new UK framework will be implemented, 
consistent with WTO obligations, that protects domestic producers, to investigate 
cases and propose measures. The UK is willing to put in place a trade preferences 
scheme which will provide the same level of access as the current EU trade 
preference scheme to ensure that the world’s poorest countries and other developing 
countries across the globe can continue to export to the UK accordingly.  
 
It seems like the UK is trying to ensure the highest amount of certainty, continuity and 
stability in trade and investment relationships with domestic, EU and other new trade 
partners but it creates a massive sense of insecurity amongst the businesses when 
the UK’s imports from and exports to the EU is totalled £553bn, with over 200,000 UK 
businesses trading in goods with the EU in 2016 alone.116 To boost export capacity, 
investment and trade policy overseas, the UK will create a new network of Trade 
Commissioners to head nine regions overseas. Such regional commissioners will add 
renewed focus and efficiency to trade and investment efforts. It remains to be seen 
that how the criteria to ensure high standards for environment and sustainability 
perform but the UK has indicated that the new trade partners and sources will be 
developed in case of hard Brexit is negotiated. To meet the demand and to find 
alternatives for the UK’s domestic businesses, the country like China can import and 
                                                          
115European Commission, 'Trade for All: Towards A More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy' (European 
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process more illegal timber from high-risk countries. Being aware of China’s role in the 
illegal timber trade, the UK must negotiate the bilateral trade agreements with 
countries like the USA, Australia and Canada.    
 
There will be new customs agreements with the EU and other trade partners after the 
UK leaves the customs union. It means that after the completion of the Brexit process, 
the UK can introduce some form of the regulatory framework for trade with EU trade 
partner countries and countries outside the EU which will also apply to the trade from 
EU to the UK. These trade procedures can be in the form of customs declarations, 
trade licenses, and border inspections on goods which can affect the trade. These 
changes may impact on the ability to access or benefit from markets.  
 
There are apparent differences in opinions of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland with regards to the Environmental Law and especially the European Single 
Market. Both Scotland117 and Wales118 want to retain the single market and looking to 
develop specific policies that build upon EU environmental policies and legislation 
concerning the environment, health, farming and fisheries. On the other hand, 
Northern Ireland wants to focus on the opportunities that Brexit presents and will 
actively participate in the UK's domestic agricultural, environmental and fisheries 
policy and trade agendas that will come with Brexit.119 
 
The security and meeting the demands for UK businesses appear to be the 
Government’s priority during the trade negotiations and the Government is keeping all 
the options open with trade partners from developed, developing and underdeveloped 
countries. While keeping the interest of businesses, the Government also needs to 
make sure that it applies all the checks before agreeing to any agreement.  The 
loopholes in a trade agreement can benefit the companies involved in modern 
practices of illegal timber trade such as by fabricating documents as the illegal timber 
trade in itself very complex to detect.  
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It is difficult to predict the full effect of the Brexit on timber trade scenario, but now that 
it is confirmed that the UK is leaving the European single market, the UK can develop 
comprehensive trade framework that prioritises the strongest possible environmental 
criteria in any trade deal. The Brexit could be an opportunity for the UK to draw global 
businesses towards timber legality and clean the system to eliminate illegal timber 
flow. The other possible effects of Brexit with robust timber legality criteria can be that 
the UK hardwood import can be shifted from tropical species to temperate species. 
The temperate region includes large areas of North America which have excellent 
forestry standards compared to tropical region. This type of shift can reduce the import 
from China as China imports timber from tropical countries with high-level of illegal 
logging, process them and export it to the Europe. The UK government delegation 
negotiating trade deals with weaker forest governance countries must be experienced, 
prepared and aware to include the robust criteria of timber legality and forest 
protection.  
 
The UK leaving the European Union might have a negative influence on the 
environment and forests.120 Even if it is difficult to predict all the problems that would 
appear from this situation, the actions to protect and restore the forests will slow down 
across the EU. The thesis deals with the European legislation, i.e. EUTR, so it provides 
a significant opportunity to discuss the scenario concerning the future of EUTR in the 
UK under Brexit. This research, in the last chapter, tries to explore the implications of 
EU withdrawal especially with timber trade import and discusses the alternatives to 
the EU regulatory controls to fill the regulatory gaps. For this research, the empirical 
data from stakeholders collected before the results of EU referendum declared, so the 
question on effects of Brexit on EUTR has not been included in the stakeholders’ 
survey, but Brexit can have some severe implications on the arguments presented in 
the research. The stakeholders’ views presented in this research on due diligence 
system, product scope of EUTR, enforcement agency, recommendations of 
improvement are some aspects which can immensely be affected if the UK introduces 
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new legislation for the illegal timber trade. The effects of Brexit on UK import of timber 
and timber products has been discussed in chapter 7. 
 
1.7 Outline of the research 
 
This chapter illustrates the global drivers of deforestation, measures are taken to stop 
deforestation and briefly explains the illegal logging of timber and related issues. It 
further describes the stands of European Union on tackling the issue of the illegal 
timber trade and besides justifies selecting the UK to study the effectiveness of the EU 
timber regulation. It also explains the theoretical background of the dissertation and 
this chapter also touches upon the methodology selected to achieve the research 
objectives. A more detailed presentation of the literature on international 
developments within forest law and policies and illegal logging follows in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 also emphasises the impact of illegal logging, including global approaches 
and legal responses. It examines the historical developments within the international 
forest policy and attempts to learn the challenges for legally binding international 
agreement on forests.  
 
Chapter 3 elaborates the broad theoretical context of the thesis and analyses the 
emergence of transnational timber legality initiative and how it has been introduced 
into the legislation. The chapter also discusses the various theories on transnational 
timber legality verification. Chapter 4 discusses the European Union Timber 
Regulation and its policy instruments by applying the black letter approach. In this 
chapter, various instruments of EUTR and their functions have been discussed. The 
black letter approach method provides an understanding that it is difficult to assess 
the effectiveness of EUTR in controlling illegal timber trade due to its complex nature 
(e.g. implementation challenges of EUTR faced by timber industry) with doctrinal 
research. Thus, it requires to study the legislation with actors involved in it to 
understand the application of EUTR and how successful it is in achieving the 
objectives.  
 
Chapter 5 elaborates on the empirical methodology employed in the study and 
illustrates the significance of choosing the methodology for this thesis. It explains the 
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various stakeholders involved in the thesis and different components of EUTR taken 
into consideration to meet the objective of the dissertation.  Chapter 6 is built upon 
results and discussion based on the empirical data collected from stakeholders 
through questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. The data have been analysed 
qualitatively using the NVIVO 11 software to conclude. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis 
with recommendations to improve the EUTR as a piece of legislation to control the 
illegal timber trade. The chapter also identifies the areas of research for future 
developments and also discusses the effects of Brexit on UK timber import. 
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Chapter 2: Illegal logging, its impacts and various international and 
national efforts to combat illegal timber trade 
 
The challenge of sustainable development and the management of natural resources 
are having a significant influence on the direction that international forest law is 
developing.121 During the last two decades, significant forest issues emerged that were 
the subject of intense debate among specialists, government officials and 
environmental activists.122 The issues of forest fires, natural forest conversion, illegal 
logging and trading of timber, land tenure conflict, and national park management are 
still being debated at the international forums.123  
 
Illegal logging is an environmental issue which is debated internationally and it causes 
enormous damage to forests, forest communities and the economies of timber 
producer countries.124 About half of the tropical-timber imports into the EU are illegally 
sourced.125 Despite growing concern, there remains an apparent lack of immediate 
and well-coordinated action at the national and international level to address the 
problem of illegal logging. In both the United States and the European Union,126 two 
of the biggest timber importers, a legislation tailored to tackle illegal logging is in place, 
but these measures are yet to prove their worth.127 This chapter focuses on the 
impacts of illegal logging, efforts to combat illegal timber trade and helps in 
understanding the complex nature of illegal timber trade with different cases. It helps 
in assessing the complexity attached to illegal timber trade and why the illegal logging 
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is still a massive issue even after continues efforts from international and national 
communities. 
 
2.1 Defining illegal logging 
 
The existing definitions of illegal logging range from a narrow understanding (that 
refers to taking timber from outside authorised forest concessions or exceeding 
assigned timber quotas) to broad definitions comprising the entire supply chains, 
including the processing and trading of timber and timber products.128 However, it is 
widely accepted that illegal logging takes place when timber is harvested, transported, 
bought or sold in violation of national laws. The concept of illegal logging also involves 
the avoidance of taxes and duties and the over or understatement of sales and profits 
by misusing transfer pricing.129  
 
Hoare130 uses the term illegal logging to refer to timber harvesting activities that are 
“inconsistent with national or sub-national laws.” The Confederation of European 
Paper Industries (CEPI)131 considers illegal logging to be when timber is harvested in 
violation of national laws.132 According to Brack, Gray and Hayman,133 the timber 
harvesting process itself can be illegal, which includes the corrupt means of the ability 
to access the forests, extracting without the permission or from a protected area, 
cutting of protected species or extracting of timber in addition to the agreed limits.  
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Some scholars and experts depict illegal logging ambiguous phenomenon with 
different expressions across the variety of affected countries arguing that it often 
results from unclear legal situations (e.g. regarding informal or traditional tenure rights) 
and the illegalization of subsistence logging.134 Some experts specifically highlight 
international competition in the wood products markets as a significant dimension of 
illegal logging and associated trade.135 World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) defines 
“illegal logging and related trade, and corruption as occurring when timber is harvested 
or traded in violation of relevant national or sub-national laws or where access to forest 
resources or trade in forest products is authorised through corrupt practices.”136 
 
The above definitions have three common elements that include illegal harvesting, 
illegal trading and corruption. Illegal harvesting includes timber removed without 
required licence or in breach of harvesting licence or law. Illegal timber trading involves 
timber or timber products bought, sold, exported, imported and processed in breach 
of the laws, including the laws implemented under the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES).137 The corruption in 
terms of illegal timber trade arises when authorisation to harvest or trade logs or timber 
products is secured through the corrupt application of laws or administrative 
procedures. 
 
2.2 Impact of illegal logging 
 
In the last few years, illegal logging has become a severe concern of the forestry sector 
worldwide, especially in the tropical developing countries due to the weak forest 
                                                          
134Paolo Cerutti and others, ‘Cameroon’s Hidden Harvest: Commercial Chainsaw Logging, Corruption, and 
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governance, law enforcement and high corruption rates.138 Illegal logging has been 
linked with highly sensitive economic and development issues such as the distortion 
of the market and free trade, loss of government revenue and tax evasion and income 
disparities.139 Furthermore, illegal logging is deemed undermining the principles of 
statehood, such as national sovereignty over natural resources or good forest 
governance.140  
 
Illegally logged timber and its associated international trade are a significant problem 
for social, economic and environmental reasons.141 In social terms, illegal logging can 
be associated with contributing to poverty, national and regional armed conflicts by 
threatening the livelihood of local forest-dependent communities.142 Economically, 
illegal logging and the related trade hinder economic development. The market value 
of products derived from illegal logging exceeds US$ 15 billion annually.143 Illegal 
logging leads to adverse environmental impacts including forest degradation, loss of 
species and emission of greenhouse gases. It is also contributing to desertification 
and soil erosion and can amplify extreme weather conditions and flooding. 144 
 
(A) Social impacts 
 
The destruction of forests and the lack of tenure rights to forest communities will put 
enormous pressure on indigenous populations forcing them to migrate to more 
densely populated areas.145 Highly uncertain land tenure relations intensify conflicts 
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between wood industry and local communities. The indigenous people of Siberia and 
the Far East are no longer guaranteed the free use of lands and forests where the 
illegal harvest is a significant threat.146 
 
Illegal logging creates well-paid jobs compared with conventional labour and 
opportunities 147, although in some cases very little of the profit from illegal logging 
remains in the local community. In Siberia and the Russian Far East, the use of illegal 
paid labour, the breaching of forest legislation, and illegal accounting practices are the 
main problems of unreported wood in Russia.148 According to the U.S. Department of 
Labour,149 timber is produced with forced labour in Peru and Brazil, particularly 
valuable hardwoods such as mahogany, and in Myanmar (Burma) bamboo and the 
hardwood teak. According to INTERPOL, between 50 and 90 % of logging in critical 
tropical countries of the Amazon basin, Central Africa, and Southeast Asia is being 
carried out by organised crime.150  
 
(B) Economic losses 
 
The scale of illegal logging represents a significant loss of revenue to many countries. 
A Senate Committee in the Philippines calculated that the country lost as much as 
US$1.8 billion per year from illegal logging during the 1980s.151 The World Bank152 
estimated that illegal logging causes losses to the governments of approximately 
US$15 billion every year. In a report of UNEP/INTERPOL,153 this value has been 
doubled, that is, the economic value of global illegal logging, including processing, is 
now estimated to be worth between US$30 and 100 billion of the global wood trade.  
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Illegal logging increases timber supply into the markets, lowering the price of timber, 
thus increasing the competitiveness of national industries.154 The Indonesian 
Government estimated losses of approximately $3.2 billion a year as a consequence 
of illegal logging activities, while the NGO Telepak Indonesia claims losses of about 
$5.3 billion per year due to the overall deforestation from logging, slash-and-burn 
farming techniques, and other factors responsible for the environmental 
degradation.155 According to data from the Russian Natural Resources Ministry, the 
yearly losses resulting from illegal logging are around US$183.3 million. Besides, the 
Forest Integrity Network described that the study funded by the World Bank calculated 
that direct yearly economic losses from illegal logging and forest corruption at US$12-
18 million for Honduras and US$8-12 million for Nicaragua.156 
 
(C) Environmental impacts 
 
Environmental impacts such as forest degradation, biodiversity and habitat loss are 
commonly associated with illegal logging, which consequently affects the sustainable 
forest management.157 In some region, illegal logging is responsible for extinct some 
of the world’s exotic species such as primates158 including orang-utans in Indonesia159 
and the Siberian tiger. The impact of massive deforestation caused by logging 
encompasses everything from landslides and property destruction to destroying 
biodiversity in deforested areas and increasing global carbon emissions.160 The 
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extensive floods in the Philippines in December 2004, which left over 1000 people 
dead or missing, were blamed by the country’s government on illegal logging, which 
had stripped the hillsides of the forests that could have absorbed the flooding water.161  
 
The high levels of deforestation due to illegal logging have been prevalent in the region 
of Central America—Honduras and Nicaragua162, South America—Brazil163, 
Southeast Asia164, Africa–Congo Basin165, Central and Eastern Europe and former 
communist countries such as Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia.166 The large 
scale illegal logging can lead to the conversion of forests to grassland and the 
depletion of plant and animal species. If illegal logging occurs in protected areas, rare 
plants and animals may become threatened.167 Deforestation and forest loss also have 
consequences for climate change, as forests play a pivotal role in both climate change 
mitigation and adaptation.168 In 2013, illegal logging is estimated to have released 190 
million tonnes of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere in nine forest producing 
countries.169 
 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna (CITES) has a vast list of species that are believed to be vulnerable to 
overexploitation. Among the tree species under the CITES, concerns are the big leaf 
mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) in America, afrormosia (Pericopsis elata) in Africa, 
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and ramin (Gonystylus spp.) in Southeast Asia. In Honduras, illegal logging is highly 
selective and the valuable species of mahogany and tropical cedar are at risk. 
According to Del Gatto170, the annual extraction of mahogany ranges between 30,000 
and 50,000 m3 and it is believed that this species is near extinction outside of protected 
areas. 
 
Tanjung Puting National Park (located in the province of Central Kalimantan—
Indonesia) is recognised as the World Biosphere Reserve by the United Nations and 
constitutes the largest protected area of swamp forest in Southeast Asia.171 This 
region is unique due to the existence of commercial tree species which include meranti 
(Shorea spp.) and ramin (Gonystylus spp) and the orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus).172 
Environment Investigation Agency (EIA)/Telepak investigators discovered several 
illegalities in Tanjung Park, which was confirmed by the authorities who seized ramin 
loads and detected ramin factories without a license to operate in Central 
Kalimantan.173 Its use in luxury products and increasing scarcity make ramin a 
valuable timber on the international market with prices varying from $600 per m3 for 
sawn ramin to $1,200 per m3 for moulded ramin.174 
 
(D) Governance impacts 
 
Illegal logging and timber smuggling are well recognised as a transnational 
environmental crime as it is generally committed in more than one state.175 The 
Indonesian Ministry of Forestry criticised Malaysia and China, for accepting stolen 
timber, thus taking unfair advantages to wood industries in these countries.176 The 
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links between armed groups and logging companies became evident during the Khmer 
Rouge regime—forest cover in Cambodia decreased from 75 % in the early 1970s to 
less than 35 % in the mid-1990s due to the illegal, but officially sanctioned logging, by 
the Royal Cambodian Army Forces and Khmer Rouge. 177 
 
An Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) in Honduras178 revealed a web of 
corruption and illegalities involving politicians, the State Forestry Administration, 
timber companies, sawmills, loggers, transporters, mayors, and police. Similar 
conclusions were derived from the work of Pye-Smith179 when analysing forestry 
crimes and court convictions and forest-related abuses in Indonesia, Ghana and 
Cameroon. The considerable complexity of obscure interests between the State, 
government officials and multiple stakeholders is the main obstacle to stop illegal 
activities. In 2008, hackers working for illegal logging cartels in the state of Para´ 
(Brazil) had access to transport and logging permits, allowing the theft of an estimated 
volume of 1.7 m3.180 Also, in Brazil in 2009, a federal prosecutor investigated a scam 
allegedly involving some 3,000 companies that eco-certified and exported illegal 
timber.181  
 
Illegal logging is not a straightforward case of criminality but rather a complex 
economic and political system that includes several stakeholders.182 The multitude of 
consequences ascribed to illegal logging activities is strongly related to many 
underlying causes that vary between places and show high complexity covering 
structural, economic and political reasons. There are several reasons for illegal tree 
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felling, ranging from economic necessities to the shortages of forestry personnel. 
Illegal logging is spread throughout the tropics, where sustainable forest management 
and forest certified area is less compared to the temperate region and in European 
countries. For example, the certified forest as a percentage of total forest area is 1.4% 
and 1.1%, in Asia and Africa, respectively, while Western European countries have 
50.8% and North America 32.7%.183  
 
Despite many fora discussing illegal logging and other topics of interest to the 
international forest policy community over the past 25 years, little agreement has been 
reached over actions to deal with illegal logging.184 Some progress is evident in the 
form of bilateral initiatives185 which have emerged, primarily because of the EU Action 
Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (EU-FLEGT). Government 
procurement policies have emerged in consumer countries as a potential means of 
curbing the demand for illegally sourced wood. The scope of compliance, however, is 
uncertain. Certification has long been intended as a tool among the potential market-
based mechanisms that would reward companies in the tropics managing their forests 
sustainably but uptake of this procedure has been disappointingly slow. The evidence 
indicates that illegal logging is still occurring even in certified forests which highlights 
significant problems with the auditing process.186 
 
The next section reflects on various measures taken to counter illegal timber trade. 
Although illegal logging was considered one of the significant causes of deforestation 
since the 1990s, real efforts to counter illegal logging started in the early 21st century. 
The following section identifies several initiatives taken at the global level and 
legislative measures from timber consumer developed countries such as the USA, 
Australia and the European Union.  
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2.3 Global efforts on combating illegal logging 
 
In past few decades, illegally sourced timber has contributed to the growing roster of 
problems affecting both timber producing and consuming countries.187 There have 
been a wide range of initiatives designed to highlight and combat illegal logging in 
recent years. These efforts are varied and encompass different activities conducted at 
local, national, regional and international levels. 
 
2.3.1 International Efforts  
 
First general and official declaration on the matter was laid out during G8 summit in 
Birmingham in 1998 and then at the 2000 G8 summit in Okinawa.188 In 1998-2002, the 
G8 adopted an action plan (G8 Action Program on Forests) that recognised the need 
for further information on the scope of the issue before recommending the measures 
to counter.189 The action plan included formal commitments from the world’s most 
extensive global financial powers to encourage the rule of law in the forest sector.190 
For example, illegally-sourced timber was estimated to cost, on average, 16% less 
than legal wood, and therefore it was distorting international timber markets and 
undermining the overall competitiveness of legally-operating forest industries.191 
 
The Asian ministerial-level conference referred to as Forest Law Enforcement 
Governance was also organised by the World Bank in Bali, in September 2001.192 This 
new kind of cooperation has led to similar regional FLEG conferences being organised 
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in Africa and Europe during 2003 and 2005 respectively and contribute to raising 
awareness of the issue at the international level.193 These multi-stakeholder meetings 
which included government agencies, NGOs, civil society groups and timber 
companies discussed and prepared a comprehensive set of plans and commitments 
in order to eliminate illegal timber from global supply chains.194 
 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has addressed illegal logging as part of its 
forestry program. The annual editions of The State of the World's Forests reports from 
FAO have highlighted illegal logging as a concern. In January 2002, FAO convened 
an experts panel on the topic that placed illegal logging onto the agenda of the Latin 
American and Caribbean Forestry Commission meeting in October 2002.195 From 14-
15 May 2019, FAO organised a technical working group meeting of experts from 
international organisations, research institutions, academia, civil society and private 
sector who gathered to exchange and provide feedback on a preliminary set on 
guiding legal elements. The guiding statutory elements will be the backbone of Timber-
Lex, an online FAO database that catalogues forest-related legislation for timber 
trading countries and ensures neutral access to information for all stakeholders.196 
CITES provides a mechanism to regulate international trade in timber species and 
products. CITES is a treaty aimed at restricting the international trade in certain 
critically endangered species and regulating and monitor trade in other species that 
deemed vulnerable to overexploitation. The CITES appendices list species that could 
be at risk and whose import, export and re-export is controlled through a permit system 
(Appendix II) and species that are already threatened with extinction and cannot be 
commercially traded (Appendix I).197 It is thought to be the only international 
mechanism that might regulate international trade in wild species, including timber, 
between all 183 of its Parties.  
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The multilateral efforts of the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO)198 also 
have a strong potential to help reduce illegal logging. The ITTO supports projects to 
address illegal logging in tropical-timber-producing countries, primarily through the 
promotion of sustainable forest management. For instance, an ITTO project in Fiji 
helped control illegal logging using barcodes and chain-of-custody199 information. A 
statistical development project in Peru has resulted in improved controls on illegal 
operations through the establishment of strategic checkpoints and the creation of 
detailed databases of concession allotments with which log output can be compared 
in real time. The ITTO has also undertaken case studies on illegal logging in Honduras, 
Malaysia and Peru.200 
 
Some governments have also adopted different initiatives to restrict the import of wood 
from other countries. Indonesian government resorted to bilateral or regional 
agreements with their trading partners in order to obtain urgent support and focus on 
issues concerning illegal logging that occurs within their countries. For example, the 
Malaysian government banned the import of logs from Indonesia from ensuring that 
Malaysian wood products considered as produced from legal sources.201  
 
The initiatives taken by the government include memoranda of understanding (MoU) 
between countries such as MoU between the United Kingdom and the Republic of 
Indonesia, signed in the April 2002.202 As per the MoU, the Indonesian and UK 
governments to work together to reduce, and eventually eliminate, illegal logging and 
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the related trade by rapid development and implementation of the necessary 
regulatory and policy reforms. The action plan is designed to cover six commitments 
ranging from legislative changes to a framework for checking compliance with 
independent verification of the traceability chain, to data exchange and cooperation 
between government agencies.203 
 
The Asia Forest Partnership, headed by Japanese and the Indonesian governments, 
describes the areas in which different countries must work together to fight illegal 
logging and the associated trade in timber. The U.S. led the Congo Basin forest 
partnership in particular against illegal logging and enhance local governance.204 In 
May 2003, the European Commission released its draft EU action plan tackling the 
problem of illegal timber trade beneath which some areas or countries were selected, 
i.e. Central Africa, Russia, Tropical South and Southeast Asia.205 
 
Governments have actively considered responsible procurement policies that not only 
advocate certified wood products but require that products are derived from legal 
sources.206 The United Kingdom government appears to have taken the initiative, by 
implementing the United Kingdom Forest Partnership for Action, that forbids the 
illegally logged timber to the UK markets.207 This agreement allows partnership 
members to buy the wood and wood products from legitimate sources and forests that 
are sustainably managed. 
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China is the world’s largest importer and exporter of wood and has agreed to the 
principle of combating illegal logging. China has signed bilateral cooperation 
agreements and memoranda of understanding on the subject with many countries, 
including the US, the EU, and Australia.208 Order to improve its image and comply with 
international requirements, China has created its national forest certification scheme 
known as China Forest Certification Scheme (CFCS), which is now recognised by the 
PEFC and is also developing its legality verification system.209 The EU has also been 
trying to reduce the trade in illegally logged wood through cooperation with private 
industry federations. Introduced in 2005, the Timber Trade Action Plan (TTAP), 
teaches companies to check the legality of their tropical timber supplies and allows 
them to develop timber tracking systems.210 
 
Several other countries have negotiated bilateral agreements to address the problem 
of illegal logging and the associated trade in illegal timber. Australia, for example 
negotiated agreements in 2008–09 and memorandums of understanding with 
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and China, all of which included commitments to work 
together to identify mechanisms to verify the legal origin of wood products.211 In The 
Same way, both the US and the EU have reached agreements (in 2007 and 2009, 
respectively) with China to tackle illegal logging though, neither contains concrete 
commitments to regulate trade. The US agreed on a similar framework with Indonesia 
in 2006.212 
 
The US has gone significantly further in its Trade Promotion Agreement with Peru in 
2007 which includes an annexe on governance of the forest sector in the chapter on 
the environment.213 This cover several mandatory requirements to address illegal 
logging, including commitments by Peru to improve forest law enforcement, develop 
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systems to track tree species protected under CITES through the supply chain, 
improve protection specifically of big-leaf mahogany, improve the management of 
forest concessions, and conduct periodic audits of producers and exporters of timber 
products exported to the US.214 On the request of the USA, Peru also undertook to 
identify a focal point, with adequate and sufficient staff to investigate violations of law 
and forest sector governance regulation. Peru also verified whether a particular 
shipment was legally produced. The US can detain questionable shipments pending 
verification that the timber was legally harvested.215  
 
The initiatives outside the government sphere have sought to improve the traceability 
and sustainability of the world’s timber resources. Notable among these has been the 
emergence of independent third-party forest certification schemes, such as the Forest 
Stewardship Council and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification 
schemes which are discussed in chapter 3. 
 
An essential part of the debate has been the role of consumer countries in driving the 
demand for timber and timber products, and hence increasing the incentives for illegal 
logging. It has always been recognised that consumer countries contribute to the 
problems of illegal logging by importing timber and wood products without ensuring 
that they are legally sourced.216 Until recently, there had been no legal mechanisms 
for importing countries to exclude illicit timber even if they could detect it. With a few 
exceptions (including the small number of tree species listed under CITES), it was not 
unlawful to import timber products produced illegally in a foreign country.217 However, 
because legally and illegally harvested timber is mostly indistinguishable in 
international market due to the high number of independent operators and production 
stages in most timber supply chains, few consumer countries attempted to prohibit the 
import of timber through legislative measures that were illegally harvested.218 
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2.3.2 Legislative measures adopted by the USA, Australia and the EU 
 
(A) Lacey Act of USA 
 
The Lacey Act was first introduced by Iowa Congressman John Lacey to the House of 
Representatives in the spring of 1900. The Lacey Act was primarily designed to protect 
and restore game birds and other wild birds. The legislation also included provisions 
for a ban on the international movement of live wildlife species.219 Lacey's law 
authorised the Department of Agriculture to help with the reinstatement of game birds 
and other wild birds where they had become locally scarce or extinct. 220 Between 1900 
to 2008, the Lacey Act has been amended six times. The Act was first amended in 
1935, expanding illegal wildlife shipment liability so that it includes individuals and 
companies. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) had also been given the 
responsibility for enforcing the Act, which also included making arrests and executing 
warrants.221  
 
In 2008, the Lacey Act was amended again through the Food, Conservation and 
Energy Act. The United States, as the largest importer and consumer of forest 
products, plays a correspondingly significant role in the trade of illegally harvested 
wood.222 There was substantial evidence that wood exported from certain countries 
with large volumes to the United States had a significant percentage of illegally 
harvested wood.223 Vast amounts of illegally harvested wood from all corners of the 
globe – primarily as manufactured wood products and rarely as raw timber enters the 
United States either directly from the country of the timber’s origin or through 
intermediary countries.224 The Lacey Act provides a new means of addressing this 
issue. 
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The Lacey Act was expanded to include plants and trees covered by the definition of 
wildlife. Previously, U.S. law only protected indigenous plants listed as endangered 
species. The 2008 amendment stipulates that all plant products imported into the U.S. 
have to be legal in compliance with the laws of each country.225 The 2008 amendment 
made the U.S. the first nation to prohibit the import and sale of illegal timber and plant 
products.226 Further, the amendments strengthened the penalties and punishments 
for violations of the provisions of the act and included strict regulations and 
requirements on how to prevent illegally sourced wood from being imported or entering 
the market. Such reforms took place in the context of growing concerns about the 
negative impact of illegal logging on natural resources and market opportunities for 
legitimate products and materials.227  
 
Several U.S. government agencies are involved in the implementation of the Act's new 
provisions and the enforcement of the penalties if a company or individual violates the 
Lacey Act.228 The United States Department of Agriculture's Animal Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) oversees the declarations required with any shipment or 
trade activity of wood products. Besides the federal agencies, several private and non-
governmental organisations have also come together to create programs to enforce 
the Lacey Act and to help push awareness of illegal logging.229 
 
The law sets forth several steps that anyone involved in the trade, sale, or transport of 
lumber or wood products should follow to abide by the provisions of the Lacey Act. 
The Lacey Act lays out clearly what is defined as a "plant" and what is required for 
companies or persons to make a declaration properly. The Lacey Act amendments 
also layout the penalties as a result of any violations.230 Civil or criminal penalties apply 
differently depending on how deliberately a person or company chose to commit the 
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violation, and whether the person or company engaged in due care.231 The Lacey Act 
defines due care as that degree of care which a relatively prudent individual would 
exercise under identical or similar circumstances.232 However, the exercise of due care 
can be largely subjective and it is up to the individual company or person's discretion 
in exercising due care such that they can ensure they are not in violation of the Lacey 
Act.233  
 
Since it passed on May 22, 2008, the Lacey Act amendments have already seen 
companies commit violations.234 First time the legal case that resulted from the 2008 
amendment was against Gibson Guitar Corporation, one of the high-profile companies 
to violate the Lacey Act.235 The federal agents raided its factories and storage sites in 
2009 and 2011 and found various types of wood products that were illegally purchased 
and imported. In 2012, Gibson signed a criminal enforcement agreement with the U.S. 
government. This agreement postponed criminal prosecution, and Gibson agreed to  
a) establish a compliance program in order to strengthen controls and procedures  
b) to pay a fine amount of $300,000 and  
c) pay a community service payment of $50,000 to the National Fish and Wildlife 
Foundation.236 
 
Despite their positive and productive demonstration of the United States' efforts of 
combating the negative impact of global deforestation, the amendments are 
nonetheless weakened by dependency on the strengths and effectiveness of foreign 
laws that combat illegal logging.237  The weaknesses of the amendments to the Lacey 
Act become apparent when it is recognised that one part of triggering a Lacey Act 
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violation is dependent upon the forestry management laws that are in countries like 
Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.238  
 
(B) Australia’s illegal logging prohibition Act 
 
It is estimated that each year around AUD$400 million of Australia’s forest products 
imports come from the sources with some risk of being illegally logged.239  In 
November 2011, the illegal logging prohibition bill was introduced in the 
Commonwealth Parliament. The Bill gave effect to the 2010 election commitment of 
the Gillard government to restrict the importation of illegally logged timber products 
into Australia.240 The legislation restricts the import of illegally logged timber and 
endorses the trade in legally harvested timber by restricting the importation of illegally 
logged timber and forms part of international efforts to do so.241 
 
The Illegal Logging Prohibition Act242 came into force on 28 November 2012. The Act 
requires a structured risk assessment and mitigation process before a business or 
individual imports a regulated timber product (as defined by their customs tariff codes) 
into Australia or processes domestically grown raw logs.243 Under the Act, Australian 
importers and processors of raw logs are required to perform due diligence to reduce 
the risk of illegally logged timber that are present in their supply chains.244 The timber 
products to which the law applies and the due diligence requirements for importers 
and processors came into effect on 30th November 2014. To strengthen the 
enforcement of this Act, it sets out the robust penalty system, including the 
comprehensive monitoring system with investigation powers so that the enforcement 
of this act can be strengthened.245  
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According to this Act, timber is illegal if harvested in contravention of laws in force in 
the place where the timber was harvested.246 The due diligence requirements stipulate 
that an importer must have information relating to the timber product and its area of 
harvest, including any legality frameworks which apply. A copy of the harvesting 
license as a piece of evidence that necessary payments or taxes have been paid at 
the point of the harvest would be essential to satisfy due diligence requirement. The 
requirements of this legislation apply to both imported timber and the timber or timber 
products produced or processed in Australia and are consistent with Australia’s 
obligations under the World Trade Organisation (WTO).247 The requirements apply to 
all the companies involved in trading in Australia, which establishes equal treatment 
for suppliers of timber regardless of nationality.  
 
 
The Department of Agriculture and Water Resources is responsible for implementing 
the Act. To help companies adjust to the new requirements, the department has, since 
May 2015, been conducting compliance assessments across the industry. The 
Australian government decided not to impose any criminal or civil penalties on any 
businesses during the early stages of the Act. The government took a lenient approach 
and gave the Australian businesses enough time to understand the requirements of 
this Act and allow them to make changes to their business to incorporate the due 
diligence system. Companies and individuals who import timber products into Australia 
or process domestically grown raw logs can face penalties from 1 January 2018 for 
failing to comply with the illegal logging laws’ due diligence requirements.248 To 
prosecute someone under this Act, it needs to be proven that an Australian importer 
or processor knowingly, intentionally or recklessly imported or processed illegally 
logged timber.249 The individual or a company can face significant penalties, including 
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imprisonment and hefty fines up to AUD$85000 for an individual or AUD$425000 for 
a corporation. 
 
(C) European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, since 1998, numerous regional efforts were 
undertaken to tackle national forest law enforcement and governance (FLEG). 
Following the FLEG conference in Bali, in April 2002, the European Commission held 
a workshop in Brussels to identify options for the EU to help control illegal logging and 
the import into the EU.250 After lengthy discussions following the workshop, the 
commission finally released its action plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance 
and Trade (FLEGT) in May 2003.251 The European Council adopted the proposal for 
an EU FLEGT action plan in October 2003. It sets out measures through which the 
European Commission proposes to address the growing problem of illegal logging and 
related trade. The European Parliament adopted a motion on the topic in February 
2004 and further elaborated in October 2008.252 
 
A vital driving force to the whole FLEGT process, without which it is hard to envisage 
that any significant intergovernmental action would have taken place, was the 
persistent and often courageous activism of a relatively small number of environmental 
and development NGOs, working in both timber producing and consuming 
countries.253 Environmental NGOs undertook a series of detailed investigations into 
the growing problem of illegal logging and related trade, notably in Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Brazil, and West Africa.254 These highlighted the devastating local impact 
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of illegal logging on the environment, on forest communities and governance and 
showed how demand from the significant importing countries was fuelling the process. 
 
The EU FLEGT Action Plan consists of four key elements: government procurement 
policies, financial due diligence, Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) between 
the EU and timber-producing countries, and illegal logging legislation to control timber 
imports from non VPA countries.255 The VPAs are the central part of the FLEGT action 
plan. The FLEGT Action Plan invites developing countries (timber producer) to 
negotiate bilateral agreements with the EU in order to gain access to a green lane for 
legal timber imports into the European market.256 Six countries have signed a VPA 
with the EU and currently developing the systems necessary to control, verify and 
license legal timber. In November 2016, Indonesia became the first country to be able 
to issue FLEGT licences through a Voluntary Partnership Agreement with the EU. 
Since then, it has issued more than 50,000 FLEGT licences to EU-bound shipments 
with a combined value of nearly USD 2 billion.257 These countries are known as VPA 
partner countries. It is expected that in the next few years more countries will become 
the VPA partner countries and some countries are interested in the process of VPA. 
 
The licensing systems established under the terms of VPAs are intend to prevent the 
export of non-licensed timber products from the partner country to the EU.258 For every 
legal requirement, a VPA will list criteria, indicators and specific verifiers such as the 
documents that need to be produced in order to prove compliance that will form the 
basis for enforcement.259 The action plan sets out a few basic requirements for partner 
countries to conclude VPA. Producer countries are free to decide if to enter into 
partnership agreements but once they have done so only timber verified as legal will 
be accepted from that country. 
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In all VPA countries, a designated licensing authority will be authorised to issue the 
FLEGT licences based on the approved verification process and the timber traceability 
system which ensures that non-verified timber does not enter the supply chain. In this 
way, VPAs will oblige partner countries not to grant licences for products containing 
timber that has been illegally produced in any other country, and FLEGT licences will 
indicate a country of harvest.260 
 
The licensing system applies only to timber traded between VPA countries and the 
EU, but in practice, all VPA countries to date have made clear their intention to license 
all exports regardless of destination.261 This could help to address an obvious problem 
with the FLEGT licensing system because it is built on agreements between the EU 
and individual countries, it is vulnerable to evasion if illegal products are shipped via 
non-VPA countries to the EU. Also, the EU Timber Regulation, which came into force 
in March 2013, extends controls to all timber imports to the EU, including from non-
VPA countries. It requires timber producers and importers who place timber products 
on the EU market to have due diligence systems in place to minimise the chances of 
handling illegal timber. FLEGT licensed timber will automatically qualify as meeting 
due diligence requirements, thus providing additional incentives for countries to enter 
into VPAs.262  
 
(D) European Union Timber Regulation (EUTR) 
 
The FLEGT regulation entered into force in 2005, enabling bilateral FLEGT VPAs to 
be established between the EU and timber-exporting countries.263 Policies resulting 
from the FLEGT action plan, however, are mostly voluntary and therefore lack 
adequate compliance. The aim of the European Union Timber Regulation is to change 
the current situation by imposing a ban on the use and sale of illegal timber on the 
European market. The Timber Regulation entered into force in March 2013.264 High 
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demand for illegal timber in conjunction with inadequate national legislation to prevent 
the importation of illegal timber has forced the EU to take serious action and introduce 
this piece of legislation at EU level. The EUTR was one of several measures specified 
in the EC FLEGT Action Plan.265 The EUTR has helped in increasing the market 
access of legally verified products in the EU and eventually has reduced the market 
and demand of products coming from the high-risk region which are challenging to 
verify.266 
 
The regulation encompasses a variety of timber products ranging from pulp and paper, 
furniture, flooring, building products and other hardwood products. Nevertheless, the 
recycled products and printed materials such as magazines, books and newspapers 
are exempted from the scope of the regulation. Printed products are, at least for the 
first five years, excluded from the scope of the regulation.267 Exemptions also exist, 
such as musical instruments, certain kinds of seats and smaller product groups. The 
regulation covers the timber and timber products imported from outside the EU and 
products produced or manufactured in the EU member states. The timber and timber 
products with valid FLEGT or CITES licenses are exempted from the due diligence 
regulation and considered as legal as per the regulation.268 
  
In deciding whether the timber is legally or illegally harvested, the timber regulation 
acknowledges that the law of the harvesting country must be the rule of reference.269 
Instead of trying to list every such laws for each timber harvesting country, it identifies 
the category of legislation that would be considered, thus leaving operators, monitoring 
organisations and competent authorities to decide on what it means in the practice.270 
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The EU member states are responsible for developing the penalty system under 
EUTR, which should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive for enforcing the 
regulation.271 Under the effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalty system, the 
member states national rules may provide that penalties applied for infringements, the 
illegally harvested timber or timber products should not necessarily be destroyed but 
may instead be used for public interest purposes.272 Regulation stipulates monitoring 
organisations to be recognised by the European Commission.273 The monitoring 
organisations are responsible for developing the due diligence system which EU 
operators can us or help the operators to design the due diligence system. Member 
states must ensure that the infringements of this regulation, including operators, 
traders and monitoring organisations, are sanctioned by effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive penalties. The EUTR focuses on lowering the risk of illegal products 
entering into the supply chain rather than licensing legal ones. 274 
 
2.4 Complex nature of illegal timber trade 
 
Illegal logging has moved from direct illegal logging to more advanced methods of 
concealment and timber laundering. Primary methods involve fabrication of logging 
permits, bribes to acquire logging permits and logging beyond concessions. The 
multitude of consequences attributed to illegal logging activities is strongly related to 
many underlying causes that vary between places and show high complexity covering 
structural, economic and political reasons. Contreras-Hermosilla275 acknowledges that 
these complexities are influenced by factors such as policies, traditions and level of 
democracy. Governance responses, depending on the current definition of illegal 
logging, may address specific activities while disregarding others. 
 
One of the fundamental challenges is the diverse understandings of what illegal 
logging means and to whom. This ambiguity has implications not only for estimating 
                                                          
related to timber harvesting; Third parties legal rights concerning use and tenure that are affected by timber 
harvesting; and Trade and customs 
271Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 Recital 27 
272Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 Article 19 
273Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 Recital 27 Article 8 
274Saunders (n 268) 
275Contreras-Hermosilla (n 144) 
66 
 
the scale of illegal logging and related trade but also because identifying its drivers 
and impacts. Many studies and programmes have acknowledged that various types 
of illegal logging may be differentiated, e.g. the “ten ways to conduct illegal logging”.276 
However it is recognised that many of these activities are interrelated and therefore, a 
clear differentiation becomes difficult. 
 
Despite the broad acknowledgement and efforts to address illegal logging 
internationally over the last two decades, further actions are still required. The illegal 
timber is still being traded referred in chapter 1.277 For instance, Indonesia has 
published data on law enforcement against illegal logging and other crimes in its State 
of Indonesia’s Forests 2018 report.278 The report shows that numbers of operations 
against illegal logging has increased from 25 in 2015 to 88 in 2017 where authorities 
seized nearly 4,000 cubic metres of wood. In the same period, there were also 175 
court cases for illegal logging. Need for greater international cooperation against illegal 
logging and the related trade in timber has therefore been firmly recognised at the 
highest level of intergovernmental cooperation. The existing differences between 
developing and developed countries (see chapter 3) can hinder the measures taken 
by countries. At present, the government agencies of both developing and developed 
nations, NGOs, businesses relying on forest resources are trying to identify the ways 
to set up interventions which are capable of enhancing compliance with national, 
subnational and local governmental policies and laws. 
 
A key challenge in combating the global illegal wood trade is the fact that illegal wood 
crosses borders as a laundered “legal” product. Transnational crime, or the 
transnational trade in laundered products, provides a particular law enforcement 
challenge as national law enforcement has no international jurisdiction unless through 
specific operations or exclusive agreements. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
emphasised that coordinated action is critical to eliminate corruption and disrupt the 
criminal networks that drive and enable trafficking in wildlife, timber and timber 
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products, harvested in violation of national laws.279 In addition, the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development and the related Sustainable Development Goals adopted 
by the UNGA in September 2015, link environmental security and sustainable 
development emphasising that combatting illegal logging and related timber trade is 
vital for the future and requires considerable attention.280 
Actions to illegal logging require stringent legislative measures and better 
implementation of existing laws, clampdowns on fraud, and generating opportunities 
for indigenous communities. Attention must be paid to monitor and assess the impacts 
of the various initiatives individually and on a range of stakeholders. Information 
sharing, informed decision-making and improved capacity building at all levels of 
governance are essential to achieve the objectives of legislation and initiatives in 
place. The continuous failure of global forest governance on the legally binding 
agreement and pressure from environmental NGOs forced developed countries to 
introduce measures to tackle the issue of the illegal timber trade.281 The countries like 
USA, Australia and Europe have developed legislative measures to control the illegal 
timber import. However, the effectiveness of these measures on a global and national 
scale is still to be assessed and this research attempts to evaluate the effectiveness 
of European Union Timber Regulation in the UK.  
 
2.4.1 The complexity of Illegal logging from producer countries’ case studies 
 
The chapter highlights that illegal logging is one of most devastating wildlife crimes 
since it threatens not only one species but the entire habitat. The illegal logging usually 
involves cutting common species for charcoal or pulp and paper.282 The rare species 
of tropical hardwood are targeted for the furniture industry and provides a prime 
example of the way that the wild animals harvested or being exported as opposed to 
the national laws in source country can still be introduced into the authentic trade 
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market in other countries. A small amount of the tropical hardwoods that are used on 
stylish furniture are CITES listed, which includes the mahogany (Swietenia species 
and Cedrela species), afrormosia (Pericopsis elata), and ramin (Gonystylus species). 
Several species commonly marketed as “rosewood” are also contained.283 
 
Over the past few years, focus on high value, CITES listed Siamese rosewood 
(Dalbergia cochinchinensis), which can be found in the Cambodia, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Thailand and Viet Nam. Harvesting of this species is prohibited 
under national legislation during much of its range.284 The harvesting of Burmese 
rosewood (Dalbergia oliveri) and Burmese padauk (Pterocarpus macrocarpus), that 
are not included in the CITES-list, appears to have filled the void. As previously noted, 
these species are recognised as endangered, and therefore they are protected under 
national law across all countries, but not under CITES. 
 
Some of the poorer source countries have struggled to stop increasing trade in tropical 
hardwoods and rosewood species, as they do not have the ability to monitor the forest 
loss and to prevent excessive logging.285 Some source countries have imposed log 
export bans or even the overall logging bans. Nevertheless, with limited ability to track 
and enforce these checks, exports can be vulnerable to the introduction of wood that 
is illegally sourced.286 The logging bans can give officials a base for action at logging 
sites, but do not provide a basis for challenging exports. This occurs because even if 
the new wild harvesting is not permitted, it is still possible that the timber to be exported 
is derived from the stocks of timber felled prior to the ban, or that it was imported from 
any other country without the logging ban. 
 
 All of this creates a scenario of considerable ambiguity as to the legality of any given 
export. To aggravate the confusion, all those domestic controls seem to have little 
power as soon as the wood has been exported. Outside CITES, most destination 
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countries do not have a legal basis for refusing wood that has been harvested or 
exported contrary to source country regulations. The US Lacey Act, the EU Timber 
Regulations, and the Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition Act prohibit the import of 
any illegal timber, wherever the law was broken. For other destination markets, 
however, the local regulations of source countries are insignificant and the trade could 
not be refused. Thus, illegally logged or exported timber can be a part of legal tropical 
hardwood furniture in another national market. 
 
In another case of illegal logging, during 2013 and 2014, Environmental Investigation 
Agency (EIA) carried out in-depth research in Kalteng area of Indonesia to identify 
timber harvested illegally from palm oil concessions.287 The EIA also found that land 
clearing occurred far beyond the boundaries of the concession, as far as 2 km into 
areas designated as Production Forest. By 2014, Kotawaringin Timur’s state attorney 
brought criminal charges against four individuals connected to the organisation. The 
case was brought on the relatively small charge of cultivating palm oil on 181ha of land 
in 2012 before obtaining a permit, in the breach of the Forestry Law and Plantation 
Law. The allegations were dismissed before the case made it to trial because the 
contents of the indictment were “vague” and it should be heard in a civil court. In 
October 2014, a judicial official confirmed to EIA that the case remains in the system. 
The case illustrates how concessions must undergo more in-depth inspection, even 
when there is a seemingly legitimate permit. The scale of the offences that occurred 
before the permit that is issued, and for the illegitimacy during the process of 
establishing tenure over the concession, means the timber from it should be 
considered illegal. 
 
In 2015, an undercover investigation by Greenpeace Brazil exposed how logging 
company laundered and sold over $7 million of illegal timber. The company filed 
fraudulent paperwork to claim high quantities of the valuable timber in areas than it 
could legally log. Then it used that documentation to launder illegal wood from other 
areas of the Amazon. After one-year, Brazilian authorities confirmed that the company 
engaged in large scale fraud and imposed sanction on the company. Nevertheless, 
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the damage is already done because the laundered wood entered the global 
market.288 
 
The World Bank study289 reported that criminal justice system has been used to 
combat illegal logging but only in very sporadic instances and in a restricted and 
inefficient manner. The study also reported that most cases targeted the low-level 
criminals whose involvement in illegal logging activity was due to poverty and therefore 
did not create any effective results and encouraged sceptics to overlook the relevance 
of criminal justice methods. There are few examples available that indicates the failure 
of criminal justice system in the field of illegal logging. In 2005, an initiative to fight 
illegal logging identified 186 suspects in Papua, Indonesia and secured nearly 400,000 
cubic meters of illegally harvested timber. However, only 13 suspects were convicted 
and the prison sentence of two years was the only most significant punishment.290  
 
Likewise, in April 2010, Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono ordered the country’s Anti-
Mafia Task Force to review cases of illegal logging in which suspects were convicted 
or acquitted to lenient sentences. It was discovered that from 92 accused of illegal 
logging, 49 were acquitted, 24 received one-year prison terms and 19 others received 
between one and two years of punishment.291  
 
From the above cases, it is apparent that illegal logging has many multifaceted causes 
ingrained deeply in the social, economic, cultural and political structures of the 
societies. The impact of illegal logging varies, depending on local, regional and 
historical circumstances, making it challenging to employ a simplified solution globally. 
The international community, national and local governments, multilateral, regional 
and bilateral processes as well as civil society organisations have heavily invested 
their resources in tropical forest governance. While some measures yielded 
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encouraging results,292 the problem of corruption, deficiencies in the design and 
performance of regulations and enforcement institutions are some of the weaknesses 
that still need to be addressed.  
 
The discussion about the various definition of illegal logging, its impact and measures 
undertaken highlights that it is significant to clarify the concept of illegal timber trade 
to check the effectiveness of a regulation that tackles illegal logging and related trade. 
The varied impacts of illegal logging helps in identifying the activities that are 
considered illegal in the context of harvesting and timber trade which could also have 
significant impact on forest and people. The different legislative measures adopted by 
the timber consuming countries and other international efforts help in understanding 
how the international provisions interact with legal system which subsequently be 
useful to achieve the aim of the study. The insight of complexity within illegal timber 
trade including the dynamics of timber producer developing countries helps in 
determining the tools or regulatory governance used in the conceptualization or 
designing the legislation to tackle the multifaceted issue of illegal logging.293 
 
Chapter three helps in setting the theoretical background for this research. It attempts 
to study the developments within the international forest policies and analyses the 
failure of the international community in attaining legally binding international 
agreements on forest issues during various global forest conventions. The chapter 
also describes the theories of transnational timber legality initiative and explains how 
the experimentalist governance provides the analytical framework for the thesis. 
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Chapter 3: The global forest conventions, development of transnational 
timber legality verification initiative and experimentalist 
governance 
 
3.1 Development of global forest negotiations 
 
The historical developments strongly influence the forest policies implemented today 
in the forest sector.294 The series of international forest conventions took place in the 
last three decades but participating nations or agencies have not been able to frame 
legally binding agreements on forests.295 In the absence of a legally binding global 
forest policy, many global forest conventions, regional, multilateral and bilateral policy 
initiatives, processes and arrangements have emerged.296 Therefore, it is necessary 
to analyse and understand the historical developments of the sector to form the 
theoretical background for the thesis.  
 
The regulation of forest access and resources are in focus of local governments, 
especially in developing and underdeveloped countries.297  Forests were being viewed 
as not just a global resource but also an object of knowledge that could be managed, 
made productive, and economised.298 For many years, sustainable management of 
timber supplies was debated internationally.299 However, the concern to protect global 
forests emerged in the 1980s, which in many ways was a starting point for attention to 
global environmental issues. In the mid-1980s, tropical deforestation climbed the 
international agenda as importance of forests and the biological diversity sustained by 
tropical forests realised.300 
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The concept of biodiversity was first introduced in 1986 at the conference of the 
National Forum on Biodiversity, which was held in Washington, DC, USA.301 This 
conference not only dealt with the richness of life on earth and the threats to the 
extinction of species but also addressed the economics, functions, values and 
conservation of biodiversity. Another source for the term biodiversity has been the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN).302 This international nature 
conservation organisation recognised the need for a global biodiversity convention in 
1984 and wrote a draft treaty.303 Inspired by this, the United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP) established an intergovernmental negotiation committee to design a 
legally binding global biodiversity treaty. This led, after complex and challenging 
negotiations, to the adoption of the Framework Convention on Biological Diversity in 
1992, which was signed by most countries at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in the same year.304 
 
Many conventions addressed the forest concerns but three of them are of particular 
importance to the forest sector: The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). All three of the Rio 
conventions recognise the significant contribution of forests in achieving their 
respective goals and objectives.305  
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its accompanying protocols support 
an international effort to protect and sustain future generations of Earth's biological 
resources.306 The CBD has provided an important forum for discussing biodiversity-
related issues of access and benefit-sharing, such as conventional rights to land and 
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intellectual property rights.307 Since the advent of the CBD, many countries have 
considerably moved ahead with its implementation. For instance, since 2002, Brazil 
has significantly reduced deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon and designated half of 
Acre's Amazonian state as protected areas.308 The UNCCD supports sustainable land 
management strategies such as agricultural conservation, agro-forestry and soil 
preservation in drylands, where tree removal, cropping and overgrazing leads to soil 
erosion and degradation of watersheds. The UNFCCC acknowledges the important 
role forests play in mitigating climate change, as they represent a major global carbon 
reserve.309 
 
The next section analyses the success and failure of forest conventions conventions 
and other developments took place in governing forest resources worldwide. It 
highlights that why the international forest community shift from global forest 
convention to the transnational timber legality verification approach to combat the 
multidimensional issue of illegal logging and timber trade. It further explains how the 
timber legality verification initiative incorporated in the form of legislation. 
 
3.1.1 Journey from forest Principles to United Nations Forum on Forests 
 
The G7310 countries, the group of seven major industrialised states, initiated the 
international negotiations aimed at a global forest convention in 1990. Forests had 
been firmly placed on the international agenda during the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) process, which acted as the facilitator for 
building an official discourse on the topic.311 The conference highlighted a period of 
numerous international environmental agreements. The legacy of UNCED was three 
conventions covering biodiversity (Convention on Biodiversity, CBD), climate change 
                                                          
307Catherine Klein, 'New Leadership Needed: The Convention on Biological Diversity' (2016) 31 Emory 
International Law Review 135  
308Ministry of the Environment of Brazil, Office of the National Program for Biodiversity Conservation, Fourth 
National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2010) Ministry of the Environment 
<https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/br/br-nr-04-en.pdf>   
309 The Rio Convention on Forests (n 305)  
310The Group of Seven (G7) is an informal forum of countries representing around half of global economic output. 
The group has met regularly since 1976 to discuss key issues related to global economic stability 
311Melanie Steiner, ‘The Journey from Rio to Johannesburg: Ten Years of Forest Negotiations, Ten Years of 
Successes and Failures (Rio's Decade: Reassessing the 1992 Earth Summit)’ (2002) 32 Golden Gate University 
Law Review 629, 630 
75 
 
(UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC) and desertification (UN 
Convention to Combat Desertification, UNCCD).312 The Rio Summit generated a 
variety of forest commitments relating to, both legally and non-legally binding (Forest 
Principles), and prompted many other forest-related initiatives and commitments. 
While the adoption of a legally binding instrument focusing on forests failed at the 
UNCED in 1992, forests formed the central part on the international level.313 
 
Three years, after the Rio Earth Summit, was known as a time of building confidence 
between the negotiating partners. Subsequent to this phase, representatives in the 
third session of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD-3) reached 
agreement on the formation of an ad hoc Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF), 
with a time limit of two years to review forest issues and to report the CSD in 1997. 
The IPF was not created to implement the forest principles that have emerged 
because of Rio, but instead to take forward the work that was begun during the 1992 
Earth Summit and to produce concrete goals, capable of implementing the action.314  
 
Between 1995 and 1997, four IPF sessions took place and finally agreed to over one 
hundred action proposals related to sustainable forest management. In some 
instances, however, matters remained pending because further examination and 
discussion were required.315 One of the recommendations to appear out of the final 
IPF session (IPF-4) was intended to proceed with Intergovernmental dialogue post-
IPF in the hopes of achieving consensus on critical issues.316 The IPF also 
underscored the need for enhanced international efforts in sectors such as 
governance, international institutions, and organisations and instruments.317 
Accordingly, the final IPF report recommended that a successor body be formed to 
keep working towards achieving consensus on issues that might not be resolved by 
the IPF process.318 
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In July 1997, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)319 decided 
to create a special Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) to continue the work of 
the panel for the next three years.320 The IFF held four meetings, with fourth and last 
session being organized from January 31 - February 11, 2000 in New York. The 
programme components discussed at IFF-4 included: promoting, facilitating and 
monitoring implementation of the IPF proposals for action, the need for financial 
resources, problems requiring further explanation and protection of all forest types and 
sustainable development. Despite the difficulty with a few of these elements, the IFF 
was able to succeed in establishing consensus and reached agreement on proposals 
for action on all programme.321 In the end, a decision was reached after hours of 
negotiations to establish a United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF).322  
 
The UNFF is an intergovernmental policy forum to promote the management, 
conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests. Its primary function 
was to strengthen long-term political commitment.323  The UNFF met ten times from 
2001 to 2013 to discuss the issues related to forests with a different set of objectives 
and the eleventh session concluded on 14th May in 2015 at New York.  In 2007, at its 
seventh session, the UNFF adopted a non-legally binding instrument on all types of 
forests, following nearly three years of intense negotiations, starting from UNFF-5 and 
culminating at UNFF-7. The main objective of this instrument was to increase the 
strength in political commitment to implement sustainable management practices for 
all types of forests at all levels. In September 2014, the New York Declaration on 
Forests pledged to halve the rate of deforestation by 2020 and end the loss of natural 
forests by 2030 at the Climate Summit held at UN Headquarters in New York.324  
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It is evident that forests have been in the central agenda in many UN conferences, 
starting from Kyoto Protocol in 1997 to New York declaration on forests in 2014, but 
the success of these conferences to save the forest is obscure and it seems like never 
ending process. In 2007, UNFF 7 approved a “Non-Legally Binding Instrument on all 
Types of Forests” (NLBI) but the Core Forest Process remains mostly ineffective 
because the instrument is not legally binding, i.e. participation and compliance are 
voluntary and the instrument adopted has yet to affect changes in the behaviour of 
actors or the policies of institutions.325 It is necessary to understand why the efforts of 
forming a strong agreement have been failed. Virtually there is no progress made even 
after more than two decades, then why governments continue to engage in 
international deliberations. The next section focuses on the developments that took 
place during the conventions and analyses why the international convention on forests 
does not seem to be an achievable target.   
 
3.1.2 The failures of forest negotiations: North-South divide 
 
Global debates on sustainable forest management have been primarily characterised 
as a collective debate between the rich and developing countries326, in the forest 
context—countries that have tropical forests with high levels of deforestation and those 
with boreal and temperate forests with low deforestation rates. When the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, it appeared that it would be possible to come up with a legally binding 
agreement on forests.327 Instead, the parties adopted the non-legally binding 
statement of principles on the management, conservation and sustainable 
development for all types of forests (forest principles)328. The forest principles lack 
both specifics and implementation action, leaving it very difficult to achieve the 
objectives.  
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In the post-UNCED conferences and meetings, the international will to arrive at a 
legally binding agreement was missing329 and the international community was divided 
in reaching agreement on the forest convention. Despite widespread awareness of the 
crisis in tropical forests, the international community has moved from one policy to 
another. Explanations of the failure of global forest governance have focused on a 
variety of factors, including conflicts over sovereignty and control of forest resources, 
northern consumption patterns, appropriate financial mechanisms and limited 
institutional and forest governance capacities at national and sub-national levels.330  
 
Before the Rio conference in 1992, many organisations had already started preparing 
the issues of global forest governance. With forests strongly in the agenda at Rio, the 
discussion of a Global Forest Convention (GFC) had been looking like a step away. 
Though, negotiations toward the GFC became rapidly distracted, owing to a widening 
gap between North-South negotiating partners.331 Forests were the one environmental 
commodity on which developing countries were unwilling to reach a compromise.332 
Issues such as the underlying causes of deforestation, northern consumption patterns, 
appropriate financial mechanisms and technology transfer hindered the attainment of 
consensus in governing the world's forests.333  
 
Forest negotiations were divided between developed countries of North and 
developing countries of the South. In the North, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)334 countries have been unanimous in their 
appeals for forest convention. In south, the group of seventy-seven (G77)335 
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developing countries, supported by China, strongly opposed to a convention because 
it would interfere with the sovereign rights of states to control their natural resource 
use policies.336 Developing countries were also of the view that financial incentives 
should be offered by developed countries to finance the protection of the world's 
remaining forest stocks. The Malaysian Prime Minister commented, “If it is in the 
interests of the North that we do not cut down our trees then they must compensate 
us for our loss of income”.337 
 
The North attempted to specify jurisdictional duties for forested countries of the 
southern hemisphere by emphasising the fundamental principle of stewardship, under 
which all countries need to preserve their forest cover. The Southern developing 
countries declined the concept of stewardship as an infringement on sovereignty. US 
negotiator Curtis Bohlen stated that some countries are not willing to take specific 
measures to protect their forests and they are trying to obtain money prior to agreeing 
to do anything.338 
 
Similar to the unstable UNCED forest talks, the international debate on forest policy 
became more constructive at the turn of the millennium. The origins of this 
transformation can be traced to an informal intergovernmental working group on 
forests co-sponsored by Canada (the most persistent pro-convention advocate over 
the last decade) and Malaysia (which led for the G77 during the UNCED negotiations). 
This group agreed on a programme adopted by the Commission on Sustainable 
Development in a revised form as the programme of work for the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Forests. Nevertheless, nominal progress has been made on the issues of 
trade, finance and technology transfers.339 
 
Canada’s stance was that it would talk about the funding only if the other states agreed 
on a forest convention that also prevailed during the last phase of the IFF negotiations. 
The G77 stayed firm in their argument for higher financial flows and technological 
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transfer and again, the developed countries managed to avoid making any 
concessions. At the IFF, many countries demanded the establishment of a global 
forests fund. In response, the EU and the United States did not agree to support the 
global forest fund. 
 
Canada headed the negotiations for the pro-convention lobby at IFF 4 and the moment 
when the IFF discussed the convention issue, the representatives had apparently 
agreed to create UNFF. However, two days from the end of IFF 4, Canada withdrew 
its support for UNFF as there was no consensus for a convention.340 The United 
States, who objected with the commitments both to a convention and the 
supplementary financial flows, supported the creation of UNFF. Canada agreed 
somehow, despite the absence of the firm commitment to a forest convention. The 
G77 spokesman noted that the G77 had made the concessions in the spirit of 
compromise and that their key concerns on finance, trade and technology continued 
to be outstanding and should be dealt with by UNFF after it is created. 
 
Forest convention proved to be impossible to achieve as the negotiations revealed 
deep divisions among developed and developing countries. Critically, negotiations 
about forest convention and attempts to embed its principles in a legally binding 
agreement plunged because of three key points. First, there was no agreement on 
how developing countries would be compensated for not being able to use their forests 
to develop their economies. Second, some countries felt that a legally binding 
agreement would limit their sovereignty. Third, there were concerns by non-
governmental organisations that a legally binding agreement would favour timber 
production to the detriment of other interests.  
 
The current international forest regime consists of soft law (non-legally binding) 
instruments. The term ‘soft law’ does not have a precise legal meaning, but it usually 
refers to any international instrument other than a treaty containing principles341, 
norms, standards, such as the IPF/IFF proposals for action. It reflects political rather 
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than legal commitments. Those states that reject any resolution do not generally 
distance themselves from the negotiating process and do not subsequently ignore its 
existence. The states who reject the resolution has no obligation to comply with any 
commitments and respect other states to react as they think appropriate. Thus, soft 
law is characterised by a lack of state consent, respectively the lack of consent to be 
bound by an agreement.342 State consensus is perceived as a fundamental parameter 
for the legitimacy of an agreement. Considering these aspects, soft law on forests is 
essential for the formation and evolution of international law on forests and a valuable 
part of an ideal international forest regulation. This in turn, advocates for international 
legally binding norms on the forest to ensure the enforcement of forest regulation. 
 
3.2 The complexities of international forest governance 
 
International forest dialogues, by its very nature, includes a range of actors that vary 
widely in their type, specific interests, and goals. They constitute a wide variety of 
entities from global institutions, civic groups to national governments. Although global 
forest governance has been described as a ‘non-regime’ by Dimitrov343, the current 
framework is more accurately described as a “regime complex” – a set of specialised 
sectoral and issue-based regimes and other governance arrangements more or less 
loosely linked together, sometimes mutually reinforcing and sometimes overlapping 
and conflicting.344 
 
The myriad of national and international organisations involved Global Forest 
Governance (GFG) make the system complex. Complexity is interpreted as a source 
of failure and should be minimised or fixed.345  These complexities create a lack of 
coherence in state approaches in the international arena which added to the failure of 
the GFG. As such, it has resulted in divisions between developed nations and 
underdeveloped nations which is difficult to bridge and a general inability to look at 
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forest issues. The proliferation of international instruments, in particular the treaties or 
conventions concerning GFG, and the lack enforcing means have complicated the 
problem, making effective governance at all levels more difficult.  
 
It is important to note that forest issues are multidimensional and have numerous 
linkages such as biodiversity conservation, climate change, economic development, 
sustainable forest management, poverty reduction and livelihoods, trade and 
economic development. To handle this complexity, the international forest dialogues 
kept on shifting the agenda to address emerging urgencies better. During the past 40 
years, these transformations have altered forest policy from a commodity issue into a 
biodiversity issue, a sustainable development issue and a human rights issue among 
others.346 As the world’s population increases, demand for agricultural commodities  
and timber will continue to increase. So, the improvements in agriculture productivity 
and the sustainable management of forests need to play a vital role in Global Forest 
Governance. 
 
The multi-dimensional issues related to forests, such as illegal logging and trading of 
timber, requires a great deal of co-operation between both timber producer and 
consumer countries. For an international instrument to be effective, countries must 
engage fully with it. For example, the restricted implementation of the 1992 Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD) shows that it is almost impossible to implement 
aspirational legislation effectively.347 The responsibilities of Article 14 (Access to 
Genetic Resources) and 15 (Access to and Transfer of Technology) of the CBD were 
not fully implemented. During the negotiations, the internal differences among the 
member states have proved to be hard to overcome. The issues of sovereignty and 
finance shifted the main agenda of addressing forest issues. The issue of deforestation 
has been discussed on the international agenda for the last three decades and if 
countries were united during the forest conventions, much of the forest loss could have 
been restricted.  
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The global forest conferences have been useful in raising awareness on forest issues 
but to protect forests, strong law at national and international level and enforcement 
of laws are essential. The events since 1992 confirm that the biggest challenges in the 
forest sector are the development of the rule of law and the identification of means by 
which a law can be implemented effectively on a global scale. The result of the 
negotiations could be interpreted as an instance of failed governance since it did not 
lead to a hard law agreement. Dimitrov348 describes the international forest 
negotiations as a case of the unsuccessful regime, meaning that the discussions have 
not led to a formal treaty and consequently no regime has come into existence.349 
Moreover, during conventions, the international legal standards of forest sustainability 
were ambiguous, weak and incomplete.350  
 
Although the international forest negotiations will be remembered as a case of weak 
consensus, it has certainly put the forest and related issues in the global agenda. The 
instruments such as forest certification, The United Nations collaborative programme 
on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing 
Countries (UN-REDD) programme, proactive role of environmental NGOs in forest 
governance are some of the positive developments of last three decades.  
 
3.3 New developments along with global forest negotiations 
 
The international institutional framework for forests has many overlaps in terms of 
forest management policy which ultimately has increased difficulties to address the 
underlying issues. However, it has certainly helped in developing the understanding 
and awareness about the importance of forests globally with increased participation 
from civil society organisations to businesses, actively supporting sustainable forest 
management. This new partnerships and stakeholders participation has enhanced 
decision-making and implementation.351 Although states once played the dominant 
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role in global governance, as issues have increased and the interconnections between 
them became more complex, other actors, including international organisations, 
private sector, civil society organisations, and consumers, also become major players 
in designing and implementation of the GFG process.352 Ironically, the governance 
discourse produced new tools to give organisational shape to this integration 
process.353  
 
A comprehensive discussion of the new developments in the form of collaborative 
partnerships is beyond the scope of this research, but developments of forest 
certification and Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) conference which 
are essential for this research due to their importance on developing timber legality 
regime and combating illegal logging. The reason for choosing these two initiatives is 
that both these partnerships have distinctive features. Forest certification is a non-
governmental programme and system for the inspection, monitoring and labelling of 
timber, wood and pulp and non-timber forest products in which forest management 
quality is measured against many agreed standards. While FLEG conference was a 
high-profile international meeting on illegal logging, organised by the World Bank, the 
UK and US aid agencies which were held in Bali in 2001. The forest certification has 
been discussed below and the FLEG conference initiative has been discussed in 
chapter 2. 
 
3.3.1 Forest Certification 
 
The tropical deforestation and environmental issues were growing concern in the 
1990s and to discuss these issues, a group of timber companies and representatives 
of environmental and human rights organisations met in California in 1990.354 This 
group comprises of officials from different backgrounds emphasised that the wood 
products traded globally should come from the sustainably managed forests and a 
system that could credibly identify well-managed forests has to be developed. This 
innovative concept was developed over parallel NGO meetings in Rio and a non-profit 
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organisation referred to as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was launched in 
1993 with the alliance of Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) and with other leading 
environmental organisations.355 In 1994, the founding members approved a set of 
principles and criteria for well-managed forests, and a global secretariat was 
established in Oaxaca, Mexico, reflecting the FSC’s intent to address the regulation of 
forests globally.356  
 
Forest certification is a system that results in an independent third party issuing written 
certification that certifies the location and management status of a timber producing 
forest. This involves assessing quality of forest management with a range of 
predetermined principals and criteria. A product with forest certification assures its 
customer that product comes from responsibly managed forest and environmental, 
social and economic criteria have been taken care of.357 The idea behind certification 
was to develop a set of wide-ranging rules governing sustainable forest management 
and mobilise customers of forest products to encourage adherence to the standards. 
 
Many certification programmes started to emerge as the concept of certification began 
to take traction. Since the beginning of the FSC, a range of alternative forest 
certification schemes have been developed and some are dominated by industry in 
terms of decision making and are more flexible in terms of criteria and policies, 
including the Sustainable Forestry Initiative and the Canadian Sustainable Forestry 
Certification Coalition, created by timber industry associations in the United States and 
Canada, respectively. Some certification programs cover the forests worldwide while 
some countries have developed their own national and regional programs or schemes 
to manage the forests. Out of many certification schemes, FSC and Programme for 
the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC) are the most popular and credible, 
which manages the global forests.358 
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The FSC is a certification program that lays a series of standards to guide logging 
companies. FSC claims that by applying these standards, the companies can get good 
value for their products and be responsible for the environment. This certification 
system provides a logo which allows customers to recognise the forest products 
produced from sustainably managed forests or recycled materials. The FSC has 
certified around 50 million hectares of forest between 2012 and 2017. The FSC is 
managing nearly 196 million hectares of forests according to FSC standards across 
84 countries.359 The majority of these FSC certified forests are within Europe and 
North America. The tropics — Asia, Africa, and South America — account for 16% of 
FSC certified areas. 
 
With the emergence of the FSC, landowner groups in several European countries, the 
USA and Canada, initiated alternative industrial schemes that gradually moved under 
the umbrella of an international organisation called PEFC.360 The PEFC is an 
international non-profit, non-governmental organisation promoting sustainable forest 
management. The PEFC is a mutual recognition scheme of national standards, e.g. 
UK Woodland Assurance Standard (UKWAS) in the UK or USA’s Sustainable Forestry 
Initiative (SFI). As of September 2017, more than 300 million hectares of forest area 
is administered in accordance with the PEFC's internationally recognized sustainability 
benchmarks.361 
 
Over the years, efforts to promote sustainable forest management through forest 
certification have been mixed. There is now considerable support for third party 
certification among most commercial forestry operations in North America and Europe. 
362 The amount of certified forest area has increased almost exponentially during the 
last decade; about 90% of the globally certified area is located in the northern 
hemisphere.363 This indicates the success of forest management certification in 
Europe and North America but also shows that certification schemes have still not 
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become widely established in the southern hemisphere.364 While support for forest 
certification is growing, it is weakest in tropical developing countries where there was 
so much scrutiny was first placed. The share of southern developing countries in 
certified land has been significantly lower, as most developing country producers could 
not afford the associated costs, needed external support to adopt high forest 
sustainability standards, and faced little domestic demand for certified forest 
products.365 
 
The concern over the legitimacy of forest certification has also affected its uptake. The 
founding members of FSC comprised stakeholders not only from environmental realm 
but also comprised stakeholders from forestry, the timber industry, non-governmental 
organisations, and local communities. Lars Gulbrandsen366 emphasises that 
environmental NGOs have been portrayed as “self-appointed judges in an area in 
which they have insufficient understanding, limited experience and no legitimate right 
to regulate in the first place”. It is worth noting that the claim for representing a broad 
array of different actors is used as a source of legitimacy from one side, while this very 
argument is used to delegitimise the FSC from the other side. While the FSC claims 
to derive its legitimacy from which represents a wide range of stakeholders from the 
social, the economic and the environmental realms, PEFC membership is limited to 
actors from the forestry sector that ultimately set up their norms.367 
 
Forest certification plays a significant role in ensuring the legality of timber products 
as most certification schemes require compliance with national legislation. However, 
since certification is not based on surprise audits, it could not be the most ultimate 
solution to the illegal timber trade and can only ensure responsible forest 
management.368 Nevertheless, the question is how effective the certification system is 
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in controlling illegal logging and has the certification scheme delivered the promises it 
set out to realise? According to a study369 in Mexico, the comparison between FSC 
certified forests and non-certified forests revealed that there is no difference in 
deforestation rates which means that the FSC system has not made any difference to 
the deforestation. Another study370 in Indonesia’s Borneo region, conducted between 
2000 and 2008, concluded that FSC certified forests have forests that were FSC-
certified had lower deforestation rates compared to non-certified timber forests. One 
study published in 2016 indicated that the forest certification system improved the 
forest management practices in Gabon, Cameroon, and the Republic of the Congo in 
Africa.371 
 
Since last two decades, private forest certification has provided a more creative but 
incomplete response to the failed multilateral forest regime.372 Karmann and Smith373 
and Romero374 found that most literature they reviewed was based on geographically 
limited case studies, anecdotal evidence, or studies that were not conducted by 
independent observers. More importantly, they concluded that there is insufficient 
empirical evidence regarding the impact of certification at a global scale and hence, 
more studies of the impact of certification are needed. More recently, Heilmayr and 
Lambin375 showed that FSC certification schemes were more effective in slowing down 
the conversion of forests in other forms of land use compared to other market-driven 
governance approaches in Chile, although the results are only for one country. A 
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study376 conducted in Cameroon, Indonesia and Peru, FSC certification has improved 
environmental management and social performance of the certified companies but it 
has limited effectiveness in reducing deforestation and forest degradation, the primary 
concerns to which certification was a response. Thus, the focus of several countries 
has shifted to other instruments and legality verification has emerged as the new 
leading policy instrument to combat illegal logging and forest degradation. 
 
3.4 The emergence of timber legality verification initiative to combat illegal timber 
trade 
 
 
In the mid-1990s, environmental NGOs successfully pushed the issue of illegal logging 
on the agenda of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Forests, calling  on participating 
countries to take national action and encourage international cooperation to minimise 
illegal trade in forest products.377 The G8 then included illegal logging in its 1998 Action 
Programme on Forests378 and introduced a set of measures to improve enforcement 
of the domestic forest laws and reduce illegal international trade in forest products, 
which were echoed in turn by the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable 
Development. 
 
The private certification schemes, by the early 2000s, had achieved high rates of 
coverage among industrial forest companies in developed economies but due to 
certification's limited uptake in the tropics, international agencies, led by the World 
Bank, began to focus increasingly on promoting capacity building and learning within 
tropical countries.379 The idea, supported by studies showing that many developing 
countries had strong but unenforced forest practice regulations380, was to help 
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countries develop and implement their policy priorities and goals for sustainable forest 
management. Consequently, the UK, German and EU development agencies 
committed themselves to “Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG)381 
initiatives to strengthen capacity development, and also promote the policy learning 
networks with the hope of improving, instead of challenging the sovereignty and 
national policymaking.382  
 
Similar to the private certification itself, FLEG initiative has emerged from discontent 
with the lack of progress in tackling the problem of forest degradation through 
multilateral institutions.383 The FLEG initiatives brought together governments, 
businesses, and NGOs from timber producing and consuming countries to discuss 
domestic and international steps to combat illegal logging and trade.384 The main 
FLEG outputs included an East Asian FLEG ministerial statement in Bali in 2001, 
followed by ministerial statements in Africa in Yaoundé in 2003, in Europe and in St. 
Petersburg in North Asia in 2005, as well as initial talks in Latin America.385  
 
The FLEG processes opened the door for new initiatives and experiments within and 
across countries,386 with various participation of civil society and forest sector 
stakeholders.387 Many of these FLEG mechanisms focused on building greater 
capacity to enforce existing laws,388 decreasing various legal systems, and enlisting 
NGOs to oversee the on-the-ground activities, including a reduction in elevated levels 
of illegal logging.389 However, none of these processes generated binding 
commitments among the participating countries, nor the creation of systematic 
mechanisms for monitoring progress toward their agreed aims.390 In these 
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circumstances, the EU decided to go ahead by connecting the improvement of forest 
law enforcement and governance (FLEG) to the regulation of trade (T) to obtain the 
consent of developing countries themselves.391 The focus of the FLEGT Action Plan 
was the negotiation of bilateral Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs)392 with the 
developing countries in establishing licensing systems for the export of legally 
harvested wood to the European market, where legality includes the reference to the 
social and environmental conditions of production. 
 
Partly as a result of concern about the effectiveness of global certification systems and 
FLEGT initiatives, “legality verification” is now becoming a principal policy tool for the 
fight against forest degradation and deforestation that are linked to illegal logging.393 
The rise of a timber legality regime holds a unique significance in the governance of 
forests and has its historical basis in the 2001 G-8 Bali Ministerial Declaration that 
committed the parties “to address violations of forest law and forest crime, in particular 
illegal logging, associated illegal trade and corruption, and their negative effects on 
the rule of law”.394 The legality verification involves audits against a set of standards 
by an independent body to identify a method to eliminate illegal supply from global 
forest products395 and focuses on tracking products along the supply chains, providing 
more considerable attention on the technical challenges.396 The legality verification is 
a combination of international certification and FLEG efforts; similar to FLEG efforts 
legality verification acknowledges and supports national sovereignty; however like 
certification, it depends on third party verification.397 
 
By 2010, activist campaigns, market pressures, and inter-governmental negotiations 
transcended into a transnational timber legality regime in legislative interventions, 
such as the United States Lacey Act and the European Union Timber Regulation. This 
legality regime requires importers in the US and EU to exercise due diligence (or due 
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care) of their timber supplies and subjects them to penalties (consignment seizure, 
fines, or even imprisonment) for illegal timber in their supply chains. More recently, 
Australia and Japan have introduced their timber regulations, and China is in the 
process of doing so.398 
 
The EUTR introduced in 2010, levels the playing field by establishing legality 
requirements that extend to timber import from all countries. The European 
Commission explains that “legality verification controls - and hence due diligence will 
have been carried out in the exporting country in accordance with the Voluntary 
Partnership Agreements between those countries and the European Union, and the 
resulting timber can be considered risk-free by operators.”399 The EUTR and the VPA 
system work together in the European market to facilitate trade in legal timber.400 The 
idea was that illicit timber from partner countries could be removed from the European 
market by issuing FLEGT licences exclusively for timber whose legality could be 
checked. The EUTR aims to limit trade on the basis of international legality definitions 
rather than enforce its own concrete requirements. The EUTR sets out specific legality 
criteria for timber products regardless of their origin, but timber products with a FLEGT 
licence are excluded from these requirements.401  
 
3.5 Transnational business governance and theoretical contributions towards 
transnational timber legality verification initiative 
 
Conventionally, the policy making have focused on the competence of states to 
collaborate in the development of an international economic activity legal 
framework.402 In recent decades, various environmental and sustainability issues 
remain inadequately addressed and many countries have become susceptible to the 
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economic, social and environmental crisis spreading rapidly across globally.403 
Nevertheless, attention has been concentrated in recent years on new forms of global 
governance that supplement or compete with conventional forms of authority known 
as transnational business governance .404 An understanding of the nature and function 
of transnational governance form a vital part of the search for new approaches to 
environmental governance.405 The transnational governance promotes governance in 
accordance with objective legal prescriptions. It holds at least some governance actors 
accountable in terms of the rule of law through the work of international and national 
courts and other judicial, adjudicative, and enforcement mechanisms.406 
 
Transnational business governance (TBG) refers to systematic efforts to regulate 
business conduct that involve a significant degree of non-state authority in the 
performance of regulatory functions across national borders.407 TBG is long-standing 
in domains including accounting408, electricity409 and kosher food.410 As their scope 
has broadened, transnational codes of conduct, certification and labelling schemes, 
and other TBG initiatives have proliferated. TBG schemes involve diverse actors – 
from individuals to organisations, technical experts to political entrepreneurs, NGOs 
to government agencies to business firms.411 Pursuing diverse interests, values, and 
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beliefs, these actors establish institutions that take highly varied forms and take on 
virtually all of the tasks that constitute regulatory governance.412 
 
Transnational standards for sustainable forestry or agriculture exist in various laws 
governing land use, pesticides, and water pollution. However, the growing literature 
on social and environmental standards, codes of conduct, and certification systems 
routinely overlooks this layering of rules.  Instead it portrays private standards as filling 
a "regulatory void" or "governance gap" created by the inability or unwillingness of 
states and international bodies to regulate a world of mobile capital and global supply 
chains.413  
 
As noted in chapter 2, there have been many efforts taken internationally and at the 
state level by many institutions to curb illegal logging and trade associated with it. 
Consequently, the growing institutional density has spurred the development of new 
concepts in international relations. This has eventually led to the concept of regime 
complexity414 which is a set of overlapping and perhaps even different regimes which 
share a common focus. The regime complexity can be characterised as a situation 
where there is no single, coherent set of hierarchically enforced rules governing a 
transnational issue or policy area, but instead a set of parallel or overlapping regulatory 
institutions.415 Transnational governance initiatives are constantly facing the issue of 
the complexity of the regime wherein the proliferation of regulatory schemes function 
in the same policy field, supported by variety of public and private actors.416  
 
Overdevest and Zeitlin theorise forestry standards with experimentalist governance 
and argue that experimentalist governance constitutes a promising “regime complex” 
in the forestry sector with the emergence of legality regulations. Cashore and Stone417 
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use the theory of coalition to understand the “nascent” legality regime. In the US, a 
“Baptist-bootlegger”418 coalition of environmentalists and domestic lumber 
manufacturers supported the expansion of the Lacey Act. By using the coalition theory 
Cashore and Stone argue that legality verification can help to build a global coalition 
of firms, governments, and NGOs that can benefit from higher prices and stronger 
standards. Bartley,419 on the one hand, argues that legality verification approaches 
such as the EUTR are likely to undermine private forest certification schemes because 
the former is likely to spur customers and suppliers to meet the compulsory legality 
requirements rather than the more costly and demanding sustainability requirements 
under the latter. As per Sotirov and others,420 the timber legality has a narrower focus 
than sustainability certification and they set narrower political boundaries at national 
or regional rather than global levels, thus making it easier to reach a common 
agreement. 
 
Alter and Meunier421 focus primarily on the adverse effects of regime complexity but 
they suggest it may build more positive interactions between parallel or overlapping 
institutions. Thus, competition between regimes can promote productive 
experimentation by actors pursuing different approaches, reduce the risk of failure of 
any single institution and enhance accountability by creating new opportunities for 
dissatisfied parties to challenge existing rules. From the above theories, it is very 
evident that complex transnational regulatory governance will produce novel, 
problematic, or impactful interactions. As pointed out by Overdevest and Zeitlin, 
Cashore and stone also argue that standard-setting can in the form of timber legality 
regulation strengthen one another and evolve, such that an apparent weakening of 
standards can lead to stronger standards in the future. Nevertheless, they also indicate 
that legality standards are weaker than their own sustainability standards.  
                                                          
418According to Bruce Yandle, Durable social regulation evolves when it is demanded by both of two distinctly 
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foundation for political action. "Bootleggers" are much less visible but no less vital. Bootleggers, who expect to 
profit from the very regulatory restrictions desired by Baptists, grease the political machinery with some of their 
expected proceeds. They are simply in it for the money. 
<https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1999/10/bootleggers.pdf> 
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420Sotirov (n 64)  
421Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier, ‘The Politics of International Regime Complexity’ (2009) 7 Perspectives on 
Politics 13 
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After highlighting several problematic issues related to risk management, the 
infrastructure for certification, and market segmentation, Bartley argues that 
surpassing certification by the legality regime would not necessarily be a negative 
development. As per Sotirov and others422, the timber legality has a narrower focus 
than sustainability certification and they set narrower political boundaries at national 
or regional rather than global levels, thus making it easier to reach a common 
agreement. They use the same coalition theory of “Baptist -Bootlegger” of Cashore 
and Stone to conclude that transnational governance of timber legality regime 
revealed common interests between industry and environmentalists. For instance, the 
timber companies that could easily verify their legality held a competitive interest in 
squeezing out illegal timber; while environmentalists saw new leverage to protest 
against damaging forest practices.423 Although Alter and Meunier424 mainly focus on 
the harmful effects of regime complexity, they also suggest that it can generate more 
positive interactions between parallel or overlapping institutions.  
 
These theories provide contrasting views on relationship between public-private 
interactions. Meanwhile, some scholars are predicting that legality regime will promote 
the voluntary initiatives that certify sustainable forests. Along the same lines, Cashore 
and Stone425 suggest that public legislation initiatives have strengthened private third-
party certification schemes. On the other hand, Bartley426 opposes such predictions 
and argues that the rise of the timber legality regime could restrict the expansion of 
private forest certification. Keohane and Victor427 elaborate that regime complexity has 
the potential to generate positive interactions in transnational governance. In their 
view, “loosely coupled” regime complexes can emerge as a creative response to the 
failure of attempts to create a more comprehensive and integrated international 
system. Jonsson and others428 highlight that there is a need to reconsider the 
importance of the legality verification regime because legality does not guarantee 
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sustainability in the broader context of the global governance system targeting 
sustainable forest management. The striking common feature of all these theories is 
that scholars are hopeful that the rise of timber legality may remove illegal timber from 
the supply chains irrespective of regime complexity. 
 
The EUTR has facilitated substantial institutional development by private actors in the 
establishment of legality verification and certification schemes. The implementing 
regulation promotes the adoption of private certification and legality verification an 
instrument for achieving due diligence.429 The EUTR puts private certification and 
legality verification schemes under public oversight and thus incorporates them into 
the wider transnational legality assurance scheme. The emergence of transnational 
approaches to tackle illegal logging and associated trade by verification of legality has 
triggered discussion on the consequences for the global timber trade regime.430 This 
thesis helps assessing to what role legality verification plays in effectiveness of EUTR, 
to what extent various actors or stakeholders support transnational legality verification 
mechanism in the form of EUTR and whether legality verification affect uptake of 
private forest certification schemes. The research also helps in evaluating the different 
challenges emerged due to the legality verification instrument for operators or 
importers such as interpreting the rules, documenting the verifying timber legality and 
appropriate actions to mitigate the risk. The research helps in identifying if the 
transnational timber legality initiative like EUTR may construct an effective legality 
regime from distinct components with diverse interests or constitute a constraint for 
the businesses to achieve the legality regime and create a barrier to transparency and 
hence effectiveness. 
 
 
                                                          
429European Commission, Implementing Regulation No. 607/2012 of 6 July 2012 on the Detailed Rules 
Concerning the Due Diligence System and the Frequency and Nature of the Checks on Monitoring Organisations 
as Provided for in Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down the 
Obligations of Operators Who Place Timber and Timber Products on the Market.  
430Iben Nathan and others, ‘Facing the Complexities of the Global Timber Trade Regime: How Do Chinese wood 
Enterprises Respond to International Legality Verification Requirements and What are the Implications for 
Regime Effectiveness’ (2018) 92 Forest Policy and Economics 169  
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3.6 Transnational business governance (TBG) and experimentalist framework for 
analysis 
 
 
To evaluate the regulatory effectiveness of transnational interactions poses significant 
analytical challenges. Diversified body of transnational business governance is 
emerging but the understandings of the interactions or relationships between different 
actors or how regulatory forms co-evolve, reshape or perform with each other are still 
minimal.431 The interactions take place at multiple levels of analysis. At the micro level, 
the individuals and organisations that create and act within TBG schemes, the meso 
level of schemes themselves and the macro level of regulatory complexes.432 
Similarly, units of analysis and the regulatory components can vary with more 
comprehensive interactions433 within public-private regime complexes.434 According to 
Eberlein and others435, a single approach or theory cannot encompass the full 
complexity of the TGB initiative. 
 
The experimentalist Governance represents a form of adaptive, open-ended, 
participatory, and information-rich cooperation in which the local actors interact 
through the localised and transnationally agreed to norms, subject to the periodic 
revision in light of knowledge locally generated.436 The experimentalist approach has 
several fundamental advantages.437 Though adapting common goals, it 
accommodates diversity to different local contexts and provides a system to 
coordinate learning from local experimentation. Since both the objectives and means 
of achieving them are explicitly conceived as provisional and are subject to revision in 
view of experience, the problems identified in one implementation phase can be 
corrected in the next iteration. Transnational experimentalist regimes seem to emerge 
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in many key issue-areas, such as finance, energy, telecommunications, food safety, 
disability rights, data privacy and environmental sustainability.438  
 
The experimentalism has received considerable attention as a new model of 
governance for emerging challenges within the transnational governance system.439 
The experimentalism has been presented mainly as a response to strategic 
uncertainty where the parties are facing problems but aware that their preferred 
problem-solving strategies cannot succeed and therefore are willing to engage in a 
joint investigation of possible solutions.440  FLEGT is an example of how 
experimentalist regulation along global supply chains may stimulate the construction 
of a jointly governed transnational regime involving public and private actors from 
developed and developing countries. However, other pathways are also possible, and 
comparison among them is likely to prove fruitful. As mentioned in the chapter earlier 
about the failure of international forest dialogues and regime complexity, the 
experimentalism within EUTR proves to be the correct measure to address the issue 
of illegal logging and develop forest governance structure in tropical countries. 
 
The experimentalist governance offers more significant policy space to the nations and 
regions in pursuing broadly shared goals, arguably makes it compelling and legitimate. 
However, the same diversity that makes experimentalist governance attractive can 
also make it difficult to get a transnational regime to diverge from the framework 
goals.441 Thus, too many participants with different perspectives may make it hard to 
reach an initial agreement on common framework goals. Conversely, a single 
dominant player may be able to reject other proposed solutions even if he cannot 
impose his own. In the case of application of Experimentalist Governance to law-
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making in European private law, especially consumer law, While there is agreement 
in the EU that markets should be regulated to ensure the economic and social inclusion 
of consumers,442 the diversification of law making across public and private actors 
creates a complex picture within which it is uncertain that by whom the responsibility 
will be taken for ensuring consumer protection.443 
 
The EUTR definition of due diligence allows operators to be diligent in assessing risk 
and mitigating risk. The EU plays a much stronger role in overseeing due diligence 
than in the Lacey Act and by comparison to the EUTR, the Lacey Act does not 
specifically allow outside actors to provide due diligence.444 The EUTR is much better 
in terms of the institutional development that it needs along the supply chain than the 
Lacey Act and as it is likely to produce more performance-based and risk information, 
the EUTR contributes to a more sustained experimentalist architecture. 
 
Overdevest and Zeitlin445  have substantially contributed to the theory of 
experimentalist governance in the European Union and defined “experimentalist 
governance as a recursive process of provisional goalsetting and revision based on 
learning from the alternative approaches to progress these goals in different contexts”. 
They further explained that in the most developed form experimentalist governance 
framework involves a multilevel architecture. This multilevel design consists of four 
elements, explained below, which are linked in a repetitive cycle. Furthermore, 
experimentalist governance regimes are strengthened by ‘penalty default’ 
mechanisms that encourage reluctant parties to cooperate by threatening to impose 
adequately unattractive alternatives.446  
 
1. Broad framework goals, such as prohibiting the import of illegal timber, and 
metrics for assessing their accomplishments are provisionally established by 
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Rights, and in Artt 114 and 169 TFEU < http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_2.2.1.pdf> 
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some combination of ‘central’ and ‘local’ units, in consultation with relevant 
stakeholders. 
 
2. These established central or local units can be public, private or hybrid 
partnerships (such as monitoring organisations, enforcement authorities, forest 
certification bodies, timber trade associations, civil society organisations)  and 
they are given adequate preferences to follow the framework goals in their way. 
 
3. As a condition of autonomy, these units must regularly report about their 
performance and engage in a peer review whereby their results are compared 
to those of others employing different means to the same ends. If the progress 
is not satisfactory against the agreed indicators, the local units are expected to 
show that they are taking appropriate remedial measures, informed by the 
experience of their peers. 
 
4. Stakeholders regularly review the goals, metrics, and decision-making 
procedures themselves in response to the challenges and possibilities 
discovered by the review process, and the cycle repeats. 
 
Based on the above four broad elements of the experimentalist governance, this thesis 
develops a similar analytical approach to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulation 
with a transnational form of governance aimed at discouraging illegal timber trade. 
This analytical framework helps in examine interactions within a single scheme 
including among actors that set standards, implement them and review them. The 
research framework helps in determining if the above mentioned four broad elements 
of experimentalist governance help in overcome challenges within illegal timber trade 
and develop a coherent approach between diverse stakeholders working towards the 
same objectives. This framework also helps in assessing interactions with 
transnational timber legality verification initiative that address different issues within a 
single sector such as timber legality and sustainability.447 The analytical framework 
including the stakeholders also helps in assessing the potential of experimentalist 
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governance in simplifying the transnational governance for the businesses to comply 
with timber regulation obligations. 
 
The analytical approach with experimentalist governance and stakeholder’s analysis 
identifies if the experimentalist governance mechanism displays a robust capacity to 
improve existing timber regulation with regime complexity. Inspired from the four 
experimentalist elements, the analytical framework has been developed that includes 
different components or instruments of the EUTR and the experiences or perspectives 
of various stakeholders with their components. To evaluate the effectiveness of the 
EUTR. The implementation of the EUTR, the compliance mechanism, penalty regime, 
timber industry awareness, due diligence requirement is some of the components 
which have been assessed during the empirical research with different stakeholders. 
Chapters four and five have more in-depth detail on components of the EUTR and 
empirical research.  
 
The international forest governance has failed to develop legally binding agreements 
to address the issues such as illegal logging while experimentalist governance 
appears promising but it often untested.448The empirical evidence to the 
experimentalist governance would make a precious contribution to the governance of 
transnational timber legality verification initiative in reshaping the international 
decision-making process to effectively respond to uncertainty and ultimately 
strengthen the problem-solving function of international law.449  
 
The research methodology chosen for the thesis is a combination of the black letter or 
doctrinal and empirical approach. It must be noted that doctrinal and empirical legal 
research is the ultimate way to find the answers that have been raised in the context 
of attempts to understand the emerging issues in the framework of the law. Both 
methodologies are of equal importance for development and understanding of the law 
and often the combination of methodologies can work together to achieve a better 
                                                          
448Gabrielle Goldstein and Christopher Ansell, 'Experimentalist Governance in Global Public Health: The Case of 
UNAIDS' (2018) 35 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 219 
449Armeni (n 439) 
103 
 
understanding of the law depending on the research questions.450 The use of multiple 
methods results in higher reliability than a single methodological approach to a 
problem.451 The next chapter helps in evaluating the legal instruments of European 
Union Timber Regulation by black letter approach. The doctrinal approach is the 
necessary prerequisite for undertaking empirical analysis of law.452 
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Chapter 4: Evaluating the legal instruments of European Union Timber 
Regulation by black letter approach 
 
 
As mentioned in the chapter 1, world’s forest are at risk from deforestation and 
degrading very rapidly453 with forest area of 1.3 million square kilometres lost between 
1990 and 2016; it is the equivalent of 800 soccer fields of forest lost every hour.454 
Fighting deforestation and achieving sustainable forest management are very complex 
issues. It is very evident that despite all efforts, conservation and sustainable use of 
forests cannot be ensured by current policies. Therefore, stringent actions are needed 
to manage forests sustainably and create new forest coverage to play a crucial role in 
our sustainability policies. Solutions need to be country specific and region specific, 
with an overall dual objective of safeguarding existing forests, particularly primary 
forests, and substantially increasing sustainable, biodiverse forest coverage 
worldwide. The EU by itself cannot reverse the trend of deforestation and it must be 
part of a global coalition.455  
 
The EU has adopted a significant number of environmental legislation in the form of 
regulations, directives and international conventions. The environment action 
programmes regulated by article 192(3) TEFU, are adopted in the form of legally 
binding decision.456 The article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) stipulates 
that the Union should aim for the “high level of protection and improvement of the 
quality of the environment”.457 The objectives of article 3(3) TEU are completed by the 
environmental objectives in article 191 and 192 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TEFU) which states protection of human health, protecting and 
improving the environmental quality, prudent use of natural resource and 
environmental protection at international level. The EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) has 
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been enacted by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Article 192(1) 
which refers to the environment protection at international level. Thus, EUTR directly 
becomes a part of the environment action programme which is regulated by the article 
191 – 193 TEFU. The EUTR is complemented by the regulation 363/2012458 laying 
down the rules for the recognition of monitoring organizations by the Commission, and 
by the regulation 607/2012459 providing detailed rules for due diligence systems and 
for the checks of monitoring organizations by Competent Authorities. 
 
The European Commission published a proposal460 in 2008 for a regulation which 
states that companies first placing the timber on the EU market must develop and 
apply due diligence system to invalidate the risk of illegal products imported into the 
EU. A strong demand for illegal timber combined with poor national legislation to 
prevent the import of illegal timber has resulted in the EU taking serious measures and 
implementing this regulation at EU level.461 The introduction of the timber regulation 
signifies the transition within the EU by announcing a statutory requirement which 
requires that if timber is to gain access to the EU market, it must be harvested 
legally.462 The EUTR has become applied directly across the EU on 3rd March 2013. 
The EUTR was implemented in the UK through The Timber and Timber Products 
(Placing on the Market) Regulations 2013.463 
 
To achieve the research objectives, it is essential to study the components of EUTR 
by applying the black letter approach which then helps in evaluating the mechanism 
of EUTR that controls the illegal timber. A doctrinal (or black letter) research 
scrutinises law as a written body of principles and involves a critical conceptual 
analysis of legislation.464 Thus, the aim of using the doctrinal research is to assess the 
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principles of EUTR which lays down the obligations on operators who place timber 
and timber products on the internal market for the first time. This chapter examines 
the responsibilities on the private companies and enforcement authorities to achieve 
the objectives stipulated under this regulation. It also discusses the role of forest 
certification bodies, monitoring organisation, due diligence system and timber 
products included in the regulation. The chapter also analyses the implementation 
status of the regulation in the EU and the UK based on the information available from 
the two evaluation reports published by the European union and post information 
review report published by UK Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA). 
 
Before evaluating the EUTR components, it is essential to understand the reasons for 
the European Union to adopt a new regulation as a choice of legal measure and what 
were the deficiencies in the current position that EUTR addresses or provide remedies 
with this measure. This chapter also focuses on the current state of implementation in 
all EU member states, reporting requirements exist to the EU and how is the potential 
member state non-compliance is managed.  
 
4.1 The adoption of EUTR timber legality mechanism despite the existences of 
the EU Wildlife Trade Regulations (EUWTR)/CITES 
 
The EU has introduced a variety of regulatory and non-regulatory actions to deal with 
the challenges of deforestation and forest degradation.465 Deforestation and forest 
degradation have a negative impact on many of the EU’s global objectives in various 
policy areas such as conservation of biodiversity, climate change, human rights, peace 
and security, good governance and the rule of law.466 Although forest cover in the EU 
has increased467 in recent decades, the deforestation rate in other regions, especially 
in tropical areas, continues at alarming levels.468 Therefore, significant measures to 
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combat deforestation and forest degradation are necessary to enable EU to comply 
with its related international commitments.  
 
Three fundamental legislative mechanisms that the EU uses to address the issue of 
illegal timber trade: the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR)469, the FLEGT Regulation470 
and the EU Wildlife Trade Regulations (EUWTR)471 which is the EU’s mechanism for 
implementing the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES). The 2003 Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
(FLEGT) Action Plan outlines the EU response to the fight against illegal logging and 
associated trade, by improving forest governance, strengthening law enforcement and 
promoting trade in legally and sustainably harvested timber and timber products. 
Based on the FLEGT Action Plan, the EU adopted two regulations: Regulation (EC) 
No 2173/2005 (the FLEGT Regulation) and Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 (the EU 
Timber Regulation or EUTR). 
 
Although there is no specific global forest agreement/treaty to tackle illegal logging 
and related trade, CITES focuses on the protection of international trade in the plants 
and animals listed in its Appendices.472 CITES is an international agreement which 
came into force in 1975 and currently has 183 Parties having committed to protecting 
>35 000 species from unsustainable or illegal international trade, including several of 
commercially valuable timber species.473 The capacity-building support for 
governance of listed timber species is delivered through the program together by the 
ITTO and the CITES Secretariat and funded primarily by the EU, the United States 
and private sector.474 CITES is implemented in the EU through the EU Wildlife Trade 
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Regulations (EUWTR). In the chapter 2, the significance of FLEGT and EUTR as EU 
policy measure to fight against illegal logging has already been discussed in detail. 
 
Within the framework of the EU Wildlife Trade Regulations (EUWTR), commercial 
trade is prohibited for tree species listed in Annex A475 (with some exceptions, such as 
plantation timber). For commercial trade in timber and timber products that are 
included under Annex B, imports into the European Union require a legality finding by 
both the Management Authority (MA) of the exporting country and the MA of the 
importing country, before the issuance of export and import permits. Likewise, legality 
findings are required for Annex C species, for those countries whose populations are 
listed in this Annex.476 
 
Under the EU Timber Regulation and FLEGT Regulation, timber and timber products 
covered by CITES provisions (timber and timber products listed in Annexes A, B or C 
of the EUWTR) are deemed to be legally harvested and to comply with the EUTR  
requirements and are exempt from the FLEGT licencing requirements.477 As such, 
timber covered under CITES licence may enter the EU without operators having to 
exercise due diligence obligations under EUTR and without the requirement for a 
FLEGT licence. Considering the interaction between these three EU regulations, a 
clear view of the various approaches to ensure the legality is important, to improve the 
effectiveness of the EU’s commitments for addressing illegal logging and related 
international trade. 
 
There are some important differences between the legality required under 
CITES/EUWTR (verification of legal acquisition) and the due diligence obligations for 
operators placing timber on the EU market for the first time under EUTR.478 Under 
CITES/EUWTR legality defined for each shipment whereas according to EUTR, 
legality is specified by the operators for each supply chain. Similarly, with 
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CITES/EUWTR, government officials issue permits for each shipment confirming 
legality whereas with EUTR, it is EU operators who are obliged to ensure legality of 
their supply chains. Under EUTR, the scope of legality is much broader (i.e. covering 
‘all applicable legislation’ in the country of harvest, including rights to harvest, 
payments for harvest rights, third parties’ legal rights and trade and customs), 
compared with laws ‘for the protection of fauna and flora’ considered under 
CITES/EUWTR.  
 
The EUTR requires systematic approach, with the due diligence process being used 
by operators placing timber on the EU market for the first time consisting three steps: 
information gathering, risk assessment and risk mitigation.479 Thus, EUTR explicitly 
requires due diligence in verifying legality, detailing precisely what a due diligence 
system should entail. Furthermore, the traders in the EU have to ensure traceability 
back to the operator by maintaining a record of their suppliers and clients. Under 
CITES, the approach used by MAs for determining legal acquisition is left to the 
discretion of the Parties (i.e. MAs in the country of export), hence practices may vary 
widely. 
 
The EUWTR only requires a ‘documentary evidence’ from an applicant.480 EUTR 
requires ‘documents or other information’481 and exceeds the requirement for 
documents in which the legality risk is high (e.g. draft guidelines suggest that the risk 
mitigation may include field visits, audits and third-party verification). Central to the 
EUTR, legality is traced throughout the supply chain, back to the sub-national region 
and harvest concession where appropriate. This aspect is less emphasised in the 
context of CITES/EUWTR, but the 2018 EUWTR guidance document482 points out that 
timber legality ought to be from harvest to export, traced across the supply chain, 
bringing the EUWTR into closer alignment with the EUTR.  
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Under EUTR, Competent Authorities (CAs) carry out checks on operators and traders. 
They can be penalised in accordance with national legislation of the Member States.483 
CITES non-compliance is designed to focus on broad governance changes rather than 
resolving particular offences. Under EUWTR, suspension and negative opinions can 
be formed for imports in EU of species/country combinations of concern. EUTR 
stipulates that individual operators can also be sanctioned, including fines and 
prosecutions, following CA checks.484 
 
As described above, there are differences in achieving the timber legality verification 
in accordance with the CITES/EUWTR and the due diligence requirements for 
operators placing timber on the EU market for the first time under the EUTR. Notably, 
the EUTR due diligence obligations consider a much broader scope of laws in the 
country of harvest and have a more comprehensive methodology, with the due 
diligence process including data collection, risk assessment and risk mitigation. 
Nevertheless, the success of the EUTR depends on operators being aware of their 
due diligence obligations and implementing effective due diligence programmes, while 
the responsibility for granting import permits and checking legality under the EUWTR 
rests with the EU management authorities. The challenge within the EU, despite the 
exemption for CITES-listed timber under EUTR and FLEGT, is how best to achieve 
greater consistency and compatibility ensuring that timber protected by Annex I to the 
EUTR entering the EU market is legally sourced, whether it enters on a CITES permit, 
FLEGT licence or EUTR due diligence obligations apply to it directly. 
 
4.2 Elements of the EUTR 
 
The timber regulation broadly contains three main elements. First, it prohibits the 
placement of illegal timber and related products on the EU market.485 Second, it 
implements a system of ' due diligence ' that obliges operators to ensure that timber 
and timber products placed on the internal market are derived from legally harvested 
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timber.486 The third component is regulatory or enforcement mechanism to ensure that 
operators comply with the due diligence requirements.487  
 
The timber regulation stipulates several requirements for different actors operating in 
the timber industry. This section highlights the role of different legal instruments of the 
EUTR including the sets of obligations that apply to certain non-state actors that carry 
out timber-related economic activity in Europe. The EUTR obligations that apply to 
non-state economic actors are two distinct groups: operators and traders. The UK 
enforcement agency, monitoring organisation, UK penalty system developed and the 
role of forest certification have also been discussed in this section. The study of various 
components of EUTR helps in critically analysing the existing statutory provisions and 
also helps in evaluating the potential of the regulation in controlling illegal timber trade 
which has been discussed in detail in section 3.3. 
 
 
4.2.1 Obligations to operators and traders and due diligence requirements 
 
(A) Responsibilities of operators 
 
The timber regulation provisions applies to timber harvested in the EU or outside and 
specify that the timber legality assessment should be made referring to the laws 
established in the country of harvest. The timber regulation makes it illegal to place 
illegally harvested timber on the EU market and requires due diligence from operators 
or companies that first place timber on the EU market and take sensible steps to 
determine that the timber or timber products being placed on the market by them have 
not been harvested illegally.488 The 2016 guidance document published by European 
Commission defined placing on the market when an operator first makes timber or 
timber products available on the EU market for distribution or for use in the course of 
its commercial activity. 
 
                                                          
486Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 Article 6 
487Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 Article 7 
488Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 Article 4 
112 
 
The regulation states that operators shall apply the due diligence system to each 
specific type of timber or timber product supplied by a supplier. A "due diligence 
system" can be described as a documented, tested, step-by-step method, including 
controls, aimed at producing a desired outcome in a business process. The process 
of due diligence requires operators to access specific information on thecordsre timber 
including country of harvest, species, and quantity to assess the risk of timber illegality 
concerning relevant risk criteria.489  
 
Operators while importing or placing the timber or timber products must identify, 
analyse and mitigate the risk of illegally harvested timber or timber products being 
placed on the market, considering the appropriate risk assessment criteria. The risk 
assessment criteria must assure legal compliance and prevalence of legal harvesting 
of tree species in a country of harvest.490 An operator needs to know relevant risk 
factors to incorporate them into their due diligence process.491 During the risk 
assessment, if the risk identified is negligible, operators are still required to request all 
the details from the suppliers and need to keep the necessary documentary 
evidences.492  
 
There are three possible pathways to validate due diligence established EUTR. The 
first is possession of a valid FLEGT VPA license. As mentioned in the above section, 
the timber and timber products with FLEGT-license are proof that the timber is legal 
and complies with the requirements of the EUTR. In this scenario, the operator can 
place FLEGT licensed products on the market without any obligation of exercising due 
diligence. As per article 3 of the EUTR, the timber products imported under the EU 
Wildlife Trade Regulation (EC) No 338/97493, which implements CITES in the EU, have 
also been exempted from the due diligence requirement. “The timber species listed in 
Annexes A, B or C to Regulation (EC) No 338/97 shall be considered to have been 
legally harvested for the purposes of EUTR.” Second, operators can develop their own 
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due diligence system, with full risk assessment, risk mitigation, and regular evaluation 
procedures. Third, they can use a system developed by a monitoring organisation 
(MO) recognised by the European Commission (EC) which has been described in the 
latter section of this chapter.  
 
For the operators maintaining their own due diligence system, it is their responsibility 
to regularly evaluate the due diligence system they have developed and ensure that 
all the responsible actors of a supply chain are aware about the requirements and 
implementing the correct procedure to comply with EUTR.494 The evaluation should 
for example check whether there are documented procedures for collecting and 
recording vital information about supplies of timber product, assessing the risk if 
product contained illegally harvested timber, and describing actions to mitigate 
different levels of risk. The proof of timber legality is decided based on the 
documentary evidences and on the elements of due diligence process that operator 
implements.  
 
(B) Role of traders 
 
Traders are all those organisations or buyers who sell or buy timber or timber products 
that have already been placed on the European market by the operators. It means 
responsibilities rest upon the individual or unit that first places timber on the EU market 
(the operator) but there is also record-keeping requirements applicable to entities 
further down the supply chain (traders). Obligations specifically related to the traders 
are simple and are designed to provide timber and timber products that traders are 
dealing in can be tracked throughout the supply chain. The traders in the supply chain 
must be able to identify the operators or traders who have supplied them and, where 
applicable and whom they have supplied timber or timber products. The information 
must be retained for at least five years.495  
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4.2.2 Role of Competent Authority (CA) and Monitoring Organisation (MO) 
 
(A) Duties of a competent authority 
 
The successful implementation and compliance of the timber regulation depends on 
simple, consistent processes and requirements being implemented, as well as on the 
availability and use of relevant information.496 The EU member states are required to 
designate their competent authorities497 and need to establish ‘effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive’ rules on penalties for infringements of the provisions of the 
regulation.498 In the UK this responsibility has been placed on Department for 
Environment Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA) who have nominated the Regulatory 
Delivery, previously known as National Measurement Office as the competent 
authority. Now the Office for Product Safety and Standards (Safety & Standards), part 
of the department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), is the 
Competent Authority (CA) for to enforce the Regulations on behalf of DEFRA. 
Competent authorities are the public authorities who implement and enforce the timber 
regulation. The competent authorities must carry out checks on operators,499  
monitoring organisations,500 traders and maintain and communicate records of their 
actions.501 
 
Competent authorities must regularly carry out checks and may also carry out 
inspections when in possession of relevant information suggesting risk factors or a 
breach of the law, from third parties which can include NGOs. Civil society 
organisations are expected to play a supervisory role, as the EUTR requires 
competent authorities to investigate substantiated complaints by third parties.502 The 
competent authority must have appropriate authority and resources to carry out its 
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role.503 In Accordance With That, obligations of the competent authority are to identify 
implementation actions necessary at national level. 
 
Competent authorities must conduct checks on operators to verify that they are 
compliant in line with a periodically revised plan in response to a risk based 
approach.504 If the competent authority identifies flaws in the activities of an operator, 
it can serve the notice of remedial actions to that operator.505 Additionally, according 
to the nature of the inadequacies detected, the member state can take provisional 
measures which may include the seizure of timber and a prohibition on the marketing 
of timber and timber products. These steps apply to corrective actions and should not 
substitute any prosecution steps for infringement. 
 
The EUTR does not indicate that competent authority must carry out checks on 
traders. To apply the sanctions to traders for violations of the traceability obligation, 
checks should first be carried out. Further, the timber regulation stipulates that 
“Member States should ensure that infringements, including by operators, traders and 
monitoring organisations are punished by effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
penalties.”506 
 
Competent authorities must conduct checks on monitoring organisations regularly and 
where a competent authority has relevant information, which could include 
substantiated third parties’ complaints.507 If the competent authority establishes that 
monitoring agency no longer meets the relevant criteria based on tests carried out, it 
must notify the Commission. The Commission is entitled to withdraw recognition. 
Competent authorities do not have the authority to grant or revoke recognition, rather 
they are being consulted throughout the process of recognising monitoring 
organisations. 
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The competent authorities must maintain records that must be provided to the public 
and circulated to other government agencies. If a competent authority detects a 
violation of the terms of the timber regulation, any subsequent disciplinary action will 
be focused on the documents it maintains. Consequently, such inspections must be 
conducted to a standard that will support such enforcement steps. Furthermore, 
records of such checks must be kept in a manner that would be admissible in 
enforcement proceedings. Although notices of remedial actions may be issued by a 
competent authority, it may not be necessary to initiate more formal disciplinary 
proceedings, such as court proceedings. 
 
Besides, competent authorities must work with “each other, with the administrative 
authorities of third countries and with the Commission” to ensure compliance with the 
timber regulation and exchange information on serious deficiencies found by checks 
carried out on operators and monitoring organisations.508 Such cooperation is vital for 
achieving the goals of the timber regulation. Importantly, it acknowledges that the 
Member States’ competent authorities have active responsibilities to cooperate with 
other relevant government agencies. 
 
(B) The concept of Monitoring Organisation (MO) 
 
Monitoring Organisations are a new type of organisation that the European 
Commission will officially recognise. The MOs has to develop and maintain due 
diligence systems that an operator may use. The duties of the MOs are to develop, 
review and enhance information collection, risk assessment and risk mitigation 
systems; to verify their proper use by participating operators; and to take corrective 
action in the event of misuse.509 An operator that is using the monitoring organisation’s 
due diligence system is still prohibited from placing illegal timber on the market. 
Currently there are thirteen monitoring organisations recognised by the European 
Commission across all the EU member states and out of these thirteen organisations, 
six organisations operate within the UK. 
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Since an effective due diligence system is a key tool to ensure that this prohibition is 
not infringed, an operator has a clear interest in ensuring that the due diligence system 
it uses is fit for purpose. A monitoring organization, based on its reputation, has 
legitimacy and prestige, which will suggest to an operator that its due diligence process 
is effective. A monitoring organization can reduce the supervisory burden of a 
competent authority by serving as a provider of a reliable due diligence programme. 
Thus, a monitoring organisation is in the position of significant accountability and clear 
usefulness to an operator and competent authority. This combination underlines the 
value of ensuring the effective establishment and implementation of regulations 
relating to the acknowledgement and removal of the recognition of monitoring 
organisations. 
 
The EUTR recognition provisions for MOs state that they will be subject to scrutiny by 
both the European Commission and the Member States' national competent 
authorities responsible for administering the EUTR. The MOs will be subject to EC 
audit at least every two years and will be subject to further scrutiny if the 'operational 
due diligence systems ' provided to operators fail to exclude illegal material. 
4.2.3 Penalties 
 
Member states must establish penalties for infringements of the timber regulation.510 
Article 19 mentions that the “penalties must be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
and may include fines, seizure of the timber and timber products, and immediate 
suspension of the authorisation to trade.” This means that they should be fixed at a 
level which is sufficiently dissuasive to make sure that in general, companies are not 
willing to break the law. This may take into consideration of the financial benefit of the 
law-breaking companies and the financial loss to communities and governments in 
harvesting country.  
 
Penalties will apply if an operator refuses to practise due diligence and an operator 
fails to maintain their due diligence process. Penalties must also apply equally to cases 
where the concerned timber is derived from the EU Member State or as been imported. 
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If the member states want to depend on existing laws to sanctions for infringements 
of the timber regulation, they must ensure that these legislation already imposes 
penalties on all enforceable duties.511  
 
In the case of non-compliance, the law allows for two forms of measures: immediate 
interim measures; and general sanctions. If, after an operator check, a Member State's 
competent authority detects any deficiencies, it has the authority to issue interim 
measures, depending on the level of seriousness, including: the seizure of timber and 
timber products; or the prohibition of the marketing of timber and timber products.512 
The timber regulation suggests possible penalties that Member States might establish, 
which include fines appropriate to environmental damage, the value of timber products 
in question and economic losses in the form of tax loss. The member state authority 
can also seizure the consignment of timber and immediately suspend the trade licence 
of the company.   
 
The penalties set in the UK Regulations513 for an operator who places illegally 
harvested timber on the EU market and does not maintain and apply the due diligence 
system, obstruct the visiting inspector or fails to act on a remedial notice. The operator 
is liable for up to two years imprisonment or an unlimited fine if convicted in a Crown 
Court. If convicted in a Magistrates Court, the operator may face up to three months 
of imprisonment and/or a fine up £5,000 for each offence. If any operator or trader fails 
to maintain adequate traceability records can be fined up to £5,000 for each offence. 
The fine of up to £5000 has been sanctioned for any person disclosing the information 
received from the competent authority without permission. 
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4.2.4 Forest certification schemes and the EUTR 
 
The EUTR has recognised the forest certification or third-party verification schemes 
as a part of the risk assessment procedure that include verification of compliance with 
applicable legislation. If an operator wishes to use the certification or other third-party 
verification schemes, then those schemes must meet the criteria explained in the 
Article 6(1) (b) and Article 6(1) (c). The criteria include that the scheme must include 
relevant legislation, must conduct field visit at least once in a year to verify that the 
operator complies with applicable legislation, should be able to trace the product 
supply chain before placing on the market and the schemes must include controls to 
confirm that timber or timber products of unidentified origin or have not been harvested 
in accordance with applicable legislation, must not enter the supply chain. 
 
The operators can use credible certification schemes which provides information on 
the origin of the timber and timber products which is an indicator that timber has been 
logged legally514 but it is not an evidence of legality under the timber regulation. 
Certification is one possible tool to assist compliance with the timber regulation and 
provides an important starting point for the risk assessment. So, if the product is 
independently certified and is from a low risk area the risk assessment will be simple. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the Forest Stewardship Council and the Programme for 
the Endorsement of Forest Certification are the internationally recognised schemes 
available for the operators and traders to choose from. Both FSC and PEFC have 
made are in the process of changing their systems to more closely align with the 
requirements of EUTR. 
 
4.3 Product scope of the EUTR 
 
The EUTR does not cover all the timber and timber products placed on the EU market. 
The timber regulation covers most timber products, including paper. However, an 
exception is made for recycled goods and printed materials like books, magazines and 
newspapers. Printed products are exempted from the scope of the regulation at least 
for the first five years. The EUTR uses the Combined Nomenclature (CN) codes as a 
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way of identifying products that are affected by the regulation. The list below indicates 
the products which are covered by the EUTR with their CN codes.  
 
• 4401 Fuel wood, in logs, in billets, in twigs, in faggots or in similar forms; 
wood in chips or particles; sawdust and wood waste and scrap, whether or not 
agglomerated in logs, briquettes, pellets or similar forms  
• 4403 Wood in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or 
roughly squared  
• 4406 Railway or tramway sleepers of wood  
• 4407 Wood sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not 
planed, sanded or end-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6 mm  
• 4408 Sheets for veneering (including those obtained by slicing laminated 
wood), for plywood or for other similar laminated wood and other wood, sawn 
lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded, spliced or end- 
jointed, of a thickness not exceeding 6 mm  
• 4409 Wood (including strips and friezes for parquet flooring, not assembled) 
continuously shaped (tongued, grooved, rebated, chamfered, V-jointed, 
beaded, moulded, rounded or the like) along any of its edges, ends or faces, 
whether or not planed, sanded or end-jointed  
• 4410 Particle board, oriented strand board and similar board (for example, 
waferboard) of wood or other ligneous materials, whether or not agglomerated 
with resins or other organic binding substances  
• 4411 Fibreboard of wood or other ligneous materials, whether or not bonded 
with resins or other organic substances  
• 4412 Plywood, veneered panels and similar laminated wood  
• 4413 00 00 Densified wood, in blocks, plates, strips or profile shapes  
• 4414 00 Wooden frames for paintings, photographs, mirrors or similar objects  
• 4415 Packing cases, boxes, crates, drums and similar packings, of wood; 
cable-drums of wood; pallets, box pallets and other load boards, of wood; 
pallet collars of wood  
• 4416 00 00 Casks, barrels, vats, tubs and other coopers’ products and parts 
thereof, of wood, including staves  
• 4418 Builders’ joinery and carpentry of wood, including cellular wood panels, 
assembled flooring panels, shingles and shakes 
• Pulp and paper of Chapters 47 and 48 of the Combined Nomenclature, with 
the exception of bamboo-based and recovered (waste and scrap) products  
• 9403 30, 9403 40, 9403 50 00, 9403 60 and 9403 90 30 Wooden furniture  
• 9406 00 20 Prefabricated buildings 
 
The EU can change the list of timber products mentioned in the annexure to include 
the exempted products that contain wood. These changes in the timber products can 
be seen in few years’ time once some experience of implementing EUTR has been 
121 
 
acquired. The amendments might be needed to expand the product scope of the 
EUTR considering the future developments. 
 
4.4 Analysing EUTR instruments 
 
The regulations on fighting illegal logging was implemented after extensive 
discussions and with a strong push from the European Parliament. The last 
rapporteur515 of this regulation and Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Satu 
Hassi stated that: “EU legislation to ban the sale of illegally-sourced timber represents 
a major international breakthrough, from the forests around the world that are ravaged 
by illegal logging to the EU market where timber and wood products are sold.”516 She 
also added that “the tough rules agreed would not have been possible without the 
strong backing of the European Parliament.” The regulation is a vital tool to ensuring 
progress in the fight against illegal logging. The law on timber was intended to change 
the timber industry by banning illicit timber from the EU market.517 However, it is 
uncertain whether the protection afforded in the regulation is adequate.  
 
(A) Due diligence requirements for timber industry  
 
The regulation's prohibition requirement is limited to only first importers, excluding 
other timber producers and retailers in the rest of the supply chain. According to the 
European Economic and Social Committee, because of this limitation “the expected 
impact of controlling the risk of placing illegal products on the market is progressively 
reduced as operators in the supply chain can get nearer to the final consumer.”518 This 
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can be argued that with the aid of the traceability provision extended to all timber 
traders, this loophole in the law can be filled. Nonetheless, the traceability duty is 
restricted only to basic information and failure to disclose such details will most likely 
result in no penalties.519 
 
The regulation defines the procedure whereby competent authorities have to audit 
operators, but there is no specific system is made available for auditing traders.  The 
due diligence is only demanded of operators accounts for a concession made by 
drafters of the EUTR, who understood that the due diligence provisions could turn out 
to be quite costly for traders and wanted to avoid imposing undue administrative costs. 
 
The stage at which the timber regulation's key responsibilities are applied is when 
timber or timber products are first made available for sale or commercia introduced on 
the EU market. Broadly, it means that if timber or timber product are first offered for 
sale or commercial exploitation within the EU, having custom clearance if arriving from 
outside the EU, the organisation which does this is referred to as an operator. The 
purpose of exploring how this strategy works in practise is to point out that any 
regulatory regime that attempts to control or otherwise affect commodity trading must 
be vigilant to the point where the key responsibilities have an effect. There must be 
clarity to the party that is regulated, the exact point at which the obligations attached 
must be known, and public authorities must be able to accurately identify those parties 
and have adequate means to take enforcement action where there are infringements.  
The timber legislation defines the types of law applicable to whether timber has been 
legally harvested but does not describe the specific laws falling within those 
categories. The downside is that those affected by the timber regulation need to 
identify the specific laws to be adhered to at national level, thus increasing the 
pressure on individual actors to consider different laws. This indicates the need for 
clear and effective guidlines at Member State and EU level from public authorities.520 
The timber regulation does not determine that the operator needs to be based in the 
EU, it does not clearly specify that an operator can be an entity outside the EU. It is 
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an essential consideration whether an operator can be based outside the EU, which 
has substantial consequences for the way in which the law is enforced. This is 
something that should be clarified from the beginning and, if the controlled group can 
be located outside the EU, care must be taken to ensure that the law itself can be 
applied.521 
 
The timber regulation forces operators to examine whether the timber has been 
harvested illegally. If present risk of illegality is identified, the financial flows that are 
related to that trade are flows that are related to illegal practices. Consequently, in EU 
Member States these could be regulated with a focus on money laundering or the 
movement of assets that are linked to illegal practices. The operators had not 
previously had to question that timber was of legitimate origin but since they need to 
do it now, the associated financial services companies should also pay attention to the 
information produced by timber regulation activity and respond to it. 
 
(B) Assessing the responsibilities of competent authority/enforcement agency 
 
Competent authorities must carry out operator checks and establish a schedule of 
checks or system to determine a schedule involving the identification of operators 
within their jurisdiction and the identification of relevant risk factors and how they will 
be used to decide the frequency of checks. The timber regulation framework 
somewhat answer the first point, by identifying obligations to which the operators are 
prone to. Bearing in mind the absence of further guidance on other points over the EU 
level, accountability is falling with each Member State competent authority to define 
the way to fulfil these steps. The risk is that member states can interpret the relevant 
provisions in a different manner, which will lead to unfair standards of implementation 
throughout the EU. This highlights the importance of creating clear enough stipulation 
from the beginning. The law must be implemented in the same way in each Member 
State and provisions must be clear enough to ensure consistency of approach. 
Essential point here is that more information on how procedures are to run and 
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decisions are to be taken in action will help all stakeholders play their role in regulatory 
framework activity. 
 
There must be specific requirements and standards to be met in order to be 
accountable, transparent and efficient, and accurate information about the application 
of the law itself and the regulated goods must be available and used. For the timber 
regulation to be complied with, the information on how it operates in practice, must be 
made publicly available. Keeping in mind the reality of timber supply chains, a 
substantial amount of information concerning the harvest of timber originate beyond 
the EU, should be provided. Possible barriers to this information include a lack of 
certainty as to which information is essential, how it is to be presented and how it is 
taken into account. The competent authority must provide relevant guidance to the 
operators to simplify the information gathering process. This clarity is necessary for 
public authorities applying the law and for interested third parties to scrutinise the 
operation of the law. Failure to provide relevant information in a timely and open 
manner may substantially restrict the ability of various stakeholders to communicate 
effectively with the legislation, including the right of third parties to request relevant 
information. 
 
With regards to the checks on monitoring organisations, the 2016 guidance 
document522  describes that if an MO provides services to operators within a CA’s 
jurisdiction, the CA should carry out checks on this MO at least once every two years. 
If an MO does not currently provide services to operators within a CA’s jurisdiction, the 
CA does not need to carry out checks on the MO. Though, the CA of the member state 
where an MO has its principal office, has to carry out checks on the MO at least every 
two years. The CAs are being encouraged to share their results amongst themselves. 
Effective liaison between MOs and CAs can help improve the work of both. If the CA 
is aware which operators are using the MOs, it could take account in its risk-based 
planning, for instance by making less visits to those particular operators. This is 
beneficial for the CA, operators and MOs. In the same way, if the CA knows that 
operators are unable to properly use the due diligence systems provided by an MO, it 
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can take this into account, for example through increasing the number of visits to these 
operators. Keep in mind that the MOs are required to share this information with CAs 
referred to in paragraph 8(1)(c) of Regulation 995/2010. If a particular MO discovers 
particular evidence of illegality, it may be of instant use to CAs in all Member States. 
 
As per the first evaluation report523, checks in 19 Member States resulted in remedial 
actions or penalties for violation of EUTR obligations. Many inquiries were conducted 
on the basis of substantiated third-party complaints. A risk-based approach is used by 
all CAs to prepare and review their plans. Risk elements contain the specific features 
of suppliers and their products, the type of operators and third-party evidence (i.e. 
"substantiated concerns").  Not all Member States reported having carried out checks 
in the first evaluation report. The checks started late and were irregular at the 
beginning in several countries due to delays in the implementation of applicable 
national legislation. 
 
With regard to the checks on monitoring organisations, the CAs are obliged524 to carry 
out checks on a MO at least once every two years. In the second half of 2015, i.e. after 
the evaluation period covered by the first report, the checks on the first recognised MO 
were carried out. During the second evaluation reporting period (March 2015 – 
February 2017), all monitoring organisations, except for ICILA S.R.L. in Italy, were 
inspected by competent authorities and none of the inspections resulted in the 
Commission being notified of issues that might lead to the withdrawal of recognition 
as a monitoring organisation. 
 
The Commission has set up an Expert Group on the EU Timber Regulation and the 
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Regulation to ensure 
cooperation between Member States, Competent Authorities and the European 
Commission to ensure compliance with the EU Timber Regulation according to Article 
12 of the EUTR. The Expert Group meets four to five times per year. Concerning the 
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EUTR, it is the duty of the competent authorities and the Commission to exchange 
information on deficiencies found by checks indicated in articles 8(4) and 10(1) of the 
EUTR and on the types of sanctions implemented under Article 19 of the EUTR. 
 
The post implementation review published in April 2018 by UK DEFRA525 suggests 
that during the first two years of implementation of the Regulations, Safety & 
Standards focused primarily on raising awareness as opposed to compliance 
activities, to allow for a period of adjustments for business to adapt to new 
requirements. Since 2015 a much more enforcement-led approach has been adopted 
and the UK CA started to focus on continued non-compliance by operators, resulting 
in two prosecution under the Regulations. 
 
Angora 2011 Limited, trading as Lombok, was convicted on 25 October 2017 at 
Westminster Magistrates Court and was fined £ 5,000 plus expenses after pleading 
guilty at the first hearing.526 The company failed to take due care when placing an 
artisan sideboard on the market, imported on 1 June 2016 from India. Considering 
their mitigation and credit for an early guilty plea, The British timber retailer, Hardwood 
Dimensions (Holdings) Ltd, was fined £4,000 in March 2018, for its failure to ensure 
that timber it placed on the market from Cameroon was legally harvested. The 
prosecution was based on deficiencies in the company’s due diligence systems.527  
 
The UK enforcement authority for the EUTR, recently published a report on the 
plywood imported from China to the UK.528 The report indicates insufficient due 
diligence process, a failure in terms of knowledge of their product when tested, or both. 
Out of 16 companies surveyed, only two companies have supplied satisfactory due 
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diligence system. The report also highlighted the less proactive approach of the 
companies in complying with the EUTR. The overreliance on the certified timber was 
also a significant factor identified under the report. As per the EUTR, certified timber 
does not prove that the timber has originated from a legal source. As per the Article 6 
of the EUTR, there needs to be evidence of the steps taken to achieve negligible risk, 
which was missing as per the report. 
 
(C) Penalty system of EUTR 
 
A consistent system of sanctions is required for effective implementation of the 
regulation. The penalty system is not harmonised in the Regulation since Member 
States are entitled to determine the nature of the penalties as they deem necessary.529 
The only clarification available in Article 19 of the regulation is that penalties should 
be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ and may include fines, the seizure of 
timber and timber products, and an immediate suspension of the permit to trade. The 
expectation is that the competent authorities would act against operators who did not 
implement adequate due diligence systems, or who place illegal products on the 
market.530 As per the first evaluation report, small number of penalties have been 
applied so it could not determine if they are “effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
All member states have range of penalties for potential infringements of the EUTR. 
Penalties can be administrative and criminal in 13 countries, only administrative in 10 
countries, only criminal in two countries and four countries did not specify the type of 
the penalties (administrative and/or criminal).531 
 
The absence of a harmonised system of sanctions is criticised by non-governmental 
organisations.532 If the penalty systems of different Member States varied 
substantially, resulting in a discrepancy between the various measures aimed at the 
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eliminating illegal timber, this could undermine the effective implementation of the 
regulation on a national level.533 Furthermore, considering the international nature of 
timber trade, decisions on the appropriate level of penalties must also take into 
account the penalties imposed or envisaged by other appropriate international legal 
frameworks. 
 
The position held by MEP Satu Hassi on this issue was more optimistic. First, the 
formulation that the penalties should be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ is 
strong enough to avoid major inconsistencies with respect to penalties on a national 
level. Second, it is the European Commission that has to control the adoption of 
sanctions among Member States. Third, complete harmonisation of penalties is almost 
impossible to attain because of the resilient commitment of individual Member States 
to keep their law enforcement systems intact.534 
 
The issue on which there was no consensus between the European Parliament and 
the Council was whether the sale of illegal timber could be considered a criminal 
offence. The European Parliament called for serious timber-related offences to be 
criminalised.535 The European Commission and Council's stance prevailed in the final 
text of the regulation and the criminalization of the selling of illegal timber was not 
implemented. The failure to introduce a criminalisation paragraph for serious timber-
related offences weakens the timber regulation because the Member States are 
unlikely to incorporate criminal penalties for grave timber offences into their legal 
systems on their own initiative.  
 
One example is the United Kingdom. Caroline Lucas, former MEP, has proposed a 
Bill that addresses the holes in the EU regulation and introduces more strict penalties 
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for illegal logging in the UK. The proposed Bill includes measures that make the 
possession and importation of illegal timber a criminal offence. By authorising and 
implementing these measures, the British government backed down, even after 
previous assurances to the House of Commons to go ahead with the timber bill 
criminalising significant timber crimes. 
 
The British government's position is that' the best way to address the global issue of 
illegal logging is through coordinated action at European level. In failing to support the 
regulation's criminalization mandate, Member States were unwilling to fill this gap at 
national level, fearing the extra administrative burden and the necessary changes in 
their criminal processes. Moreover, the UK competent authority indicated a preference 
to work by persuasion, with prosecution only as a last resort for those flagrantly 
ignoring the rules. The proposed UK rules provide a defence if it can be proven that 
proper use has been made of a due diligence system which complies with the 
requirements of the EUTR. 
 
(D) Narrow product scope 
 
The EUTR was designed to provide consumers with assurances that wood products 
purchased in EU member states such as the UK are not contributing to forest 
destruction due to illegal logging. The introduction of the regulation itself marked a 
significant step forward – but it does not go far enough. The Timber regulation covers 
most timber products, including paper. However, an exception is made for recycled 
products and printed materials such as books, magazines and newspapers. As a 
result, illegal timber can still enter European markets in the form of books, magazines 
and other imported products from abroad.536 Printed products are excluded from the 
scope of the regulation at least during the first five years.  
 
The Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI) and the European Mine, 
Chemical and Energy Workers’ Federation (EMCEF) demanded the incorporation of 
printed products in the Timber Regulation in order to prevent the evasion and ensuring 
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a level playing field.537 The concern expressed by CEPI was that by virtue of being 
converted into printed products, thousands of tonnes of paper could slip into Europe’s 
markets under the EU’s regulatory radar – circumventing rules with which 
papermakers inside the EU must comply. Because paper itself is not exempt from the 
regulation, a due diligence process will have to be developed by the European paper 
industry, whereas international suppliers are able to ignore these regulations. Possible 
implications would have been that illegal timber continues to enter the EU market and 
that print buyers will choose non-European suppliers, therefore excluding European 
papermakers and their suppliers. These developments will inevitably eliminate a level 
playing field and contribute to timber regime inequality. 
 
WWF tested the goods coming to the UK that are not protected by the EUTR and 
found many of the samples contain non-declared high-risk species. The analysis of all 
934 wood-based CN codes highlighted that 481 CN codes, or 51%, currently sit 
outside the scope of the EUTR.538 Drawback of the approach is that some industries 
can still trade or import timber products harvested illegally which is an unfair advantage 
to the companies who import timber products which are not included in the regulation. 
For example, some musical instruments are made from high value tropical timber and 
are currently completely unregulated and it might continue to remain out of scope 
because the trading volume is minimal compared to other sectors. The scale of the 
out of scope codes was highly significant with a value of €31.7bn.539 The exclusion of 
some timber products can undermine the impact of EUTR as illegally logged products 
can make their way to the EU market. 
 
EUTR's current scope is not sufficiently extensive to halt the putting of illicit timber on 
the EU market. Widening the CN code list or making it all-inclusive would bring several 
non-timber industries into scope and give it a more level playing field – not only within 
the EU but for all businesses wishing to trade with the EU.  
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(E) Using forest certification schemes for compliance 
 
A first point to take note from the timber regulation is that in certain circumstances, 
voluntary methods alone are not adequate means of influencing the production of a 
particular product. Voluntary certification programs have existed in the wood industry 
for many years Yet convincing and ensuring sector-wide compliance with a high 
standard of harvest legality were not adequate on their own. According to the 2016 
guidance document, when operators are dependent on the certification as assurance 
and purchase from suppliers with chain-of-custody certification, they must make sure 
that the chain of custody certification covers the particular product they purchase. 
 
The timber legislation sets out situations when schemes for certification may be of use. 
In particular, certificate schemes are recognised as potential instruments in the 
exercise of due diligence, evaluating and reducing the risk of illegal harvesting. The 
regulation makes it clear that to be of possible use here, a certification scheme must 
meet the same category of legislation that the timber regulation imposes compliance 
with and would have to meet four criteria stated in previous section. The responsibility 
for considering such a case lies with the operator540 and it has been clarified that the 
certification is a potential but not essential tool. The operator must be convinced that 
the third-party organisation which issued a certificate was adequately qualified and is 
in order with the certification scheme and the appropriate accreditation body. There is 
no requirement to use voluntary certification schemes; instead, each operator can 
decide whether or not to do so; the operator will remain liable in any case.541  
 
Despite all these provisions, questions remain to be asked regarding how the 
certification schemes can be used in the practice. In order to make possible use of 
voluntary certification schemes in the operation of law, detailed clarity must be given 
as to the extent to which this may be the case. This is about ensuring that the Timber 
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Regulation works properly. The research by Proforest542 has shown that none of the 
existing private schemes is fully compatible with EUTR and FLEGT VPAs. 
 
(F) The impact of FLEGT VPA or CITES licenses on EUTR 
 
The timber regulation creates special recognition for VPA or CITES licences by 
providing for the automatic recognition of timber and timber products with these 
licences as legally harvested.543 This creates an incentive for countries to engage with 
the EU in a VPA, which is arguably aimed at facilitating more comprehensive reforms 
of national forest governance systems. Generating, storing and, where appropriate, 
sharing information about illegality risks in timber supply chains and imports is central 
to efficient enforcement of both CITES and EUTR requirements.544 The decision to 
link the EUTR explicitly with the legal framework for the enactment of CITES in the EU 
could appear at first view to create a loophole in the EUTR, since the legal validation 
element of CITES export permitting is significantly weaker in some timber range states 
than would be expected under a VPA or the EUTR. 
 
The FLEGT action plan initiated in 2003 but only one country has yet been permitted 
to deliver FLEGT export licenses. Indonesia has become the first and only country to 
issue FLEGT licenses in November 2016. Indonesia, which has been establishing its 
own national Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAs) 545 for over ten years, has 
been piloting checked timber shipments in collaboration with EU Member State 
authorities. Apart from Indonesia, five other countries are in implementing stage of 
their VPAs (including Ghana, Liberia and the Republic of Congo) and nine others are 
in negotiations with the EU. Ghana, began the process of VPA with the EU in 2008 
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and signed its first VPA in the same year, was expected to deliver FLEGT license 
timber by the end of 2013, has not yet reach this target.546  
 
There is a serious risk that the continued failure to deliver FLEGT licences in 
conjunction with the onset of EUTR legality verification requirements will lead to the 
unravelling of the coalition in many countries supporting VPAs. With the distribution of 
FLEGT licences in many VPA countries still off for some years, the opportunities may 
flow in the reverse direction, leading local producers and European buyers to seek 
private solutions such as certification to meet EUTR's due diligence requirements. 
These innovations are likely to penalise domestic forestry firms that have actively 
participated in multi-stakeholder VPA processes to define agreed legality concepts 
and matrices for verification.547 This may drive smaller local producers who cannot 
afford the costs of private certification to direct their sales towards less remunerative 
Asian markets. 
 
(G) Supporting role of Monitoring Organisations (MOs) 
 
Any organisation may, in principle, qualify as a monitoring organisation provided that 
it operates as a legal entity, possesses the requisite expertise and does not have any 
conflicting interests in conducting these functions. Even though there is no mention of 
remuneration in the timber regulation, it is most likely that a monitoring organisation 
will charge operators for the services provided or have some form of pre-existing 
relationship with the operator by offering the service as an advantage to an ongoing 
association. 
  
The regulation does not provide any specific information on the European 
Commission's criteria for recognising monitoring organisations. However, paragraph 
28 of the preamble of the regulation clearly states that “the Commission should be 
empowered to adopt delegated acts per Article 290 of the Treaty of the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) concerning the procedures for the recognition and 
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withdrawal of recognition of monitoring organisations”.548 The 2016 guidance 
document549 clarifies that MOs must be aware that, even if they do not have an office 
in a specific member state, if the CA of that Member state intends to carry out a check 
on them, they need to provide staff and to make the information available to the CA at 
the CA’s convenience.  
 
4.5 Current state of implementation of the regulation in the EU 
 
Article 20(3) of the EUTR allows the Commission to review the application of the 
Regulation, on the basis of Member States' reports and the experience, "the 
functioning and effectiveness of the Regulation, including in preventing illegally 
harvested timber or timber products derived from such timber being placed on the 
market.” In 2016, The Commission's review takes the form of an evaluation under the 
EU's Better Regulation Guidelines. This includes answers to five questions of 
evaluation: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU-added value. The 
assessment involves EUTR’s first two years of operation. Besides, Article 20 stipulates 
that, based on reporting and experience with the application of the EU Timber 
Regulation, the Commission shall review the functioning and effectiveness of this 
Regulation by 3 December 2015 and every six years after that. 
 
The evaluation revealed that there were discrepancies across the EU over the period 
from March 2013 to March 2015. In the reporting period, a Few Member States began 
to implement the EUTR only late. The commission has conducted bilateral dialogue 
with eight Member States, which has been successful in fast-tracking enforcement 
with the majority of them. In 2015, however, the Commission initiated legal action 
against four non-compliant Member States. All Member States, except in the case of 
Spain, reported having named a Competent Authority (CA) to control operators ' 
compliance with EUTR requirements. These institutions ' institutional structures, legal 
powers and status vary from one Member State to another, reflecting different legal 
and institutional frameworks. 
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A broad variance has been identified in the human and financial resources available 
for EUTR implementation and compliance. Existing human resources vary from 
around 1 to 200 person/month.550 The assessment report suggested that EUTR 
implementation and compliance during the first two years were sluggish and 
inconsistent and is still incomplete. During the first two years of operation, inconsistent 
implementation and patchy compliance did not encourage the creation of a level 
playing field to protect operators from unfair competition from products made from 
illegally harvested timber. 
 
This second report551 on the implementation of the EUTR indicates steady progress 
after four years of its implementation. Nearly all countries meet EUTR's formal 
requirements. During the reporting period, there has been a substantial increase in the 
number of reviews and penalties imposed for EUTR violations. Despite clear progress, 
ongoing efforts are needed to ensure that EUTR is applied consistently and effectively 
across countries. Uneven implementation can have potential implications for market 
operators in term of both legislative effectiveness and a level playing field. More than 
17,700 controls on operators placing domestic timber on the market and approximately 
2,800 controls on operators placing imported timber on the market were carried out 
over the reporting period. Report indicates, however, that the number of checks on 
operators deal with domestic timber varied significantly between Member States, from 
thousands to no checks. 
 
Some EU countries have stepped up their law enforcement over the past couple of y
ears. A Swedish court ruled in 2016 that Almtra Nordic breached the EUTR for impor
ting tropical wood from Myanmar without adequately evaluating the risk of illegal logg
ing of the timber.The case set a significant precedent under the EU Timber Regulatio
n for companies to fully trace their supply chains back to where the timber washarve
sted.This sparked a flood of compliance actions across Europe, with countries such 
as the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK fining companies who did not comply with t
he law. 
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The number of checks remained relatively low in several countries compared to the 
number of operators and should make further effort to ensure that scope and quality 
of the checks carried out reflect a more consistent EU wide approach. In 2017, the 
commission published a letter of formal notice to Belgium on the quantity and quality 
of checks carried out by its competent authorities and, respectively, a reasoned 
opinion to Slovakia on the penalty rules applicable to violations of EUTR provisions on 
imported timber. The Commission is also has bilateral dialogues on the introduction of 
EUTR with a variety of member states. Although progress has been made in some 
countries, the current level of technical capability and resources available to the 
competent authorities (both human and financial) does not always meet the needs and 
must be strengthened in most of the Member States to increase the number and 
performance of enforcement controls. 
 
The biennial report indicates a positive response from the participants towards to 
overall implementation of EUTR but some major challenges still exist. Only a few EU 
countries have shown some commitment to enforcing the EUTR. Some lagging 
behind, especially in critical tropical timber import countries such as Belgium, or those 
in the south of Europe. Very little information is made available to the public on EUTR 
compliance by member states. Further data is necessary to demonstrate the success 
of the EUTR or lack of progress and to preserve the integrity of the system, both within 
the EU and in countries exporting timber. 
 
There needs to be a robust enforcement of the regulation and penalties from all EU 
member states for the infringement of the regulations to eradicate the import of illegal 
timber and timber products. This matters because countries that are trying to enforce 
the EUTR are being undermined by those that are not and when high-risk products 
are put on the market without proper controls, they can travel across Europe easily. 
This creates a competitive disadvantage on firms that work under stricter rules. 
 
4.6 Can the legal framework be strengthened by black letter research? 
 
The critical question is whether the EUTR has stopped illegally harvested timber 
entering the EU supply chain. It has undoubtedly strengthened operators' ability to 
obtain more information from the supplier but this needs to be more than just a paper 
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exercise in high-risk areas where third party verification is still the best solution. 
Greenpeace, the environmental NGO operating worldwide, monitoring of the situation 
since May 2014 indicated that some operators do not collect or keep records of the 
products supply chain and in the process completely ignore the risk factors. They only 
collect official documentation and do not make any attempt go beyond that for verifying 
the information provided by the supplier unless they receive a request from the 
authorities. The EUTR can undoubtedly be a significant positive change for the timber 
industry and for the forests worldwide but its efficiency and applicability in addressing 
the complex issue of illegal logging is a topic which needs to be evaluated at 
application level. 
 
Complicated supply chains, with logs sourced from different areas, are intricate for 
operators to assess and competent authorities to audit. This has been highlighted in 
a report on Chinese plywood complied by the UK competent authority. Moreover, 
various factors have an impact on wood import from tropical countries where illegal 
logging is a massive issue. Weak internal accounting, weak timber logging control and 
faking of timber records make the work more difficult for responsible timber firms.  
 
According to a study552 on company’s due diligence system from North-western 
Russia concluded that most logging companies in Russia lack systems to track the 
origin of wood, except for certified wood. This study highlights major obstacles persist 
in the implementation of legislation by EU member states on the technical 
effectiveness of DDS in relation to the EUTR. Furthermore, the prosecution remains 
unclear, the fine system is not unified and the role of third-party evidence is still 
unclear.  
 
The EUTR confines the trade does not exist in commodities that are illegal in the EU, 
but that are illegal in accordance with the laws of the countries where they have been 
manufactured. In this Way, imported timber and timber products are required to 
comply with the standards for legality that are enforced by other countries instead of 
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criteria developed by the EU. Except if the court in a timber-exporting nation were 
expected to proclaim the timber to be illegal, it would be challenging for European 
courts determining differences that arise under the EUTR to define legal status of such 
timber. They might not be familiar with overseas laws and are probably impossible to 
read many such laws in their original language. The due diligence requirement, which 
indicates how illegality is to be determined, is therefore important to achieve the import 
ban. Despite reliance on improbable rulings by courts in timber-exporting countries, 
European courts can also take advantage of other evidence in determining whether 
the timber imported into the EU has been harvested legally. 
 
The success of the EUTR is highly dependent on the EU – FLEGT programme initiated 
in 2003 and delay in issuing the trade licences can undermine the success of the 
regulation. The forest certification schemes have not been exempted from the 
regulation but it seems to be the most straightforward options to carry out due 
diligence. The over reliance on certification to comply with the EUTR also raised 
concern in the report published by the UK competent authority and there needs to be 
proper guidelines to deal with this raising concern effectively.   
 
The regulation does not mention anything on controlling the timber shipments on a 
border which means the custom officials do not have the authority to check the 
shipment. The regulation has been enforced by the member state appointed 
enforcement agency that carry out the checks on the businesses whose timber-trading 
activities are subject to the regulation. The EUTR is focusing on reducing the risk of 
illegal products entering the supply chain rather than licensing legal ones.553 The 
enforcement procedures and criteria to be used by competent authority must be made 
clear to all stakeholders. Therefore, it must be allowed to actively engaged 
stakeholders who can provide relevant information. These elements are essential for 
ensuring a transparent, accountable system of governance. 
 
The black letter methodology alone is not an suitable methodology to understand the 
practical application of a law or the on-field impact of a legislation. Nevertheless, 
doctrinal analysis needs to support the most legal research, as a strong doctrinal 
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analysis to establish what the law is often a necessary precursor to researching other 
legal questions – particularly in areas in which the law is uncertain or evolving.554 
Doctrinal research is one of the most fundamental methodologies of legal research but 
to identify the effectiveness of EUTR, research methodology which looks beyond pure 
doctrinal analysis needs to be adopted.  
 
To evaluate the efficiency of EUTR, it is necessary to have information on enforcement 
efforts, timber industry awareness, implementation challenges, approach of the 
competent authority and scope of the EUTR in controlling the illegal timber. These 
aspects require a multilevel enquiry with relevant stakeholders which can be gathered 
by empirical research.  The timber industry, enforcement agency, forest certification 
bodies, monitoring organisations, and different research and non-Government 
organisations would be amongst the targeted participants.  
 
The empirical research with stakeholder analysis helps in revealing how the regulation 
has been perceived amongst stakeholders and in finding various positive and negative 
aspects of EUTR’s legal instruments. The number of checks and prosecution by 
competent authority, the application of due diligence system, number of companies 
using the services of monitoring organisation, the system changes made by forest 
certification bodies to comply with EUTR are few examples which have been 
considered during the empirical research method. The questionnaire and semi-
structured interviews have been selected as the modes of data collection for empirical 
surveys. The next chapter focuses on the empirical research method and illustrates 
the step by step procedure to collect responses including the different categories of 
stakeholders involved. 
 
4.7 Empirical/stakeholder studies conducted within the European Union 
on EUTR implementation 
 
The EUTR was welcomed by many stakeholders as a long-awaited effort to curb illegal 
logging.555 However, particularly in the early stages of its implementation, the 
                                                          
554Terry Hutchinson, ‘Valé Bunny Watson? Law Librarians, Law Libraries and Legal Research in the Post-Internet 
Era’ (2014) 106(4) Law Library Journal 579, 584  
555Giurca (n 89)  
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regulation caused ambiguity in international timber markets as the effects and/or the 
requirements were not fully understood or known by stakeholders.556 An effort had 
been made to disseminate information and adapt viable risk assessment and risk 
mitigation procedures through adequate Due Diligence Systems by European 
companies, industry federations, non- governmental organizations and Member 
States.557 Following consultations with stakeholders and experts, the EC 
acknowledged that certain aspects of the EUTR and its non-legislative aspects need 
clarification, hence producing guidance documents and supporting various information 
campaigns.558  Since the EUTR is fairly new regulation, assessments of the effects on 
timber markets of this regulation and its implementation studies are very scarce. 
Papers assessing stakeholders’ interpretations of the regulation are also scant. 
However, how the EUTR is understood and regarded by different stakeholders is of 
paramount importance for the implementation of the regulation.  
 
The results of a 2011 study559 conducted on the implementation of due diligence 
system (DDS) in Romania indicate that the business sector is more likely to be pro-
active in fighting the problem of illegal logging compared to the forest administration 
sector. However, the results highlight that the provision of the EUTR regulation are not 
known by the private sector which is supposed to be held responsible for the 
implementation of the DDS. This stakeholder study, conducted before the EUTR came 
into force, indicated that the stakeholders’ opinion can be beneficial in the negotiation 
process to design an efficient policy instrument if the opinion of relevant stakeholders 
is considered. In another study560 for Romania published in 2016, the relationship 
between the EUTR implementation process and the FSC certification is explored. The 
study used the analytical framework of Transnational Business Governance and found 
that FSC certification helped companies to prepare for and align with the EUTR’s 
                                                          
556 Giurca (n 24) 
557European Forest Institute, ‘Support Study for Development of the Non-Legislative Acts Provided for the 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down the Obligations of Operators Who Place 
Timber and Timber Products on the Market’ (EFI 2011) 
558European Commission, ‘Issues Relating to the EU Timber Regulation Legal Framework for Which Guidance 
Should Be Developed’ (Commission of the European Communities 2013) 
559Raluca Nichiforel and Liviu Nichiforel, ‘Perception of Relevant Stakeholders on the Potential of the 
Implementation of the “Due Diligence” System in Combating Illegal Logging in Romania’ (2011) 15(3) Journal of 
Horticulture, Forestry and Biotechnology 126 
560Ines Gavrilut and others, ‘The Interaction Between FSC Certification and the Implementation of the EU Timber 
Regulation in Romania’ (2016) 7 Forests 
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requirements, in particular concerning risk assessment and risk mitigation procedures 
needed for a due diligence system (DDS). However, the study also concluded that 
development of viable DDS remains problematic as many companies were 
unprepared to undertake this task. 
 
A qualitative study561 on the Impact of EUTR on forest certification strategies in the 
Finnish wood industry suggest that the EUTR is not likely to impact domestic timber 
producers and large importers with existing certification in Finland, while the impact 
will be on SMEs importing timber from outside the EU without any existing traceability 
systems and on downstream wholesale/retail companies providing a variety of wood 
products. The study confirmed that business-to-business customer demand continues 
to be the major driver for the forest certification uptake. Moreover, the demand for 
certified products in not inherently from the consumer markets, but the pressure comes 
from global corporation, governments, NGOs, and investors. In a study562 conducted 
in Germany, the researcher scrutinised implementation of EUTR by gathering the 
stakeholder data between May and August 2014. The study argued that EUTR 
performance in Germany is not generally perceived as ineffective, instead, stakeholder 
perceptions vary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
561Jani Holopainen, Anne Toppinen and Sini Perttula, ‘Impact of European Union Timber Regulation on Forest 
Certification Strategies in the Finnish Wood Industry Value Chain’ (2015) 6 Forests 2879 
562Sina Leipold, ‘How to Move Companies to Source Responsibly? German Implementation of the European 
Timber Regulation Between Persuasion and Coercion’ (2017) 82 Forest Policy and Economics 41 
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Chapter 5: Research setting and empirical methodology 
 
 
One of the main objectives of the EUTR is to establish sustainable and legal market 
for timber trade in the EU. The research hypothesis to be tested is that “The EUTR 
has technical and operational limitations in controlling illegal timber entering the UK.” 
The assessment of EUTR and its principles by Black letter approach in chapter 3 gave 
an understanding that to study the enforcement efforts of EUTR, the views of the 
timber industry on EUTR, due diligence system to identify the risk and mitigation, 
timber products coverage require more than just black letter approach. To test the 
hypothesis, the empirical research methodology has been considered to study the 
various components of the legislation by obtaining information from the stakeholders’ 
experience and their views on EUTR in the form of questionnaire and semi-structured 
interviews.  
 
The following sections explain the step by step process for empirical research method 
adopted for this thesis. The procedure followed to obtain ethical approval from the 
university for the empirical study, the selection of participants to collect primary data, 
questionnaire design and semi-structured interview method for data collection and 
qualitative examination conducted using NVIVO 11 have been explained in detail. The 
resulting research establishes the propositions that empirical method has contributed 
a great deal towards legal scholarship. Moreover, this method can contribute to the 
scholarly understanding of the law, and that the techniques necessary to become 
adept at this method are not so difficult to apply. 
 
5.1 The process of receiving ethical approval from the university before conducting 
empirical study 
 
Any research involving human participants should be subject to an appropriate level 
of ethical scrutiny to protect participants, researchers and the University.563 The 
researcher must consider the ethical implications before finalising the research plan 
                                                          
563Kingston University, ‘Ethics Guidance and Procedures for Undertaking Research Involving Human Subjects 
(Kingston University 2014) <http://cdn.kingston.ac.uk/documents/research/research-policies-and-
guides/documents/ethics-2014.pdf>   
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and prior to begin the research.564 All the researchers must ensure that their projects 
are conducted following the Kingston University’s Guide to Good Research Practice 
and the ethical principles appropriate to their discipline/professional body.  
 
The procedure has been followed under the University’s ethics guidance to get the 
ethical clearance from the Faculty Research Ethics Committee (FREC). Before 
starting the application process, the attempt has been made to design the study to 
mitigate or minimise ethical problems from the outset followed by drafting the consent 
form for participants. Consent form had been kept short and straightforward as 
possible while retaining the relevant information. The draft schedule of questions 
(questionnaire) had been designed which contained a few personal questions but no 
sensitive topics. For example, the name and the nature of the participating 
organisation were included in the questionnaire but name and the sex of the participant 
were excluded. The application along with application form, consent form and 
questionnaire submitted to FREC to get the ethical clearance of the study. 
 
The questionnaire received few suggestions from the research ethics committee. The 
FREC advised to collect data anonymously at source and recommended that online 
questionnaire could be designed to keep the participant’s identity completely 
anonymous. The committee suggested that due to the sensitive nature of the research 
topic (effectiveness of legal boundaries for timber trade) data collection will be highly 
scrutinised. The information for participants’ and brief detail about the research study 
has been added before the commencement of questionnaire. It gives the flexibility to 
respondents whether to be a part of the study or not.  
 
In the ethical approval application, it has also been mentioned that due care will be 
taken for storage and safety of the data on computer systems. It has also been assured 
that the data gathered from questionnaires and interviews will remain confidential and 
will not be disclosed to any third party for any purposes. As per the University’s 
research ethics guidelines, this research project falls under the low risk category and 
has been considered for fast track clearance. In June 2015, after considering the final 
                                                          
564 ibid 
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draft version of questionnaire with all the recommended changes, the committee 
approved the application for empirical study. 
 
5.2 The selection of survey participants to collect primary data and sampling 
method for representative sample size 
 
In any legal system, stakeholders are an integral part of that system as they form the 
basis for the objectives of that legislation. The process of identifying the stakeholders 
or survey participants began during the doctrine analysis of EU timber regulation and 
although the list of survey participants was finalised during the ethical approval 
application, some participants were also contacted during the survey. The 
stakeholders have been identified as per their involvement (e.g. civil society 
organisation) and functioning and governing role of the organisation (e.g. timber 
industry, enforcement authority) within the EUTR regime. For this research, non-
governmental organisations, timber import companies, timber industry associations, 
certification bodies, monitoring organisations, other independent organisations 
working within the field of timber trade are the source of primary data.  
 
Primary data is the raw information collected by the researcher for a specific purpose. 
The aim of collecting primary data is to acquire vital insight on EUTR mechanism which 
enables to examine the timber regulation in more appropriate and effective ways. It 
has also helped in obtaining significant views that are not available in the context of 
purely doctrinal approach. The next section of survey participants describes the nature 
of the participants and the purpose of their selection to obtain the primary data. The 
survey participants are divided into four major categories. The table below shows the 
number of stakeholders contacted, responses received and mode of data collection.  
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Table 2: Number of stakeholders contacted and data collection mode 
 
Stakeholders’ category Number of 
organisations 
contacted 
Number of 
responses 
received 
Data collection 
Mode 
Timber companies Over 250 
companies 
25 Online questionnaire 
Timber trade associations 4 2 Semi-structured 
interview 
Monitoring organisations 5 2 Online questionnaire 
Enforcement agency 1 1 Questionnaire 
UK government 
departments responsible for 
protecting environment and 
woodlands 
2 2 Semi-structured 
interview and emailing 
questions 
Forest certification bodies 3 2 Online questionnaire 
Civil society organisations 4 3 Semi-structured 
interview and EU led 
consultation 
questionnaire 
Other independent 
organisations 
4 3 Semi-structured 
interview 
 
(1) The UK timber industry includes the timber importing companies (large 
businesses and small-medium enterprises) and timber trade associations operating in 
the UK 
 
(2) The Regulating and enforcement authorities includes the UK enforcement 
agency, UK government body managing the enforcement agency and EU recognised 
monitoring organisation operating in the UK 
 
(3) Forest Certification bodies includes the two of the most globally known forest 
certification bodies and independent national certification standard  
 
(4) Civil Society Organisations and other independent organisation includes the 
UK based environmental non-government organisations (NGOs) and other 
independent research organisations actively working for EUTR 
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1. UK Timber Industry 
 
The UK timber industry significantly imports hardwood timber/timber products from the 
tropical countries of South East Asia, South America and from Russia where illegal 
logging is a common issue. The timber industry is a vital source to understand the 
changes in the dynamics of timber import after the EUTR came into effect. The 
response of timber industry in importing timber from outside EU and exercising due 
diligence is significant in understanding the impact of the EUTR on timber industry. 
The changes in timber import volume, awareness towards the EUTR requirements 
and impact on supplier outside EU can be helpful in identifying the future impacts on 
the timber industry within and outside the UK. 
 
To select the participants from UK timber industry, timber importers details have been 
collected from the UK Government website HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) Trade 
Statistics unit. All products imported into or sent out from the EU need to be classified 
for customs’ identification purposes. Each different item is categorised in different 
classification code which is known as Combined Nomenclature (CN) codes. The CN 
codes have been collected for the timber products falling under the scope of the EUTR. 
The names of the timber importers have been gathered by entering the CN codes for 
a specific timber product from the UK Trade Info website. The name of the importing 
companies collected for the import from April 2013 to October 2015. Apart from 
importers, the other players of timber industry such as traders, retailers, saw- millers 
have also been contacted to take part in the research survey to understand the impact 
of the EUTR on their businesses.  
 
There are four major timber trade associations exist in the UK namely Timber Trade 
Federation (TTF), Southern Region Timber Trade Association, Scottish Timber Trade 
Association (STTA) and North-East Timber Trade Association (NETTA). These 
associations have been contacted to take part in the survey and they have been 
provided with a questionnaire link created for timber industry to distribute amongst 
their member companies. The member companies of these associations have also 
been contacted separately to take part in the study. 
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The data from the timber importing companies have been collected through carefully 
designed online questionnaire. During the questionnaire designing process, utmost 
care has been taken to keep the respondent’s identity anonymous. The questionnaire 
designed to detect the awareness of the timber industry and their views and 
experiences after the introduction of the timber regulation. The semi-structured 
interview has been the mode of data collection for timber trade associations which has 
the questions on EUTR impacts on timber companies, the import volume, the 
implementation challenges for companies, the enforcement efforts and overall 
approach of enforcement agency, the effects of monitoring organisations on the 
companies, the timber products covered and illegal timber entering the UK. 
 
2. Regulating and enforcement Authorities 
 
As per article 7 Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 “each Member State shall designate 
one or more competent authorities responsible for the application of this Regulation.” 
The EUTR is implemented in each Member State via national legislation and enforced 
by national authorities. In the UK, Regulatory Delivery Enforcement, Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy acts as the competent authority, contracted 
by the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The competent authority 
has powers to keep a check on operators (Article 10) and need to keep the record of 
checks (Article 11). The data on implementation status, financial and human 
resources, penalty regime, checks carried out by competent authority, key 
implementation/enforcement strengths, weaknesses and challenges have been 
included as the schedule questions in the interview to analyse the efforts. 
 
The enforcement agency as a participant helps to analyse the approach of the 
enforcement agency, prosecution and fines imposed on companies in the case of 
illegalities identified, total number of checks on operators carried out and number of 
cases dealt with. It also helps in understanding operating procedures for different 
circumstances such as carrying checks on operators, due diligence evaluation, 
procedure followed for identification of timber species and products testing during the 
checks, exchange of technical assistance or guidance with other member states or 
European Commission and process undertaken to evaluate the due diligence system 
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developed by monitoring organisations.  
 
The EUTR allows third parties to present ‘substantiated concerns’. To have 
information from CA on the procedure/protocol to deal with these concerns would help 
in rating the organisational aspects of the UK’s CA. In the same way, the CA’s system 
to deal with companies operating without appropriate due diligence could also help in 
the achievements of the CA. As an enforcement authority, the information on 
transparency in the functioning of the CA is a crucial point of investigation for this 
research. The enforcement agency had been contacted several times for the semi-
structured interview but the agency kept on denying the request. After the intervention 
from then supervisor, the agency agreed to answer the questions over the email. 
 
Article 8 of the regulation describes the functions of monitoring organisations. The role 
of EU-recognised Monitoring Organisations is to develop and maintain due diligence 
system that an operator may use to comply with the EUTR. The competent authority 
is responsible carryout checks at regular intervals to verify that the monitoring 
organisations operating within the competent authorities’ jurisdiction. MOs are formally 
obliged to report repeated failures to observe due diligence to the relevant competent 
authority.  
 
Table 3: Monitoring Organisations operating in the UK 
Monitoring Organisations Functions in Recognition Date 
BM Trada All the EU Member States 01.06.2015 
SGS United Kingdom Limited All the EU Member States 
except IT 
30.01.2015 
Soil Association Woodmark All the EU Member States 30.01.2015 
Control Union Certifications All the EU Member States 27.03.2014 
NEPCon All the EU Member States 19.08.2013 
 
 
The MOs are the integral part of the EUTR and its success or failure would help 
correlate and analyse the impact of the EUTR. The number of clients using the due 
diligence of MOs, the operational challenges and the awareness in the industry 
regarding the EUTR would help in evaluating the performance of the MOs. The data 
from monitoring organisations have been collected through online questionnaire. The 
questions on their overall experience with EUTR, the industry awareness on MO, the 
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due diligence regulation they have developed, challenges and issues of MOs have 
been included in the questionnaire.  
 
3. Forest certification bodies 
 
Article 6 (b) of the timber regulation mentions that “operators must apply risk 
assessment procedures to assess risk of illegally harvested timber or timber products 
obtained from such timber being placed on the market.” These procedures shall 
consider “the relevant risk assessment criteria, including assurance of compliance with 
any applicable legislation, which could include certification or other third-party- verified 
schemes.” It is clearly mentioned in the timber regulation that although certification 
could be an aspect in timber legality but only certified timber will not prove that operator 
has implemented due diligence.  
 
It has been observed from the initial analysis that the over reliance on certified timber 
for legality prevails in the timber industry so the legality and sustainability criteria of 
the certification bodies would help in assessing the part played by the certification 
bodies for the timber regulation. The data on changes within the framework of forest 
certification bodies, both FSC and PEFC, to comply with the EUTR due diligence 
system can be helpful in determining the role of the forest certification bodies. The 
information such as the role of forest certification in due diligence regulation and 
maintaining documentation proof required in support of the due diligence can be 
helpful. The assistance from the enforcement agency to forest certification bodies for 
development of due diligence procedure can also be helpful. The online questionnaire 
has been developed to collect data from forest certification bodies. 
 
4. Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and other organisations 
 
NGOs are the one of the most important stakeholders for this research as their 
campaigning and investigating work impact profoundly on timber industry and 
enforcement agency. As mentioned in chapter 1, NGOs played very crucial role in the 
formation of EUTR and they play a key role in recognising the shipments of suspicious 
timber. For example, a shipment from Myanmar carrying the Burmese teak to 
European market was identified by the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA). The 
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EIA investigation revealed that the shipment violated the timber regulation and 
submitted the legal complaint to authorities in five countries regarding violations of the 
European Timber Regulation by nine companies.565 The charges in the EIA’s 
complaint included the failure of due diligence obligations mentioned under the EUTR, 
inability of companies to identify or trace the harvest place and harvesting procedure 
and accepting the documents that were fake according to the two months investigation 
of EIA. 
 
NGOs are very active, particularly in influencing environmental law and policy. NGOs 
and other civil society groups regularly challenge the decisions of public authorities 
(by judicial review) and to divert the proposition of large organisations that they 
consider to be destructive to nature. For example, in 2015 ClientEarth obtained a 
mandatory order from the Supreme Court requiring the government to produce new 
air quality plans for urban nitrogen dioxide limits to comply with the 2008 Air Quality 
Directive.566 NGOs also have powers to bring a derivative action against a company's 
directors to ensure that the environment is fully considered. They also have powers to 
request action under the Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) 
(England) Regulations 2015 (ED Regulations).567 
 
Data from environmental NGOs and independent organisations actively working for 
EUTR has been collected through semi structured interviews. They play an essential 
role not only at the UK level but at the EU level which influences the timber regulation. 
Data from this category will help in understanding the scope of the EUTR and provide 
a broad understanding of stakeholder’s perspective. The schedule of interview 
questions includes their views or experiences with the EUTR, challenges for 
enforcement agency and timber industry, the performance of monitoring organisation, 
timber product scope of EUTR and the amendments or changes they would like to see 
in the EUTR to minimise the existing operational and technical flaws in the EUTR 
                                                          
565Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), ‘Overdue Diligence: Teak Exports from Myanmar in Breach of 
European Union Rules (EIA 2016) < https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-Overdue-Diligence-
FINAL.pdf> 
566ClientEarth vs DEFRA [2012] EWCA Civ 897 
567Coxall Michael and Hardacre Elizabeth, Environmental Law and Practice in The UK (England and Wales): 
overview (Thomson Reuters 2015) <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/6-503-
1654?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1> 
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system. The semi structured interview over skype call and phone has been conducted 
to get their views on above mentioned aspects. 
 
5.2.1 Choosing a sample size (sampling) for empirical research 
 
Commonly, sampling can be explained as selecting members of the population to be 
included in the study. The target population assists in choosing the sampling frame 
which can be explained as a list of people with the target population who can contribute 
to the research and subsequently helps in choosing the sample size. In this research, 
the target population represent specific sections of the society associated with EUTR 
that are better positioned to serve as a primary data source.  
 
The sampling methods are divided mainly into two categories: probability and non-
probability. In probability sampling, each participant of the populace has a known 
possibility of contributing to the study and it incorporates basic, stratified systematic, 
multistage, and cluster sampling methods. In non-probability sampling, group 
members are selected on non-random basis, so not every member of the population 
has an opportunity to participate in the study. Methods of non-probability sampling 
include methods of purposeful sampling, allocation, convenience and snowball 
sampling methods.568 The stratified sampling is a probability sampling method and it 
is suitable for this empirical study as it helps in dividing the population into different 
groups (strata) according to one or more common attributes. The process of stratifying 
reduces sampling error and ensures a higher level of representation of all groups. 
 
A right sample size meets performance, representativeness and reliability criteria. 
However, the size of the sample is no necessary insurance of its 
representativeness.569 Similarly, for this research, primary data has been collected 
from relatively small samples but properly selected which can be much more reliable 
than large samples selected. The sample size has been cautiously chosen to get the 
diverse and ample information as per the research objectives. The number of 
participants surely indicates the sample representativeness but in this research the 
                                                          
568Antje Kirchner, Kristen Olson and Jolene D Smyth, 'Do Interviewer Post Survey Evaluations of Respondents’ 
Engagement Measure Who Respondents Are or What They Do?' (2017) Public Opinion Quarterly 
569Srinivas Rao Myneni, Legal Research Methodology 4th Ed. (Allahabd Law Agency 2009) 11 
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sampling size would not affect the research quality in great deal, except in the case of 
timber companies as the number of timber importing companies in the UK are high in 
number. The number of monitoring organisations operating in the UK, the forest 
certification bodies, the enforcement agency and UK government departments 
responsible for protecting environment and woodland all are limited in numbers. 
 
5.2.2 Incorporating EU’s consultation on evaluation of the EUTR for analysis 
 
Although the size of the sample does not correspond to the representativeness for this 
research, to minimise the effects of lower sample size on the results, the EU’s 
consultation on evaluation of EUTR has been considered for the data analysis. Article 
20(3) of the EUTR requires “the European Commission to review, based on Member 
States' reports and the experience with the application of the regulation, the 
functioning and effectiveness of the regulation, including in preventing illegally 
harvested timber or timber products derived from such timber being placed on the 
market.”  
 
The European Commission conducted a review by considering the EU 'Better 
Regulation'570 guidelines which provides answers to five evaluation questions i.e. 
relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU-added value. Assessment of 
the EUTR launched in April 2015 and covered the period March 2013 - March 2015 
and covers the first two years of application of the EUTR. The purpose of this counsel 
was to increase stakeholder and public participation for EUTR appraisal.  
 
The survey questions were devised using a combination of closed questions as well 
as open-ended comment boxes available at the end of each group of questions. On 
occasion, the open-ended comment boxes led to a wide range of comments that did 
not always match the questions being asked. The questionnaires with detailed 
comments from the stakeholders in the open-ended comment box were selected for 
analysis here for qualitative analysis purpose. The questionnaires with only closed 
                                                          
570European Commission, ‘Communication from The Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The 
European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions: Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance Programme: State of Play and Outlook’ (EC 2014) < https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0368&from=EN> 
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questions responses have not been included for analysis. The inclusion of the 
consultation has significantly contributed to enhance the research quality with diverse 
views of the stakeholders especially on enforcement issues and implementation 
challenges for the timber industry. 
 
Table 4: Number of contributions per sector of activity 
Participants Total 
Responses 
received 
Responses used for 
analysis 
Competent authority for EUTR 11 0 
Other government body 9 0 
Monitoring organisation as per EUTR 7 0 
Certification body or institution 7 3 
Professions organisation or federation 56 0 
International organisation 22 0 
Operators 80 6 
SME trader 6 0 
Consultancy 16 4 
Civil society organisation 28 19 
TOTAL 242 32 
 
 
The table above shows the number of contributions per sector of activity for the review 
and the number of survey have been used for analysis. All the relevant stakeholders 
were invited for this review from inside and outside of the European Union. The total 
number of respondents were 242 which is very low since respondents were invited 
from all parts of the world to take part in this review. 
 
5.3 Data collection by questionnaire and semi-structured interviews method 
 
 
A questionnaire is an instrument to collect information from the group of 
representatives of a target population which in other words known as a sample. It 
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comprises a set list of questions designed to gather responses from respondents on 
a given topic.571 The primary purpose of choosing the questionnaire method is to 
gather maximum responses from the stakeholders, especially from the timber 
companies, with minimum efforts. Also, in this method, the researcher does not go to 
any respondent for the collection of information and multiple respondents can be 
reached easily by merely e-mailing the questionnaire or by providing the link of an 
online questionnaire as in this case.  It gives the flexibility to respondents to decide 
whether to take part in the study and provides the convenience to reply at their own 
time. For this study, the questionnaire method is appropriate because the data can be 
systematically retrieved and reinterpreted in a variety of ways and can be more easily 
coded and prepared for computer analysis.  
 
5.3.1 Questionnaire design 
 
Presser and Zhao show how a shorter question helps the researcher do a better job 
by decreasing the tendency to misread it. Furthermore, the complexity of a long 
question is magnified by the intricacy of the subject matter covered. To satisfy 
research objectives, the importance has been given to identify and clarify the 
questions that need to be asked to avoid any misleading or unnecessary questions 
while designing the questionnaire.  
 
The questionnaire presentation, level of difficulty and sensitivity influences the 
willingness of a prospective respondent to participate. Enhancing question design has 
been one of the easiest, most cost-effective steps that can be taken to improve the 
quality of data.  To achieve relevance, familiarity with questions, objectives of the 
questions and the type of information needed have been planned during the 
questionnaire design. To enhance accuracy, the wording style, type and sequence of 
questions have been carefully selected to motivate the respondents to take part in the 
study.  
 
                                                          
571Maria Teresa Siniscalco and Nadia Auriat, ‘Questionnaire Design’ in Quantitative Research Methods in 
Educational Planning, Series editor: Kenneth N.Ross (UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning 
2005) 
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During questionnaire development, considerable attention has been given to refining 
wording and content. The research questions have been revisited frequently to ensure 
validity and relevance and associated subject literature has been reviewed wherever 
necessary. The words and expressions that are simple, direct and familiar to all 
respondents have been sensibly selected for question formation. In the questionnaire, 
both close-ended (yes, No and Do Not Know) and the open-ended questions have 
been included.  
 
This survey carries a variety of respondents from four broad categories mentioned in 
the previous section. To maintain the accuracy of responses, different questionnaires 
have been designed as per the respondents’ role in this survey. The design of 
questions asked to different stakeholders are different but the theme of the questions 
have been kept similar as per the research objectives. It serves no purpose to ask the 
respondent about something he or she does not understand clearly. 
 
5.3.2 Pilot testing  
 
Reliability and efficiency are essential measures on the consistency of information 
gathered by using the questionnaire. They help in realising if the respondents 
genuinely understand the meaning of the questions as they are stated. The most 
commonly used reliability and efficiency test for questionnaire is the test and re-test 
method that serves as the pilot testing. A pilot study is considered as a tool which 
helps in testing and identifying the initial response of the participants and on the quality 
of the questionnaire. It also helps in allowing researchers to conduct a preliminary 
analysis before conducting a full-scale study or experiment. 572 
 
Pilot testing is a technique used for testing the questionnaire that uses a smaller 
sample compared with the planned sample size. The pilot testing of questionnaire had 
been conducted for timber companies. During the pilot testing, the emails sent to the 
prospective respondents for their consent to participate in the study without including 
the link of questionnaire. It was observed that the response rate was considerably low 
and the strategy has been changed to contact the respondents for consent including 
                                                          
572 Sarah Mae Sincero, ‘Surveys and Questionnaires -Guide’ (Explorable 2012)  
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the questionnaire link in the email. This reformulated approach worked to some extent 
but the rate of response was still meagre.  
 
Due to this, the questionnaire has been redesigned several times to improve the 
response rate. Although open form questionnaire can prove useful where primary 
information to be developed is qualitative in nature, the questionnaire has been 
transformed from open ended questions to the mixture of more close ended questions 
and less descriptive questions. Consideration has been given to the sequence in which 
the items are presented. To engage participants and prevent boredom, descriptive 
questions have been presented at the end. The numbers of questions have also been 
reduced to encourage participation. It has also been observed that response rate 
fluctuates based on the days to send the questionnaire. The strategy applied has 
worked successfully and it was also observed that the response rate was higher for 
weekdays compared to weekends. Pilot studies have helped immensely in identifying 
and rectifying mistakes in the questionnaire that could have a negative impact on the 
information received. 
 
5.4 Semi – Structured Interviews (SSI) 
 
The interview method is a verbal technique for obtaining data and best suited for 
understanding people’s perceptions and experiences.573 The interview provides a 
flexibility in a way that it can be appropriately designed or planned with strict 
determined order to each interviewee in a similar way. On the other hand, the 
interviews can be completely unstructured, like a free-flowing conversation and does 
not include any strict order. In the Semi-structured interview, the interviewer may have 
to ask number of specific major questions, but he may be free to probe beyond the 
answers to these questions. This interview method is appropriate for this study as it 
starts with the assumption that flexibility is needed so that participants are not 
restricted by standardised questions and closed-ended structured answering 
formats.574 A broad range of predominantly open-ended questions that are derived 
from doctrinal analysis and questionnaires have been asked. 
                                                          
573Ann Blandford, ‘Semi-structured Qualitative Studies’ (eds) The Encyclopaedia of Human-Computer 
Interaction, 2nd Ed (Interaction Design Foundation 2015) 
574Irving Seidman, Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social 
Sciences (3rd edn, Teachers College Press 2006) 
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The purpose of SSIs for this research is to ascertain participants’ perspectives 
regarding an experience pertaining to the aspects of EUTR. 575  For this research, 
semi-structured interviews are suitable which involve several open-ended questions 
such as EUTR’s impact on timber industry, enforcement approach, monitoring 
organisations, role of forest certification bodies in timber legality, due diligence system 
and product scope. In the open-ended type of questions, the interview revolves around 
the research topic and provides opportunities for both interviewer and interviewee to 
discuss the topics in more detail.576 Moreover, since the interviewer and the person 
interviewed are both present, there is an opportunity for greater flexibility in eliciting 
information. Also, the interviewer can observe both the subject and the entire situation 
to which he is responding. 
 
Even though the nature of questioning with SSIs is flexible, the questions related to 
the research objectives have been covered. To do that, the interview pro-forma has 
been designed which comprised of predetermined or scheduled primary questions 
followed by sub questions or probes. Arthur and Nazroo577 emphasise the importance 
of careful preparation for interviews, particularly a topic guide known as an interview 
schedule or interview guide. Following the pocket guide advice from Arthur and 
Nazroo, the interview pro-forma has been framed which includes introduction, opening 
questions, in-depth focussing on the core research questions and closure. This 
scheduling corresponds to the stages of an interview process.  
 
It is important to note that questions are formulated to generate discussion and 
interviewers can diverge slightly from the script. Due to this, the questions have not 
strictly been asked in the same order to each interviewee, however, the systematic 
order has been followed whenever possible during the interviews. Each interview 
followed its own trajectory based on the responses from the participant. During the 
                                                          
575Michele J McIntosh and Janice M Morse, ‘Situating and Constructing Diversity in Semi-Structured Interviews’ 
(2015) 25 Global Qualitative Nursing Research 
576Beverley Hancock, Elizabeth Ockleford and Kate Windridge, ‘An Introduction to Qualitative Research’ 
(National Institute of Health Research 2007) <http://www.rds-yh.nihr.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/5_Introduction-to-qualitative-research-2009.pdf> 
577Sue Arthur and James Nazroo, 'Designing Fieldwork Strategies and Materials', Qualitative Research Practice: 
A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers (Sage Publications Ltd 2003) 
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interview, emphasise has been given to the importance of listening, to encourage 
participants to talk, asking open-ended questions, and not being judgemental. Even 
though the participant should do most of the talking, during some interviews, the 
discussion has been steered towards the subject areas of research interest by 
interviewer to avoid taking a direction that are out of scope. 578 
 
In total, eight interviews have been conducted with stakeholders. Out of these eight 
interviews one interview has not been recorded as it was conducted over skype. To 
conduct interview, participants have been given the priority to decide the location and 
time. For this research, the most commonly used interview methods are face to face 
and telephonic. Participants have also been given the option of skype calling in case 
they have any time constraints. On an average basis, these interviews took 
approximately 45 minutes to complete. A smart phone application has been used to 
audio-record the interviews with prior consent of participants and each interview was 
transcribed. The saved audio file has been saved safely to the computer under the 
locked folder. 
 
5.4.1 Transcribing the interview 
 
Transcribing is a process of generating a written transcript of an interview or 
conversation which helps in analysing the recorded interview or a discussion.579 
Transcription involves close observation of data through repeated careful listening and 
it is an essential first step in data analysis. Transcribing is a very tedious process 
requiring several hours for each taped interview.580 The time consumption depends on 
the quality of the audio, the experience of a person transcribing the interview and the 
typing speed. To transcribe the interviews, first the recorded interview files have been 
transferred from smart phone to computer and then the interview files have been 
imported to the software called Listen N Write to transcribe. This software allows to 
play/pause/rewind easily/fast-forward the recording and typing at the same time.  
 
                                                          
578Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis (SAGE 
Publications 2006) 
579Hancock (n 580) 
580Julia Bailey, ‘First Steps in Qualitative Data Analysis: Transcribing’ (2008) 25(2) Family Practice 127 
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During discussion, it is apparent that the actual message conveyed is relatively small 
compared to the duration of discussion. A large extent of the discussion is conveyed 
in the way individuals talk. Tone and inflection are generally good indicators to identify 
the range of different emotions and meanings. During transcribing, consideration has 
been given to whether and how these feelings and meanings communicated on paper 
by using punctuation marks (full stops and commas will be essential for meaning, for 
instance).581  The process of revising the recordings for transcription has helped in 
recollecting visual observations of the interviewee and certainly added more meaning 
to the content and improved the quality of the transcript. 
 
When transcribing the interviewees’ statements verbatim, the fillers in speech pattern 
such as um, ah, like and so forth has been left out as it did not affect the context of 
what was stated. The audio has been transcribed accurately from the tape and not 
paraphrased. Identifying information that may compromise the privacy of the 
participants and/or those to whom they refer during the interview have been removed 
to maintain confidentiality. The attention has been paid to ensure that a transcript 
remains as faithful as possible to the speech it transcribes.  
 
5.5 Qualitative data analysis using NVIVO 11 software and data coding process in 
NVIVO 
 
Qualitative analysis is a way to discover “patterns, coherent themes, meaningful 
categories, and new ideas in data and in general uncovers better understanding of a 
phenomenon or process.”582 To analyse the data gathered from questionnaire and 
semis structured interviews, qualitative content analysis has been the most suitable 
method. The advantage of qualitative research is that it helps in discovering broader 
picture using different techniques to find it. For the most part of this research, focus is 
to use the data to identify stakeholders’ view on various components of EUTR and its 
impact on stakeholders.  
 
                                                          
581 ibid 
582Newton Suter, ‘Qualitative Data, Analysis, and Design’ (eds) Introduction to Educational Research: A Critical 
Thinking Approach (2nd edn Sage Publication 2012) 
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For qualitative analysis, software NVIVO 11 has been used because it is freely 
available from the University and several video tutorials are available on how to use 
various functions of this software. This software helps in identifying and managing 
ideas, exploring relationships in the data and finding emergent concepts. Two days 
training workshop funded by the Kingston University has been attended by the 
researcher to familiarise with the software analysis.  
 
NVIVO supports various file types such as PDFs, word documents, Audio files, visuals 
and many more. The file types used for this study are PDfs and word documents and 
these are termed as sources in NVIVO. In NVivo, source is the common term which 
shows all research materials including the primary data collected and the existing 
secondary data to be analysed. All the questionnaire and transcriptions to be analysed 
have been imported in the NVIVO workspace. After importing all the data to NVIVO 
workspace, the responses in the text form has been analysed to identify themes and 
relationships by coding sources to a node.  
 
The sources have been coded to gather all the references to a specific topic and to 
organise the data to identify underlying patterns. Node is an NVIVO term which is more 
commonly referred to in research as codes signifying data themes and subthemes and 
designed based on the research objectives being dealt for the study. Node is a vital 
component of NVIVO which helps in gathering, categorising and separating the 
material with different ideas and content in one place so that emerging patterns and 
ideas can be recognised. To analyse the content qualitatively, responses have been 
read thoroughly to the same question to derive codes. The standard coding procedure, 
highlighting important words or phrases that emphasize important features in each 
response have been noticed. Once the commonalities detected in each response, the 
sorting process begins by keeping the categories broad. Once these categories 
become “cluttered” and lengthy, they are subdivided into smaller categories.583 
                                                          
583John L Campbell and others, ‘Coding In-depth Semi-structured Interviews: Problems of Unitization and 
Intercoder Reliability and Agreement’ (2013) 42(3) Sociological Methods and Research 294 
<http://sociology.dartmouth.edu/sites/sociology.dartmouth.edu/files/coding_in_depth_semi.pdf> 
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Steps in data processing 
 
Once coding is complete, codes have been organized and analysed to provide 
additional information about the prevalence of themes within and across the 
responses. For data interpretation, attention has been paid to relationships among the 
ways themes co-occur within participants’ accounts and to look for patterns in the 
types of concerns raised to gather insights that could contribute most efficiently to the 
research focus. NVIVO 11 provides many tools for finding and filtering your data to get 
results. Models and charts have been created to present your data and display results 
visually. 
 
In the initial stages of the analyses, coding and memos of ideas that emerged while 
exploring the data have been mainly used along with coding the group of participants. 
The themes were distilled from the coded text to reflect the themes critical to the 
central question. The data analysis using matrix queries, cluster analysis, hierarchy 
charts and several other functions of NVIVO help in identifying patterns, signalling the 
themes most explored by participants. 
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Chapter 6: Data analysis, Results and Discussion  
 
6.1 Separating data to different nodes and sub-nodes in NVIVO for analysis 
 
To analyse the data, survey participants are divided in 6 major categories depicted in 
Figure 1. The number of participants for each category varies and discusses various 
aspects of EUTR.  
 
Figure 1: Survey Participants 
 
Data analysis using the coding facilities within NVivo has been the first stage of 
analysis because it has facilitated preliminary thoughts to emerge across cases and 
develop linkages between categories and first themes. By coding the sources into 
different nodes, the information on various components of EUTR provided by 
stakeholders have been separated. These coding of the components have been 
further divided in different themes to extract and interpret the stakeholders view and 
experience for specific component. To keep the survey participants anonymous, 
various abbreviations are used which are mentioned in the table below. During 
analysis, the number after each stakeholder abbreviation indicates the serial number 
as mentioned in Table 5. The total number of responses in the table consist of both 
primary data and responses from EU consultation carried out in 2015-16.  
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Table 5: Survey participants with number of responses and abbreviations 
 
Survey Participants No. of 
Responses  
Abbreviations used for 
analysis 
Forest Certification Bodies 5 FC 
Civil Society Organisations 20 CSO 
Monitoring Organisations 2 MO 
Timber Industry 29 TI 
Consultants 4 Const. 
Competent Authority and Govt. Body 2 CA 
Independent Organisations 6 IO 
 
 
6.2 Limitations of the data  
 
The process of collecting stakeholders’ views were initiated in July 2015 and continued 
till February 2016. Some interviews were conducted during the later months of 2016 
due to the availability issues of some participants during early months of 2016. The 
analysis presented here reflects the views of the stakeholders during the data 
collection period and does not address the change in views, if there is any, afterwards. 
For example, the participant who criticised the approach of enforcement agency during 
data collection, might have a view that the enforcement efforts have improved now. 
There can be more guidance documents available from European Commission to 
improve the application flaws of EUTR identified in this research which were 
unavailable during data collection or analysis. 
 
The sample size for timber importers and monitoring organisations have been small 
and the sample representativeness especially of the timber importers was an issue 
given the number of companies in the UK. The timber companies were one of the most 
important stakeholders for this research as they have the central role in complying with 
EUTR. Even after continuous efforts of reaching out to companies, only 25 companies 
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responded to questionnaire from 250 companies. To mitigate this, the timber trade 
associations have been considered for this study as these associations work 
collaboratively with the industry. The companies who took part in the research have 
all been aware about the EUTR requirements but that does not correspond to the 
awareness level in the UK because the number of operators are much higher than the 
sample size considered in this study. 
 
The monitoring organisations who operates in the UK approached several times over 
the email and phone but only 2 monitoring organisations responded to a questionnaire 
from total of 6 monitoring organisations operating in the UK. One monitoring 
organisation replied that they have not carried out any work under and therefore they 
are not confident and declined my request. 
 
The questions on Brexit have not been included in the empirical survey (also 
mentioned in chapter 1) to keep the uniformity in data collection as results of EU 
referendum came in 2016 and the data collection process started even before the EU 
referendum was announced. However, the implications of Brexit on this research have 
been discussed in chapter 6 and the views expressed are solely researcher’s own 
view and have no connection to any stakeholders who took part in this study. 
 
6.3 Analysing the responses of the participants 
 
To achieve the research objectives and to test the hypotheses, the responses of 
survey participants are coded in NVIVO based on the issues with EUTR first and 
divided in several sub-nodes such as enforcement issues, implementation challenges, 
due diligence system, product scope, issues with application and supply chain (Figure 
2). The responses have also been analysed to identify the positive reforms that EUTR 
has brought in fight against illegal timber trade. During the analysis of the EUTR issues 
it was noted that lack of uniform enforcement, transparency and implementation are 
the most common issues discussed by most stakeholders. These issues are very 
much connected with each other and in the analysis, it has been challenging to 
separate them while mentioning other issues. 
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Issues with EUTR 
 
In this section, the analysis classifies the issues with EUTR enforcement, 
implementation challenges, concept of monitoring organisation, difficulties for timber 
industry and awareness. Under the enforcement issues, the penalty system, the efforts 
and approach of the enforcement agency and technical barriers to enforcement have 
been discussed. The application difficulties, narrow products scope and EUTR due 
diligence system have been debated in the implementation challenges. 
 
 
        Figure 2: Sub-nodes for issues of EUTR 
 
6.3.1 Enforcement issues, penalty system and approach of the competent authority 
 
 
The EUTR is being implemented in each member state through the national laws and 
enforced by the national authorities. This means that differences exist in enforcement 
practices and penalty regimes. The stakeholders consider enforcement related issues 
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are the most significant one that needs improvement. The difference in penalties 
across the EU and the complications to prosecute the offender under the EUTR with 
clear evidence (due to the complexity attached with illegal timber trade and lack of 
knowledge of legislation in the country of harvest) can be obstacles for both competent 
authority to enforce and operators to comply with the regulation. With the existing 
connections of global and internal EU timber trade, such irregular implementation 
across EU member states would not help to create a level playing field.  
 
 
(A) Lack of uniformity in enforcement efforts 
 
There should be consistency of enforcement across the EU because member states 
with weak enforcement could affect the countries who are actively enforcing the 
regulation. Participant IO1 indicated that priority needs to be that its more effectively 
enforced across Europe on all member states. When timber is imported into the EU, 
the entry points keep on shifting from one member states to another, so there are high 
chances that member states that have demonstrated vigorous enforcement end up 
receiving illegal timber through the member states with weak enforcement. The 
effective and visible enforcement efforts distributed equally across all member states 
are necessary to influence the behaviour of operators. 
 
(B) Penalty system 
 
Penalties for infringements of timber regulation must be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.584 In the UK, when the operators place illegal timber or timber products on 
the market or breaches due diligence requirements, they are liable to a fine not 
exceeding £5,000 and/or a term of imprisonment not exceeding 3 months; or on 
conviction on indictment to a fine and/or a term of imprisonment not exceeding 2 years. 
The participants also note that penalty regime is not adequate, insufficient and not 
dissuasive enough. Participant Const.1 states that penalties are insufficient and 
enforcement is patchy. The ability to fine £5000 per product is perhaps dissuasive but 
                                                          
584Regulation EU 995/2010 Article 19(2) 
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without access to any data concerning penalties it is difficult to determine the extent 
to which UK sanctions have deterred infringements.  
 
Many stakeholders believe that penalty difference across the EU hinder the 
development of a level playing field for operators and prevent effective enforcement 
of the EUTR. There has not been any information available on prosecution to date 
which raises question on the approach adopted by the enforcement agency. Const. 4 
stated that “the knowledge of the competent authority is too limited to be able to 
perform an effective check at operator level.” It is unclear to what extent this is due to 
the unwillingness or inability of the competent authority to escalate cases and initiate 
legal proceedings or difficulties around collecting evidence. The ability to seize illegal 
timber in the UK further demonstrates a rational sanctions regime.  
 
(C) Lack of sufficient resources 
 
The stakeholders’ analysis also revealed that competent authority lacks sufficient 
resources both personnel and financial, the approach of the competent authority is 
lenient and absence of precise procedure to raise substantiated concern. MO2 stated 
that UK competent authority lacks resources to cover all the operators in the UK and 
that is the reason there has not been any results. The concern on lack of resources 
has been raised not only for UK competent authority but for all EU member states in 
general. 
 
During data collection, the UK competent authority mentioned that it employs 17 full 
time employees that can deliver enforcement actions under the European Union 
Timber Regulation. The authority further said that it receives £500,000 for activities 
designed to increase awareness and levels of compliance, to detect non-compliance 
and bring those matters to an appropriate outcome and to deliver effective 
management processes. An additional budget of up to £250,000 is available to deliver 
a productive and risk-based programme of product testing. From this information, it is 
quite evident that UK competent authority has a dedicated team and financial 
resources for enforcing the EUTR but the results are hardly visible. There has not been 
any information available of any cases in which the UK competent authority has taken 
operators to court following non-compliance of the EUTR. 
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The competent authority has the power to carry out checks on operators and on 
monitoring organisations but as per stakeholders there is an evident absence of 
information on number of checks and their outcomes in public domain apart from one 
report on furniture imported from Chinese companies which is officially published by 
the UK competent authority. During data collection, the competent authority mentioned 
that in 2014 – 15 it has issued 23 warning letters and 19 notices of remedial action 
and in 2015 – 16 issued 21 warning letters and 21 notices of remedial action. The 
reasons of issuing these warning letters and remedial action are missing which fails to 
show the precise picture of enforcement efforts undertaken. The information on 
number of checks carried out on monitoring organisations operating in the UK, the 
evaluation of due diligence system developed by monitoring organisations, number of 
companies using the services of monitoring organisation can be a useful tool to check 
the efficiency of enforcement team and the absence of these information can certainly 
raise concerns on the enforcement efforts. Possibility exists that the absence of 
sufficient resources can be a reason that competent authority has not been able to 
carry out proper checks on companies. It is difficult to assess the adequacy and 
effectiveness of due diligence systems, in the absence of full transparency on the 
system and information from competent authorities on the results of checks. 
 
(D) Lenient approach of competent authority 
 
Some stakeholders revealed that the UK competent authority’s general approach to 
enforcement so far has appeared to be lenient towards industry and competent 
authority considering itself and operators to be in a learning phase. The UK 
enforcement agency has prioritised working with and supporting industry sectors, 
trade associations, and businesses that are likely to be affected. It means that the 
focus has been on raising awareness of the legislation and to collaboratively identify 
and overcome the challenges that UK businesses face in complying with complex 
technical regulations. The approach adopted by the competent authority is very 
supportive to all the sectors of timber industry but this approach needs to be 
transformed into strong enforcement efforts and the competent authority should start 
investigating and prosecuting the offenders under EUTR. The soft approach can cause 
complacency amongst operators not already on their radar and there are many small 
operators not even aware about the activities of competent authority. 
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(E) Lack of guidance to raise substantiated concern 
 
The issue of raising substantiated concern has also been very evident especially with 
civil society organisations. Some stakeholders reported that the communication is 
lacking regarding the content and detail of substantiated concerns raised. There is no 
definite guidelines available on how a substantiated concern has been managed by 
the competent authority. One of the civil society organisations has documented many 
cases of illegal shipments from high risk countries but most them have not been acted 
on by competent authorities of member states despite raising substantiated concerns 
through the proper channels. The substantiated concerns present a useful tool for 
better enforcement of the EUTR but have so far not been fulfilling their potential. The 
development of proper guidelines and creating a central online platform for submitting 
the substantiated concerns (only accessed by the competent authorities) can be 
helpful in dealing with complaints. Substantiated concerns can be very vital for 
competent authorities to initiate actions on companies but before taking actions they 
must be cautious regarding the authenticity of the submitted concerns. 
 
From the enforcement perspective, the impact of the EUTR has so far been 
disappointing not because the instrument itself is flawed but because at the member 
state level enforcement has been weak. The lack of uniform enforcement of the EUTR 
across the member states could lead to a disadvantage for companies which strictly 
comply with the law and correctly apply due diligence compared to other operators. 
The different interpretations of the requirements by competent authorities generate 
uncertainty for multinationals trying to centralize a uniform approach across several 
member states and fuel misinformation for SMEs in supply chains trying to adhere to 
the law. 
 
The competent authority has failed to take the appropriate measures against the 
operators involved in the trade of timber at high-risk of illegality, even though the 
substantiated concerns provided detailed indications on the potential violations of the 
EUTR. The proficiency in timber issues and understanding of basic concepts such as 
the role of chain of custody within supply chain due diligence might be lacking within 
the audit teams of the competent authorities. These issues can be associated with 
lack of personnel and financial resources or in other case it could relate to the 
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competency of staff members, working for enforcement agency.  
 
The UK government agency managing the activities of UK competent authority 
describes that competent authority is never going to check every single timber importer 
and it is very ambitious to think that EUTR has stopped illegal timber placed in the 
market due to poor implementation. The competent authority will be unable to 
effectively enforce the EU timber regulation without sufficient resources and proficient 
staff members. The capacity building process approach of competent authority must 
move towards penalising non-compliance. 
 
6.3.2 EUTR implementation challenges 
 
Implementation of EUTR is a significant concern that relates to how EUTR is applied 
which can seriously affects the efficiency of the EUTR. Due to the connections 
between the enforcement and implementation issues several stakeholders mentioned 
that lack of resources and difference in penalties and uniform enforcement across EU 
member states are some of the common application challenges within EUTR regime. 
The common implementation challenges identified by the stakeholders are supply 
chain issue coupled with fraudulent documentation, the role of forest certification in 
due diligence system and weak implementation of due diligence system. 
 
(A) Slow implementation of EUTR across EU  
 
As the implementation, enforcement and penalties of EUTR varies in the EU, importers 
in member states where the EUTR is implemented can be seen as difficult customers 
when asking for all necessary documentation. The participant IO2 said that “buyers 
here in the UK are even more careful about their procurement and more demanding 
of their suppliers in terms of evidence to prove legality.” There is considerable burden 
on businesses here in the UK and they have been passing some of that burden back 
to their suppliers because they request more detailed information in the form of 
documents. Discrepancies in the systems of penalties and the application of sanctions 
create distortions within the internal market, giving an undue advantage to operators 
in EU countries where sanctions have been weaker or not effectively applied. It can 
severely impact the objectives of EUTR as illegal timber and timber products can be 
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redirected to member states with weaker implementation. 
 
(B) Setting up a due diligence system 
 
For timber legality, EUTR due diligence alone must be easier to apply but its 
implementation has been extremely complicated for individual parties due to the high 
level of required expert knowledge. The participant TI30 claimed that “I can still play 
around with switching the country of import or false declarations of the products.” The 
participant CSO13 mentioned that “It is difficult for competent authorities and public 
prosecutors to be able to provide the decisive evidence required to fulfil the burden of 
proof” because official documentation does not, on their own, adequate to comply with 
the EUTR. It can be challenging to establish good cases because they have to deal 
with complex supply chains and unclear legal framework from where the timber is 
coming from. The real challenge here for competent authority is to acquire knowledge 
on the country-specific documentation demonstrating compliance during checks for 
better implementation.  
 
Forest certification could have been directly linked with timber legality but as per EUTR 
forest certification cannot legitimate that the logging is done legally and can only be 
used to prove to a better sourcing system. The technical compliance standards 
established by certification schemes are a vital component of the effective functioning 
and credibility of the EUTR. The FC4 initiated an updating process of its standards in 
2012 to ensure harmonization with EUTR. FC4 regards EUTR legality as an essential 
but not necessarily sufficient step towards sustainable forest management worldwide 
which indicates that EUTR addresses the legality issues sufficiently however, 
sustainable forest management is beyond its aim. 
 
The FC5 has added a new section on due diligence to fully aligned with EUTR 
requirements and mentioned that demand for the certified timber has increased. There 
may have been an increase in certified timber entering the EU market but Operators 
must recognise that rigorous EUTR compliance requires a thorough primary risk 
evaluation for all products regardless of the availability of certification. Whether 
operators have adequately identified or mitigated risks that certified supply chains may 
incorporate unwanted material is very uncertain. Although the forest certification 
172 
 
bodies regularly produce guidance documents for the certificate holders to clarify the 
process of obtaining reliable certified products, some substantial circumstantial 
evidence585 from the EUTR-competent authorities and from independent auditors 
suggest presence of significant confusion about the nature and scope of different 
claims and the necessary steps to avoid purchasing fraudulent certified products. 
 
As per CSO 18 the EUTR has not yet succeeded in preventing vast quantities of illegal 
timber from entering the EU market due to inadequate implementation of due diligence 
system and enforcement. It is difficult to estimate the full effect on the business 
environment as evidence is lacking, especially regarding whether due diligence 
systems are preventing illegal timber from entering the EU market. These weaknesses 
are indication that no real incentive has yet been created for producer countries to 
improve forest governance especially to those who engaged with FLEGT VPA 
process.  
 
There is currently also no accessible trade data seeking to show differences in import 
that could point to specific areas of discrepancy that could suggest illegality of trade. 
The deficiencies in the implementation of the regulation at national level, as well as 
the lack of systematic enforcement by competent authorities, have hindered Member 
States and the Commission from gaining the experience that is necessary to evaluate 
the functioning of the law in accordance with Article 20 EUTR. The application of the 
EUTR still has a number of flaws which do not help to fulfil the objectives of the 
legislation.  
 
6.3.3 Concept of Monitoring Organisations (MOs) 
 
Monitoring organisations are EC recognised private organisations which can provide 
EU operators with due diligence systems. The competent authorities are responsible 
for the verification of the functionality of MOs. Most stakeholders during survey 
appeared unaware of how monitoring organisation are working in practice because 
there is a lack of information regarding the actions of monitoring organisations. In this 
situation, it has been difficult to analyse the overall impact and role of monitoring 
                                                          
585Jade Saunders, ‘Certified Products and EUTR Compliance in the Furniture Sector’ (Chatham House 2014) 
<https://www.illegal-logging.info/sites/default/files/Saunders_Certification_PP_FINAL.pdf>  
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organisation in achieving its objective. The information from competent authority on 
checks carried out would have helped in evaluating the actions of monitoring 
organisation but there is no data available from competent authority. However, some 
stakeholders mentioned that the uptake of monitoring organisation has been low by 
the operators. The operators have different options of developing and implementing 
their due diligence system so the use of a monitoring organisation is just one option 
and this could be one reason of low interest of using MOs from operators.  
 
The other reason of not using services of monitoring organisations could be that 
operators could expose to further and additional checks as it is obligation of monitoring 
organisation to report competent authority about any illegalities detected in supply 
chains of their clients. MO2 said that the operator has a perception that “using 
monitoring organisation does not protect from competent authority and would be 
‘paying the police to stop us’.” In the case of the audit, it is the operator who is finally 
responsible, even if the operator uses the monitoring organisation services, so paying 
a monitoring organisation would not make sense. In this situation, the operators would 
avoid using monitoring organisation, instead would prefer local/national timber trade 
associations who provides the same services and they are not under any obligations 
of reporting illegalities to competent authority.  
 
The role of competent authority can play a vital role in reviving monitoring 
organisations. Competent authority needs to thoroughly evaluate MO’s due diligence 
system and publish the results of checks. MO1 fears that the “status of MO has no 
appeal to the industry and will likely to continue until regulator is visiting a much larger 
section of the market and penalties start being issued.” It would help the operators in 
deciding whether to use monitoring organisation services or not. This statement 
questions the ability of competent authority in penalising the companies and states 
that unless the companies penalised for not applying and maintaining the proper due 
diligence system, the importance of monitoring organisations would not increase 
amongst the operators. 
 
The stakeholders have also been concerned for conflict of interest for monitoring 
organisations.  There is a potential conflict of interest situation when timber trade 
associations or supplier to the timber industry, is acknowledged as a monitoring 
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organisation under the EUTR. The businesses employing service providers who are 
registered as MOs could use this not in a MO capacity, which is a risk to credibility of 
the entire function of MOs under the regulation. The EU and member state must make 
sure while recognising the monitoring organisations that no conflict of interest occurs 
which would risk the effectiveness of the EUTR particularly when they are linked to (or 
controlled by) timber operators and traders.  
 
The credibility of monitoring organisations relies on the quality of their due diligence 
system but one of the stakeholder IO3 revealed during the interview that he was 
“disgusted and shocked” to see a due diligence report prepared by a monitoring 
organisation for the products imported from China. The stakeholder IO3 further 
mentioned that the monitoring organisation reached to the conclusion that there was 
a negligible risk without any evidence and the report prepared was full of errors.  This 
observation raises questions on the inability of monitoring organisations on access to 
adequate country specific information and approach and competency of competent 
authority in checking the due diligence system developed by the monitoring 
organisations. Without accurate information on the amount of checks on operators and 
MOs, it is difficult to ascertain whether the quantity or quality of checks can be 
considered sufficient.  
 
The monitoring organisations can be increasingly helpful in terms of affordability for 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Larger businesses can invest in developing 
their own due diligence system while for smaller businesses it can be more profitable 
to rely on a MO. One possible option would be for Member States to enable access to 
the services of monitoring organisations for SMEs via either technical or financial 
assistance or support. MOs don't seem to provide any added value for companies. So, 
to make them more noticeable to operators, it requires enhanced transparency, for 
instance, on the standards and procedures that monitoring organisations must follow 
to ensure the effectiveness of due diligence; the frequency and scope of their 
monitoring activities and the outcome should also be made public. 
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6.3.4 Difficulties for timber industry and awareness within the industry 
 
 
EUTR has created obligations for those first placing timber and timber products on the 
EU market (operators). CSO15 stated that “by limiting the EUTR’s prohibition and due 
diligence requirements to first placers, the EUTR exempts large-scale traders that buy 
supplies from numerous small operators, including domestic EU foresters.” Traders 
are effectively exempt from the core EUTR measures i.e. the prohibition and due 
diligence and are only explicitly required to keep record of supplies and sales. While 
the regulation stipulated that traders must also face proportionate penalties for non-
compliance with the regulation, this has not been adequately transposed into member 
state law, including the UK. 
 
(A) Unfair market condition 
 
As mentioned in the chapters earlier, EUTR is not coherently implemented across EU 
Member States, leads to disadvantages for companies which are following the law and 
investing in proper due diligence and transparency compared to other operators. 
Absence of consistency in the implementation of the EUTR across Member States 
places the regulation at risk of distorting trade routes and generating unfair market 
competition. Furthermore, the EUTR currently does not cover products such as 
seating furniture, printed materials and musical instruments so the companies that are 
dealing in timber products that fall out of scope of the EUTR will have an advantage 
as they don´t have to set up a due diligence system and are able to source illegal 
material that can often be cheaper without being subject to the same level of scrutiny. 
Most of the stakeholders of this research have shown concern with the narrow product 
scope of the EUTR and have been in favour of expanding the product scope to include 
all the timber products.  
 
(B) Dilemma of due diligence procedure 
 
To comply with EUTR, the EU operators must have access to information indicating 
that timber was logged legitimately and be adequately sure that their suppliers 
complied with relevant national laws. According to CSO15 operator, trader, and 
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competent authority interpretation of the due diligence requirements also often fall 
short of what is actually required by the EUTR. Lack of knowledge of legislation in the 
country of harvest has been an obstacle for both competent authorities and operators. 
As per IO2 many buyers here in the UK need to be more careful and need to ask more 
question perhaps they did previously. Companies required incredible amount of 
information which needs expert knowledge to implement an effective and accurate 
due diligence system to be more transparent so more cost is involved. There are 
companies routinely visit their overseas suppliers to see for themselves but of course 
if someone is going overseas, they have only seen things on that day and you can 
only rely on what you've seen and what you are shown. So, you must make judgement 
in terms of what you have seen and what documentary evidence is being presented 
to you.  
 
(C) Administrative and financial burden 
 
The due diligence system has increased the administrative and financial burden on 
operators and this has affected mainly the small and medium enterprises. The IO2 
mentioned that “every company that I have spoken to reported some degree of 
additional work that's required and all timber importers report a significant increase in 
administration surrounding their procurement of wood and wood products from 
overseas.” Most of the participants from timber industry in this study have reported 
that EUTR has incurred cost to businesses. This makes the current rule of due 
diligence costly and can be frustrating for companies who take their obligations 
seriously compared to other operators that did not take their obligation seriously.  
 
TI28 has been very critical to the administrative work required and mentioned that “the 
fallacy of the whole EUTR is based on the assumption that volumes of illegal timber 
were entering the EU prior to the EUTR which was never the case. Our clients across 
the EU were purchasing legal timber before March 1, 2013 and by and large have 
continued with their same supply chains since March 1, 2013.” He further mentioned 
that the only difference is the amount of paperwork they are required to compile and 
the time and energy it takes to attempt compliance which has proven difficult in case 
of investigation since the burden of proof varies so much from one country to the next. 
As per TI4 “it is a big task to obtain and monitor due diligence and to keep up to date 
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with ever evolving market but this has not affected the business.” TI17 and TI18 also 
have a similar view and felt that EUTR has been just another requirement. It seems 
that EUTR has definitely increased the administrative work required to demonstrate 
compliance but the companies which are least affected are those who had better 
record keeping system prior to EUTR. Most importers have probably not removed 
many suppliers and just have adapted their procedures to the new legislation. The 
small and medium companies could more likely consider purchasing within the EU 
than from high risk countries due to resources required for compliance work. 
 
The cost of applying and maintaining due diligence is exceptionally high for small 
businesses relied on certified products and began their journey towards the 
sustainability prior to EUTR. TI12 revealed that since EUTR is a legal compliance 
which does not have sustainability, it has weakened our position and also said that he 
is a bit depressed and is also hopeful that EUTR sustainability criteria will be added in 
the future. The same has been felt by participant TI14. In a contrasting view, TI20 
would like to see EUTR as a benchmark for all risk assessment and take away the 
need for forest certification to avoid confusion. Before EUTR, the companies relied 
heavily on forest certification as a tool for timber legality but EUTR has diversified this 
process and companies may have been taking time to adjust with the process of due 
diligence. To adjust to the cost, operators need to be sufficiently aware of alternative 
sources of information to carry out the due diligence and should access information 
from the competent authority but they can be hesitant to do so for fear of exposing 
themselves of rigorous checks. The same applies for operators using a monitoring 
organisation for due diligence system. 
 
(D) Timber industry awareness  
 
The awareness within the timber industry on EUTR can be a very vital criterion to 
check the efficiency of EUTR. It can be a good indication of what has been the timber 
industry’s approach to the regulation. It also helps in identifying how successful the 
enforcement agency has been campaigning in raising awareness amongst the timber 
industry and if they have made any attempts to carry out checks on timber industry. 
The questionnaire has been designed to check awareness between the operators and 
traders in the UK which comprised questions on EUTR implications on their business, 
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their role in the industry as per EUTR, basic understanding on documents required for 
due diligence, about monitoring organisation and competent authority and products 
covered under EUTR. As mentioned in this chapter previously, the sample size has 
been small compared to the number of operators and traders in the UK but the 
questionnaire survey has given quite varied results. 
 
Total 25 responses have been received from timber industry and out of these 25 
responses, there are 10 operators, 8 traders and 3 saw millers. The remaining 4 
respondents have not mentioned the category they fall under. Apart from one saw 
miller, all the respondents are aware about the EUTR and its implication on their 
businesses and all of them regularly apply due diligence to their timber import and also 
aware about the documentary evidence required for compliance.  
 
With regards to the size of the operators, there are 2 micro firms (<10 employees), 4 
small companies (<50 employees) and 4 large companies (>250 employees). All the 
10 operators are aware about the competent authority in the UK and one of the large 
operators has invited the competent authority for surveillance visit. So the awareness 
level in terms of enforcement and implementation is noteworthy and out of 10 
operators 6 companies have an environment manager/sustainability professional to 
guide companies on matters related to EUTR. Three operators are not aware about 
the services of monitoring organisations but for due diligence they have been using 
the system developed by timber trade associations. The most important point that 
came up from the questionnaire survey is that 5 operators regularly import timber and 
timber products from high risk regions such as Russia, Africa, Asia, China, Indonesia, 
Brazil and Malaysia. Although, they have shown that they apply due diligence, the 
effectiveness of identifying the risk in the supply chain and mitigating it must be 
evaluated by the competent authority. 
 
As per the EUTR, traders have been exempted from the due diligence requirement 
and only needs to keep the record of sales which they have to show as a proof during 
checks. From the survey it seems that all the traders are aware about their 
responsibility and follow the due diligence procedure whenever necessary. There are 
four traders who has developed their own due diligence system with the help of their 
local timber trade associations. Four traders are specifically using the due diligence 
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system developed by the timber trade association. One of the large traders who had 
been visited by the competent authority has stopped importing Malaysian plywood 
after they identified illegalities in supply chain which shows that companies are willing 
to change their suppliers in case of illegalities, however, this is just one example and 
cannot be taken as a case with every importer. There are two traders who are not 
aware of the monitoring organisations. It seems like even though companies are aware 
about monitoring organisations, they prefer to take help from the local trade 
associations for due diligence. The reason could be the cost involved to use monitoring 
organisation and also during checks it is the company’s responsibility to provide 
sufficient timber legality evidence irrespective of using services of monitoring 
organisation. 
 
The saw millers have not responded most of the questions and it is difficult to evaluate 
the awareness level in saw millers. Their awareness on the competent authority, 
monitoring organisation and due diligence cannot be evaluated as they have 
responded with not applicable. The sawmills in most cases receive wood from 
domestic producers and woodland owners. The UK’s domestic structure of wood 
procurement has been very controlled so it has been considered as very low risk. The 
four respondents without did not disclose their business category and company size 
seem not much aware about the monitoring organisation and competent authority 
however, all four of them are aware about the due diligence process as all of them are 
using the due diligence system developed by the trade associations which highlights 
that role of the local timber trade associations are much more significant than EU 
recognised monitoring organisations. 
 
6.3.5 The positive changes brought by the EUTR  
 
The stakeholders have clearly identified the challenges complying with the EUTR 
obligations and how they are trying to mitigate the existing issues within the EUTR. 
Although EUTR has a complex set of rules, it has helped to contribute EU’s 
international obligations to fight against illegal logging and has led to a greater 
awareness of the problem of illegal logging and its underlying causes. The EUTR has 
created pressure on both governments and companies, in and out of the EU, to clean 
up their acts, ensuring more transparency and better protection and management of 
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their timber resources. As per CSO10, “for the first-time legislation exists that 
regulates the trade for all companies placing timber on the EU market.” It is difficult to 
assess the changes that EUTR has made due to lack of information and 
comprehensive datasets, but it has enhanced the debate about transparency and 
traceability of supply chains and the need for assessment of supply sources with 
credibility of information and documentation. From the timber industry survey it is 
evident that a number of well-versed companies, have put in place due diligence 
systems and made efforts to prevent illegal timber entering their supply chains, when 
acting as operators, or kept records effectively, when acting as traders. 
 
The EUTR has raised attention to the problem of law enforcement and highlighted the 
challenges of implementation in the different EU Member States but internationally, 
the EUTR has had a positive effect on other demand-side markets. The CSO19 stated 
that “the EUTR is expected to bring benefits to exporting countries affected by illegal 
logging in the form of improved governance, security, and justice, by promoting the 
rule of law including the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities.” The IO1 
mentioned during the interview that “there's some anecdotal evidence that there has 
been a shift away from tropical timber and increase on more temperate sources.” 
EUTR has raised awareness amongst industry about their sourcing policies and 
started a discussion about transparency along supply chains. EUTR has forced the 
companies that violate the laws to change practices and come clean off their hidden 
economy. The potential need for operators to change suppliers or geographic sources 
when risks of illegality are identified as non-negligible should be viewed as a success 
of the EUTR. There are possibilities that companies may actively engage in educating 
their suppliers about the need for credible proof of legality and the EU trade partners 
such as China might develop mechanisms for complying with the EUTR. 
 
During the analysis of enforcement issues, the approach of competent authority has 
been criticised by stakeholders but some stakeholders have praised the work of UK 
competent authority. The FC3 said that UK competent authority has published some 
interesting reports using scientific testing as a means to verify documentation claims 
which demonstrates that current due diligence systems have many gaps. The 
participant CSO15 stated that UK competent authority has been suffering from limited 
staffing and financial services but also considered the UK competent authority has 
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outperformed many other competent authorities across EU. The same stakeholder 
further mentioned that UK competent authority has reportedly conducted more 
stringent, higher quality checks than, for example, the German competent authority.  
 
The UK government department managing the activities of competent authority has 
been really pleased with the competent authority and further stated that the feedback 
they are getting from the stakeholders especially from the industry and NGO side has 
been really positive. MO1 mentioned that the work of UK competent authority has been 
very effective in raising awareness and highlighting inadequate due diligence which 
consequently has encouraged operators to implement due diligence. The stakeholder 
IO2 found the competent authority very approachable and pleased with their approach. 
The IO1 stated that they have been doing a good job given the resources they have 
but also questioned in a sarcastic way by saying that there is still illegal timber entering 
the UK because it’s very difficult to clamp down. The FC5 has the similar view for 
competent authority and said that they are doing a good job so far and have worked 
with industry very closely. 
 
6.4 Concluding remarks on data analysis 
 
The stakeholders’ analysis has shown the variety of views and experiences among 
the participants on the EUTR and it is evident that profound effects of the EUTR can 
only be felt when operators bring their activity in compliance with the EUTR and 
competent authorities are effectively and uniformly enforcing it across the EU. In the 
UK, businesses who had robust due diligence and environmental purchasing policies 
in place before EUTR are in a better position to benefit from the law than those who 
had not set up a due diligence system. The competent authority in the UK has 
supported the businesses to comply with complex technicalities for few years now 
which has been an efficient approach to give the confidence to the timber industry but 
the time has come to penalise the companies who have not complied with the 
regulation. Nevertheless, to do that they need to reach a much larger section of the 
industry which required more funding from the government. 
 
Apart from slow implementation and uniform enforcement, the set-up of monitoring 
organisation, narrow product scope and transparency are the weaknesses identified 
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during the analysis. As mentioned in the timber industry analysis, UK operators have 
been using the due diligence system of timber trade associations and can satisfy the 
EUTR requirements without taking help from monitoring organisation. The absence of 
information from the UK competent authority on the checks they have conducted, it is 
difficult to assess the role monitoring organisations under EUTR.  
 
During data collection, the monitoring organisations (operating in the UK) listed on the 
European Commission website have been contacted to participate in the study. The 
person from one of the contacted monitoring organisations, who operates in all the EU 
member states with the office in London, have replied that they have never been a 
monitoring organisation. This organisation is still listed as the monitoring organisation 
on the official website of European Commission. The competent authority must check 
these monitoring organisation and robustly assess the due diligence system 
developed by them because it is the duty of competent authority to carry out checks 
on monitoring organisation and report to the Commission if they are not satisfying their 
role correctly.  
 
The narrow product scope is a key challenge being faced by the EUTR and ideally 
should include all timber-based products. The EUTR applies to some operators 
dealing in timber products and not others, creating an unfair and uneven market in the 
EU.  It is a definite disadvantage for the companies who are applying and investing in 
robust due diligence system while others can just escape because the products they 
are importing do not fall under the product scope of the EUTR. During data collection, 
all the categories of stakeholders have recommended that the products scope must 
be expanded. The exclusion of some timber products means that illegal timber can 
still be traded in the EU and certain companies can escape the regulation. 
  
The EUTR can contribute to a healthier economy and benefit the forestry sector both 
inside and outside of the EU. However, the effectiveness of the regulation is still to be 
seen due the slow implementation of the regulation. There are additional obligations 
for timber companies (especially the operators who import timber from high risk 
countries to EU) but sound due diligence system and stronger procurement 
frameworks can lead to higher profitability for individual businesses regardless of the 
size of the company. The priority needs to be set to deal with the existing loopholes 
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and create better level playing field that ensures fair competition and fair prices, and 
higher incentives for investment in sustainable forest management. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Illegal logging and associated timber trade constitute complex and serious challenges 
for the international community. Various international resolutions and decisions on this 
topic have been passed and several UN bodies have been directed to assist in illegal 
timber trade but the problem still exists. The European Union has taken a foremost 
role in enacting a legal timber market, the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and 
Trade (FLEGT) licensing scheme and the EU Timber Regulation which define 
voluntary  and mandatory regulations to ensure the legality of impoter timber.  
 
The primary purpose of this research is to assess the efficiency of instruments of EU 
Timber Regulation which is designed to prohibit the illegal timber and timber products 
in the EU market. The entire process of systematically gathering and analysing 
qualitative information from stakeholders on their concerns, issues, and experiences 
for EUTR have been utilised as a basis to achieve the research objectives.  
 
This study is an attempt to identify the impact of EUTR in a unique way by applying 
black letter approach and empirical survey including the experimentalist governance 
approach to develop analytical framework. Both theoretical and empirical work is 
included to satisfy the research objectives. This research specifies that an empirical 
evidence can be a very powerful lens to critically analyse a legislation that deals with 
a transnational issue such as illegal logging. The emphasis of the thesis is on empirical 
research to investigate the effects of the law, the enforcement of a law, compliance 
with law and experience of law. 
 
The assessment has concerned, particularly, the UK market. The theoretical 
framework on transnational timber legality verification initiative in chapter three and 
black letter approach presented in chapter four indicated the weaknesses of the 
regulation that subsequently facilitated in constructing the basis of the empirical 
survey. Consequently, questions considered for EUTR assessment for the empirical 
survey are enforcement challenges, implementation difficulties of the timber industry, 
the approach of the enforcement authority, product scope, due diligence system, role 
of monitoring organisations and certification bodies in EUTR. The possible effect of 
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Brexit have also been discussed separately in this chapter although the empirical 
survey was conducted before the result of EU referendum declared. 
 
This research shows that views of the stakeholders are very diverse and there are 
noticeable differences in opinions from the same category of stakeholders. For 
example, one of the civil society organisations (name of the organisation has been 
kept anonymous, see chapter 4) believes that EUTR is bringing benefits for all kind of 
businesses (small, medium and large) under the condition that it is applied adequately 
while the other one claims that the effectiveness of the regulation is still to be seen 
due to the slow implementation of the regulation.  
 
The study finds that although EUTR is considered as a welcome initiative by most of 
the stakeholders, they are also of opinion that EUTR has weaknesses which make it 
difficult to completely control illegal timber and timber products being placed in the UK 
market. From the data analysis, it is quite evident that implementation and 
enforcement of timber regulation, narrow product scope, ambiguous concept of 
monitoring organisation, lack of transparency from competent authority and coherent 
approach across EU, technical issues within due diligence system are some of the 
significant challenges that affect the potential of EUTR in combating illegal timber 
trade. The study concludes that the existing enforcement activities under EUTR needs 
more improvement and the level of transparency on enforcement activities  are still a 
major concern among the stakeholders.   
 
However, the analysis also reveals that EUTR has helped to contribute EU´s 
international obligations on deforestation. The stakeholders believe that it has initiated 
broader discussions amongst industry about their sourcing policies. The risk 
assessment elements of due diligence have raised attention to the lack of enforcement 
and corrupt practices in high-risk countries. The Industry is much more aware of the 
need for transparency of their supply chains and the challenges linked to establishing 
traceability systems and the credibility of documentation. At the same time, more 
specific guidelines must be developed by the competent authority on due diligence 
procedure and forest certification as an evidence of timber legality so that the offence 
related to due diligence deficiencies can be prevented. The case of UK timber operator 
Hardwood Dimensions Holdings Limited highlighted the similar issue that all the 
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importers must conduct due diligence process on all their products even from the FSC 
certification. The concluding remarks on different aspects of EUTR have been 
discussed in the following sections. The concluding remarks are mainly based on the 
black letter approach and the empirical studies conducted. 
 
The experimentalist governance approach adopted for analytical framework justified 
based on inclusiveness of different stakeholder engagement and exchanging the 
information and sharing experience over time. Although the effectiveness or the goals 
of the focus activity cannot be assured  just by the inclusivity as inclusion of all relevant 
stakeholder cannot be assured. The actors under experimentalist governance broadly 
know what outcomes they want to achieve, for example in this case, to prohibit the 
import of illegal timber and timber products, however, they seem uncertain hoe the 
objectives can be fully achieved.  
 
This study highlights that the experimentalist governance reflects the awareness of 
the participants, in this case the awareness amongst the UK timber industry, more 
than the concern about the due diligence procedure within the timber industry. The 
periodic revision process described under the experimentalist governance does not 
always achieve the desired outcomes even on the basis of experience. However, the 
most appealing feature of experimentalist governance lies in its ability to increase 
participation which increases the democratic legitimacy  of institutions. The agenda 
setting and problem solving with wide variety of networks, especially the civil society 
organisations, is one of the major and dynamic difference between the new approach 
and traditional principle regime to achieve accountability. 
 
7.1 The predicament of enforcing the regulation and the approach of enforcement 
agency 
 
From the survey, it is evident that initial focus of the UK competent authority has been 
on raising awareness of the legislation and supporting businesses to comply. The 
approach to enforcement is based on the assessment of risk and intelligence with 
activities designed to remove non-compliant products from the market to achieve 
proportionate outcomes and facilitate fair markets.   
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In 2014 – 15 regulatory delivery issued 23 warning letters and 19 notices of remedial 
action. In 2015 – 16 issued 21 warning letters and 21 notices of remedial action. 
However, further information on the details of these warning letters and remedial 
actions, standard operating procedure for checks, the total number of checks and 
penalties imposed are some of the queries which need to be addressed. This 
demonstrates a lack of transparency which gives rise to miss-communication and 
sense of insecurity to stakeholders which have also been raised during the 
stakeholders’ survey (see chapter 5). However, one of the civil society organisations 
have praised the efforts of UK competent authority and considers that it has 
outperformed many other competent authorities across the EU. 
 
Due to the multifaceted nature of illegal timber trade in the UK, it is fair to say that 
competent authority of the UK has taken a lenient approach towards the industry. Even 
after four years, the competent authority is trying to simplify compliance with this 
technical regulation for UK business to gain clear understandings of the dynamics of 
illegal timber imported to the UK. It is challenging for the enforcement agency to prove 
or to form a case against the operator in a court of law for the illegality in the timber or 
timber products without being on the ground. The only way they can prove illegality, 
say for example an Indonesian plywood, they must go to Indonesia and they need to 
prove that the logs supplied to plywood mill were illegal and scrutinised each element 
within the supply chain. This whole process of auditing and case building could take 
years as it happened in the case against Gibson guitar586 in the USA. The only thing 
the competent authority can do is highlight the weak due diligence system of a 
company. It is difficult for competent authorities and public prosecutors to be able to 
provide the decisive evidence required to fulfil the burden of proof. The efforts must 
be made to understand the intricacy of illegal logging and related timber trade and 
develop the mitigating responses to eliminate the complexities attached with illegal 
timber trade. 
  
                                                          
586The American guitar manufacturer Gibson Guitar has entered into a criminal enforcement agreement with 
the US Department of Justice. The company allegedly violated the Lacey Act by illegally purchasing and importing 
ebony wood from Madagascar and rosewood and ebony from India. See United States Department of Justice 
Press Release <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/gibson-guitar-corp-agrees-resolve-investigation-lacey-act-
violations>   
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From the survey, some stakeholders are of opinion that the staff members of 
enforcement agency are not the timber experts and their responsibilities are within the 
process that they have to follow. It has also been noted that the competent authority 
has been supportive in capacity building amongst the UK stakeholders but the efforts 
of the competent authority are not satisfactory because there is hardly any published 
outcome or list of prosecutions available. In February 2015, the UK Competent 
Authority investigated Chinese plywood imports which was commended by UK Timber 
Trade Federation (TTF) is the only noticeable work carried out by UK competent 
authority.  
 
Even though restrictions on the marketing of illegally harvested timber on the EU 
internal market has already been banned for more than four years, only now the first 
court cases are appearing. Judge in the Sweden and The Netherlands have been 
recently ruled that the due diligence requirements of the EU Timber Regulation were 
not met by two importing companies.587 In Germany, similar court decisions were 
adopted.588 A judge in France is investigating companies importing timber from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) after a criminal complaint.589 The UK competent 
authority issued the notice of a remedial action to two UK operators importing timber 
from Myanmar.590  It is time for the UK competent authority to move from the phase of 
capacity building to actively enforcing the EUTR and start inspecting companies 
systematically.  
 
                                                          
587The companies should have ensured that the timber from Myanmar and Cameroon was logged in compliance 
with the local legislation, should have provided extensive evidence of this, especially where the countries in 
question are prone to corruption and governance challenges, and should have adopted risk mitigation measures. 
See Förvaltningsrätten Jönköping (Administrative court Jönköping) 5 October 2016, case nr. 2095-16, Almträ 
Nordic AB v Skogsstyrelsen 
588In Germany, an administrative court dismissed an action against the confiscation of shipments of wenge wood 
imported into Germany from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The court agreed with the findings of the 
German competent authority (the German Federal Agency for Agriculture and Food, BLE) that the falsified 
supporting documents justified the confiscation. 
589A French judge is investigating a number of companies importing timber from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) after Greenpeace France filed a criminal complaint. Greenpeace claimed that companies were 
violating EUTR obligations, such as the prohibition to import illegal timber, and the obligation to conduct due 
diligence. This follows a previous case against illegal timber imports from DRC, also brought by Greenpeace 
France, which was closed by the public prosecutor. 
590UN Environment Programme - World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP – WCMC), ‘Briefing Note for the 
Competent Authorities Implementing EU Timber Regulation (April 2017 – May 2017), Developed by UNEP-
WCMC  
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In the UK, operators can face fines of up to £5,000, possibly per product, for breaching 
the EUTR. If convicted by a magistrate’s court operators can face three months in jail. 
If the case goes to a crown court these sanctions become more acute; higher fines 
and a jail term for up to two years can be imposed. The ability to fine £5000 per product 
is arguably dissuasive but without access to any data concerning penalties, it is difficult 
to determine the extent to which UK sanctions have deterred infringements. The 
competence of staff should be translated into more publicly available information 
because that would show their ability to track down and eliminate illegal timber coming. 
Their achievements need to be highlighted which will give more confidence that they 
can execute their job or if not, what do they need to do to be able to do it.  
 
The analysis also points out the inefficiency of competent authority to respond to 
substantiated concerns raised by the third party and lack of proper guidance to submit 
concerns. Some stakeholders have shown concern over the financial resources the 
competent authority receives for enforcement. The regulatory delivery employs 17 full-
time employees that deliver enforcement actions under the European Union Timber 
Regulation. It receives £500,000 for activities designed to increase awareness and 
levels of compliance. An additional budget of up to £250,000 is available to deliver a 
productive and risk-based program of product testing. The money received for 
enforcing this regulation is sufficient or not that is debatable but these resources 
should be better utilised to achieve the objectives of EUTR and the information should 
be available publicly. 
 
7.2 The challenges of due diligence system for timber industry  
 
The EUTR has been portrayed as a newly emerging legality verification regime which 
has the capacity to contribute to global economic development and environmental 
goals related to forest management and the entire forest product supply chain.591 
However, from the data analysis, it is apparent that it lacks the mechanism to address 
the ambiguous aspects of illegal logging such as traceability of processed/finished 
timber products with complex supply chain and financial difficulties faced by small-
scale businesses.  
                                                          
591Kleinschmit (n 128)  
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There is a due diligence system in place to tackle the supply chain issue and timber 
legality verification but the difficulty for the businesses is that they must rely on the 
information provided by the suppliers of a timber producer country and they do not 
have any other necessary tools to verify the claims of the supplier. EUTR due diligence 
entails a risk assessment of government documentation asserting that timber products 
are legal. Most official documentation is not considered to be absolute proof of 
legality.592 Widespread illegalities – including violations of community tenure rights – 
are associated with forest conversion in most of the major source countries for forest-
risk commodities.593 These types of illegalities are hard to identify and rectify in the 
timber supply chain even with the appropriate due diligence system. The large 
companies have the capabilities to develop their own due diligence and regularly visit 
their suppliers but for the small and medium enterprises, this is not cost-effective.  
 
The findings of the research indicate that EUTR has augmented the awareness of 
illegal logging issue and purchasing behaviour amongst the UK timber industry. Since 
EUTR came into effect, the operators are seeking detailed information on the supply 
chains documents for products originating from outside EU. The operators are even 
changing the supplier or carry out supplier audits or use other verification programme 
if the supplier fails to provide the information. Nevertheless, the sluggish rate of 
implementation and lack of coherent approach of the EUTR across the member states 
can lead to a disadvantage for companies which strictly comply with the law and 
adequately apply due diligence compared to others. Companies are not sufficiently 
guided due to the incredible amount of information, which needs expert knowledge to 
implement an effective and accurate due diligence.  
 
There is a threat that emerging legality verification regime under EUTR creates 
advantages for large, export-oriented enterprises compared to smaller firms in both 
exporting and importing countries. There are some stakeholders that point out that 
there is still lack of information and weak implementation of the due diligence systems 
among the small enterprises importing occasional consignments. In some instances, 
                                                          
592Janet Pritchard, 'Developing EU Measures to Address Forest-Risk Commodities What Can Be Learned from EU 
Regulation of Other Sectors?' (Fern 2016) 
<https://www.fern.org/fileadmin/uploads/fern/Documents/Developing%20EU%20measures_0.pdf > 
593Lawson (n 2) 
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the complex nature of compliance and legality verification procedures impacts 
negatively on small-scale companies.594 This is due to the perceived costs of legality 
verification, added administration cost and lack of adequate capacity and knowledge.  
 
As per EUTR, operators have the option to develop and implement own due diligence 
system to ensure that illegally harvested material is removed from the supply chain, 
by exclusion or by working with the supplier more closely. Traders are effectively 
exempt from the core EUTR measures, namely the prohibition and due diligence, and 
are only explicitly required to keep the record of supplies and sales. While the 
regulation stipulates that traders must also face proportionate penalties for non-
compliance with the regulation, this has not been adequately transposed in the UK. 
There appears to be limited options to seize illegal timber that has passed to traders 
after inadequate due diligence and enforcement of the EUTR's obligations on 
operators. 
 
During the empirical survey, it was noted that there is a large number of timber 
operators and traders operate in the UK that is part of domestic, regional and global 
markets for legal and illegal wood products. This market is interlinked which makes it 
difficult to monitor and resolve illegal logging and related timber trade. By limiting 
EUTR’s prohibition and due diligence requirements to “first placers” (operators) the 
EUTR exempts large-scale traders that buy supplies from numerous small operators, 
including domestic EU foresters. Thus, timber commodity chains lack transparency 
and traceability for ensuring timber legality. Technological tools, such as timber 
forensics, can contribute to timber verification and the detection of illegal timber.  
 
 
7.3 Role of forest certification under EUTR – misconception or symbiotic 
relationship between public and private law 
 
The findings of the research, especially from the timber industry survey, indicate that 
the UK businesses rely heavily on forest certification from FSC and PEFC as a tool for 
                                                          
594Daniela Kleinschmit and others, ‘Conclusion’, Illegal Logging and Related Timber Trade – Dimensions, Drivers, 
Impacts and Responses: A Global Scientific Rapid Response Assessment (International Union of Forest Research 
Organisations 2016)  
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timber legality verification. FSC and PEFC certified timber does not automatically 
comply with EUTR. However, it should be noted that article 6 of the EUTR implicitly 
gives a particular role to private forest certification. As per Article 6 on the EUTR due 
diligence system (DDS), it becomes clear that certification or other third-party verified 
schemes may be considered in the risk assessment and risk mitigation procedures.595 
Risk assessment and risk mitigation are part of the DDS, and in both the private 
certification schemes can play an important supportive role.  
 
This scenario can be interpreted in two different ways. First, it may increase the 
financial and administrative burden on small and medium operators for timber legality 
verification which generally depends on forest certification which is a scheme designed 
around the sustainability concept while EUTR fundamentally revolves around timber 
legality and there is a lack of sustainability criteria. The operators importing forest 
certified timber still have to apply due diligence on the same timber to show the 
compliance with EUTR. This applies to the timber traded within the EU or UK and not 
only to the timber imported from outside EU. Businesses are spending a lot of money 
to have forest certification and now they have added the cost of documentation and 
carry out risk mitigation. The companies started their journey towards the sustainability 
before EUTR have now had to divert towards legality after EUTR.  
 
Secondly, article 6 establishes an interrelation between EUTR and privately held forest 
certification which is an opportunity to link public with private forest law. Here it 
becomes clear that there is apparently regulatory co-existence between private 
regulation by self-regulatory organisations and public regulation by governments like 
the UK. Concurring regulation might be considered as complementary regulation if it 
is not colliding regulation. Law collision should be avoided but such a collision is not 
very likely here, as focus and aims of EUTR, FSC and PEFC are, as stated above, not 
contradictory.  Moreover, privately held self-regulation schemes could become even 
more successful in the shadow of the public law. Both EUTR and private certification 
are interrelated by article 6 and could be mutually supportive. Both regulatory 
                                                          
595Article 6/1(b) in the first indent of the second paragraph verbatim states that risk assessment may include 
certification and according to article 6/1(c) risk mitigation may include requiring additional information or 
documents and/or third-party verification. 
193 
 
frameworks do not appear as counterproductive instruments and could be welcomed 
as tools of designing a symbiotic policy mix combatting illegal logging. 
 
7.4 The weak concept of monitoring organisation 
 
The regulation gives operators different options in developing and implementing their 
due diligence system so the use of a monitoring organisation is just one option that 
businesses can take. The research shows that many operators and suppliers can 
satisfy the EUTR without monitoring organisation so the use of monitoring 
organisations by operators seems to be very low. Without detailed information from 
the UK competent authority on a number of checks they are conducting on monitoring 
organisations; it is difficult to ascertain whether the quantity or quality of checks can 
be considered sufficient. There is hardly any information that is available regarding the 
actions of monitoring organisations, making an assessment difficult. 
 
The monitoring organisations are liable to inform the state competent authority of any 
type of illegalities they found in the supply chain of their client. Thus, the operators are 
reluctant to take services of monitoring organisation because using a monitoring 
organisation can expose them to further and additional checks by the competent 
authority. Using the due diligence system developed by the monitoring organisation 
does not guarantee any protection or security to the companies for not being penalised 
by the competent authority. In an event of an audit, if the competent authority finds 
any illegality, the company is still being penalised even though the company is using 
the services of monitoring organisation. It is the operator who is solely responsible to 
make sure that it has applied proper due diligence and eliminate any risk of illegality 
through risk assessment.  
 
The monitoring organisations operating in the UK are some of the big companies 
which have the bureaucracy and volume behind the timber industry business. The EU 
should consider smaller and more independent organisations with sufficient 
knowledge of the sector which can function without any industry influence and provide 
transparency within the system.  
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The EU recognised monitoring organisations also act as timber legality consultants 
which may have a vested interest in avoiding any disruption to their clients’ business 
models. Those businesses employing service providers who are registered as MOs 
could use this not in a MO capacity, which is a risk to the credibility of the entire function 
of MOs under the regulation. Consequently, monitoring organisations are exposed to 
the risk of conflict of interest, mainly when they are linked to timber operators, traders 
or their organisations. 
 
Large businesses are usually more willing to invest in DDS on their own, while for 
smaller businesses it becomes more profitable to rely on a monitoring organisation. At 
present, MOs don't seem to provide any added value for companies which reflects on 
low level of their uptake. The entrustment of such public function requires enhanced 
transparency on the standards and procedures that monitoring organisations have to 
follow to ensure the effectiveness of due diligence; the frequency and scope of their 
monitoring activities and the outcome thereof should be made public. 
 
7.5 Limited product scope of EUTR undermines the fight against illegal logging 
 
Article 2(a) of the EUTR focuses on timber and timber products with the exception of 
timber products which have completed their lifecycle and they would be disposed of 
as a waste. The product coverage includes wood and articles of wood, pulp of wood 
and paper and paperboard and articles made thereof (chapter 48). Additionally, some 
commodity codes for furniture and one code for prefabricated buildings are listed. As 
already mentioned in chapter 3, the EUTR does not cover all commodities which have 
been defined as wood-based products. With regard to the Combined Nomenclature 
(CN), the statistical classification of traded goods, products such as wood charcoal, 
wood marquetry, printed matter or regenerated cellulose are not listed in the annexe 
of the EUTR. 
 
Both the black letter approach in chapter 3 and data analysis show that EUTR is still 
far from comprehensive as they do not include all products.596 The data analysis 
                                                          
596Sepul Kranti Barua, Juho Penttila and Mika Malmstorm, ‘China as a timber consumer and processing country: 
an analysis of China’s import and export statistics with an in-depth focus on trade with the EU’ (WWF – UK and 
Indufor 2016) 
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shows that product scope is a crucial challenge as EUTR applies to some operators 
dealing in timber products and not others, creating an unfair and uneven market. 
Companies that are dealing in timber products that fall out of the scope of the EUTR 
will have an advantage as they can source illegal material that can often be cheaper 
without undergoing the same high level of scrutiny or being subject to the due diligence 
requirements of the EUTR. It is a definite disadvantage for companies which are 
following the law and investing in proper due diligence and transparency compared to 
other operators who can easily escape and circumvent the regulation.  
 
In the UK, plywood import from China is considered as high-risk products.597 From 
2011-2015, UK imported 2.90 million RWE of EUTR products from China with the most 
share of wooden furniture, plywood and paper.  Amongst the non-EUTR products, UK 
imported 0.70 million RWE with the most share of printed media and wood charcoal.598 
The 2016 report599 published by WWF with newleaf sustainability practice Ltd 
suggests that the value of out-of-scope imports rose from €43.1 billion (2013) to over 
€46 billion (2014). The value of the products included under EUTR increased a little 
from €21.7 billion to €23.1 billion. By the value of timber products covered by EUTR, 
only 33% of products that may contain wood were included in the EUTR product 
scope, that means 67% of products were still not included under EUTR. With regards 
to the volume of timber products, 86% of wood-related products are covered by the 
regulation. Therefore, EUTR currently covers a significant majority of wood-related 
imports by quantity, but only one-third of imports in terms of value. This suggests that 
products not currently included in the scope of the EUTR typically have a high value, 
perhaps because they are more highly processed. The value and wide range of out of 
scope product groups undermine the coverage and effectiveness of the existing EUTR 
and makes a strong case for widening its scope. The expansion of products list will 
help to ensure that European consumers are not at risk of buying illegally logged 
timber or timber products.  
 
 
 
                                                          
597Pillet (n 528) 
598Barua (n 596) 
599Drewe (n 539)  
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7.6 The impact of EUTR on timber import and trade diversion 
 
 
The 2015-16 biannual review and assessment report600 of ITTO suggests that the UK 
imported about $6.1 billion of secondary processed wood products and UK’s tropical 
plywood imports almost doubled in 2016 to get to 197000 m3, with a significant 
increase in imports from China. As reported in the thesis earlier, China is considered 
as the most significant processing and exporting centre for illegal timber and timber 
products. There has been an increase in the share of potentially illegal timber imports 
into China during 2014-2015. In 2015, UK was China’s second largest market for total 
export value after the USA for wooden furniture. The figures showed that China is by 
far the most significant import partner country, providing 42% of all relevant UK 
furniture imports (€1.6 billion; 450,000 tonnes). Potentially, illegal timber continued to 
enter the UK from China through the imports of both EUTR and non-EUTR products. 
Along with China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brazil and Indonesia are also considered as 
significant high-risk import partners of UK.601 
 
The case of China suggests that FLEGT action plan and particularly the EUTR are 
useful only in reducing the share of potentially illegal timber imports into the EU, not in 
eliminating the total imports of such products. In other words, EU policies are only 
partially effective in cutting illegal timber flows into the EU. However, this research 
points out that UK buyers have been making increasing efforts to source legally 
verified timber and timber products from abroad. The FLEGT action plan and EUTR 
have been effective in terms of raising awareness of the problem of illegal logging and 
contributing to improved forest governance globally.  
 
It has been reported602 that measures from consumer countries such as US, EU and 
Australia to eliminate illegal timber imports have the positive impact. The findings of 
the research indicate that EU importers are shifting to lower-risk sources, favouring 
timber from verified legal and sustainable sources.603 Nevertheless, there is a lack of 
                                                          
600International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO), ‘Biennial Review and Assessment of the World Timber 
Situation 2015-2016’ (ITTO 2017) 
601Drewe (n 496) 
602Hoare (n 11) 
603CBI (n 70)  
197 
 
credible evidence that the shift is the due to the EUTR because of the time gap 
between the enforcement of EUTR and the shift from high to low-risk timber sources.  
 
EU imports of timber both temperate and tropical have been declining overall, 
however, it is uncertain that decline is due to the EUTR.604 After the EUTR took effect, 
the bulk of illegal trade can now shift to other countries. The diversions could include 
increased domestic consumption in the producer countries (even though this is less 
evident) and the increased imports by countries that have no or less stringent 
regulations on the illegal trade of wood products. These diversions can undermine the 
effectiveness of initiatives such as EUTR from the consumer countries and require 
more extensive global collaboration in combatting illegal logging and related timber 
trade. 
 
7.7 EUTR and Brexit – What could be the possible effects of new United Kingdom 
Timber Regulation (UKTR)?  
 
The empirical survey with stakeholders conducted before BREXIT so it is difficult to 
present the stakeholders’ view but BREXIT can have a significant impact on this 
research if the UK opts to have a completely new regulation for the illegal timber trade. 
At the same time, this research could possibly be the only piece of comprehensive 
academic research which studies the impact of EUTR in the UK once the new UK 
legislation introduced. During the time when the empirical survey conducted, there 
was hardly any thought that then Prime Minister David Cameroon will order for EU 
referendum so the survey questions and data analysis in the thesis has been 
presented considering that the UK will remain an integral part of the European Union.  
 
Post-Brexit concerns focussed primarily on global political and economic 
consequences but environmental concerns cannot be ignored especially when the 
illegal timber trade has many damaging effects and the UK is one of the largest 
importers of timber and timber products from outside EU. There are some articles, 
blogs and viewpoints available which describe the diverse impacts Brexit can have on 
environmental laws and forest-related policies both in the UK and EU. To highlight few 
                                                          
604Giurca (n 89) 
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of them, Winkel and Derks’ study605 shows that without the UK, the EU would lose 
influence and diplomatic standing substantially in global forest governance. According 
to ClientEarth, non-profit environmental law organisation, considers that Brexit would 
have the negative impact on the environment because The EU is insisting the UK and 
other EU countries to raise their protection to a higher level than they would actually 
want on their own.606 ClientEarth’s Supreme Court victory over the UK government on 
air pollution was based upon the EU law.607  
 
At present, EU laws including EUTR remains in force in the UK and UK should still be 
a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) after Brexit.608 The European 
Economic Area was formed in 1994 to expand the EU's internal market rules to the 
countries of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). The EU countries as well as 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are included in the EEA which allows them to be 
part of the EU Single Market. The EEA membership gives full access to the single 
market depending upon members sanctioning the national versions of all EU 
legislation and make a substantial contribution to the European budget. Notably, the 
EUTR was transposed into the EEA Agreement in May 2015, so membership would 
require that the UK maintain the EUTR. Interestingly, the FLEGT regulation which 
depicts the liabilities of European Member States on attainment FLEGT licences, is 
not currently replicated in the EEA Agreement. This means that when UK leaves the 
single market, the new arrangements, for the UK, will be required to receive the FLEGT 
licenses. 
 
In theory, once the UK has left EU, it has the opportunity to enforce its national timber 
regulations against buyers of wood products illegally harvested within the EU for 
example Romania.  As pointed out the weaknesses of EUTR in this research, there 
will be some genuine opportunities to include full product scope including all the wood 
                                                          
605Georg Winkel and Jakob Derks, ‘The Nature of Brexit:  How the UK Exiting the European Union Could Affect 
European Forest and (Forest Related) Environmental Policy’ (2016) 70 Forest Policy and Economics 124 
606Brexit Debate: Staying In EU Is Best For UK Nature And Climate (ClientEarth, 2016) 
<https://www.clientearth.org/james-thornton-on-brexit-staying-in-the-eu-is-best-for-uk-nature-and-climate/> 
607ClientEarth vs DEFRA [2016] EWHC2740 [2016]  
608Yuliya Kaspiarovich and Nicolas Levrat, ‘After a No-Deal Brexit, Would the UK Remain in the EEA by Default?’ 
(Brexit Institute 2018) <http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2018/10/after-a-no-deal-brexit-would-the-uk-remain-in-
the-eea-by-default/> 
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products under the new regulation. Problems such as lack of financial resources in 
order to enforce the regulation can be diverted specifically to deal with UK issues. Any 
such dynamic would take at least a couple of years to come into effect. The option to 
avoid this risk is to buy certified or otherwise third-party audited wood from within the 
EU. 
 
The explanatory memorandum609 prepared by DEFRA to The Timber and Timber 
Products and FLEGT (EU Exit) Regulations 2018610, ensures that EU and UK 
legislation establishing the regime prohibiting restrictions on the marketing of illegally 
logged timber on the market will remain operable once the UK leaves the EU. The tool 
makes small and functional modifications to the existing legislation mentioned above 
in order to ensure that the law becomes operable after Exit. The amendments  include 
amending references to the EU, institutions of the EU and EU administrative 
processes to UK equivalents; upgrading legal references applicable to the UK 
legislation and maintaining policy reporting requirements. The aim is to have a United 
Kingdom Timber Regulation (UKTR) and UK Forest Law Enforcement Governance 
and Trade regulation which tackles illegal logging and ensure the demand and supply 
of, legally harvested timber for the UK market. 
 
The instrument’s purpose is solely to allow the current legislative and policy framework 
to remain unchanged by the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. 
Under UKTR, the monitoring organisations operating in the UK recognised under 
EUTR will be continued and the requirements and obligations will remain intact. It 
seems like there will be some changes to the EU FLEGT partnership agreements as 
UK intends to conclude its own partnership agreements. Until the UK concludes new 
partnership agreements, Indonesia will be removed from the annexe of the FLEGT 
regulations as Indonesia is currently named as a Partner Country in the annexe of the 
FLEGT regulation 2173/2005. 
 
                                                          
609Explanatory Memorandum to The Timber and Timber Products and FLEGT (EU Exit) Regulations 2018, See 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b573aaa40f0b6338b116dba/The_Timber_and_Products_an
d_FLEGT__EU_Exit__Regulations_2018_EM.pdf> 
610Timber and Timber Products and FLEGT (EU Exit) Regulations 2018 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b573a5040f0b633a4313da9/The_Timber_and_Products_an
d_FLEGT__EU_Exit__Regulations_2018_SI.pdf> 
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The introduction of the UKTR may increase the amount of paperwork that authorities 
have to deal with which consequently affect the businesses adversely. It can 
complicate and unnecessarily increase the trading cost between the UK, affect the 
transparency and the businesses may end up paying more amount on the same 
volume of product than what they are paying now. Therefore, as soon as the UK leaves 
the EU, it will create many disadvantages for the businesses for both UK and EU 
countries.611 The challenge for the upcoming negotiations between the EU and the UK 
will be to minimise these costs.  
 
Clearly with an industry as global as the timber trade, the adoption of new standards 
can have a significant impact on timber industry in developing countries especially the 
small and medium size companies. Adoption of new requirements in place of EUTR 
can damage the traceability system companies have set up to comply with EUTR. 
Forest certification bodies have developed many guidance notes to simplify EUTR 
obligations for operators since EUTR came into force. With new UK legislation on 
illegal timber, the forest certification bodies may have to develop new standards so 
this may create many perplexing regulatory frameworks. This whole scenario could 
have a damaging global impact on the fight against illegal logging. 
 
The complex supply chain issue for the timber products harvested in high risk 
countries, processed in countries like China and entering via EU in the UK can create 
more complications to the timber traceability for operators. During the survey, it has 
been noted that UK timber importers are trying their best to comply with EUTR 
requirements with the knowledge they have and with new legislation, it is highly likely 
that it will add extra administrative cost and could possibly weaken the timber market. 
Therefore, even if in theory the UK did not need to meet some of the EU’s 
requirements, it is possible that the trade would continue to do so in order to minimise 
cost and reduce barriers to trade. 
 
                                                          
611The National Board of Trade Sweden, ‘Brexit – Options For a Future Regulatory Framework for Trade in 
Services and Customs and Trade Procedures Between the EU and the UK’ (NBTS 2017) 
<http://www.regeringen.se/494cc9/contentassets/6fda5c79a5d94ad692e4c65f082b4aa6/english-summary-
brexit-analysis.pdf> 
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Amidst this, is the government going to take a step back in the fight against illegal 
logging the main point for the UK to focus on? There is a prime example of the 2012 
coalition government’s controversial plans to sell-off England’s public forest estate to 
raise £250 million. The plans faced a massive criticism and were finally abandoned 
after the government hastily set up an expert panel which called for the 637,000 acres 
of woodlands owned by the Forestry Commission to remain in public ownership. The 
damages or consequences of new legislation in place of EUTR are considerably high 
even if UK tries to address the existing weaknesses in the EUTR. The UK has been 
very instrumental in providing support both financial and human resource to FLEGT 
action plan. The UK, especially its NGO community, was influential in bringing the 
FLEGT and the EUTR and remains among the most proactively driving its 
implementation.612 The UK’s Competent Authority ‘Regulatory Delivery’ is viewed as 
one of the most active member states.  
 
Although this research has highlighted that there is a room for improvement under 
EUTR, it seems that neither the EUTR nor FLEGT VPA initiative should be 
downgraded as part of Brexit. Once the UK leaves the EU, it would cause unnecessary 
administrative burden and put a potential barrier in the way of trade with or via other 
European businesses. Perhaps most importantly, at a time when their potential for 
positive impact looks set to grow, it would send out the wrong signal on the UK’s 
commitment to combatting the illegal timber trade. The Brexit would not affect the 
commitment of either the UK or the EU to fight against the transnational issues of 
illegal timber trade and will co-operate with each other and will be on the same page 
to address this issue. The UK has been and probably continue to coordinate 
enforcement approaches with EU Member States, like Norway and Switzerland, along 
with the US, Canada, and Australia, in an informal government process known as the 
Timber Regulation Enforcement Exchange (TREE). It is in the global interest that UK 
keeps EUTR’s instruments intact to fight against illegal logging and not to take a step 
back due to Brexit. 
 
                                                          
612EU-FLEGT Facility, ‘EUTR perspectives - The non-governmental organisation (NGO) view’ (EUFLEGT 2012) 
<http://www.euflegt.efi.int/81/-/asset_publisher/2WbEg9FaGcCQ/content/eutr-perspectives-the-non-
governmental-organisation-ngo-view?inheritRedirect=false> 
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The Brexit negotiations must take potential future burdens into consideration to ensure 
that trade can continue without restrictions after UK have left the EU. Assessing the 
current scenario on timber trade, it is very uncertain but it is fair to say that it is going 
to be a very complicated matter when UKTR comes into force. The Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 
regulations will be kept in UK law after Brexit. The change will be that companies have 
to provide CITES documents for CITES listed species between the UK and the EU 
with designated trade routes.613 The encouraging news for the UK companies using 
monitoring organization for due diligence requirement is that the monitoring 
organizations established in the UK would continue to be recognised by the UK. 
However, the EU has indicated it will no longer recognise monitoring organisations 
based in the UK if there’s no deal. The Office for Product Safety and Quality will 
continue to check that companies maintain appropriate records and there would be no 
need for further action to be taken by businesses at the border as a result of the EUTR 
reforms. 
 
7.8 Recommendations  
 
The recommendations provided here are based on the information gathered during 
the empirical survey and analysis performed. It considers how the EUTR system can 
be improved overall and in the UK including its instruments. Therefore, effects of Brexit 
have been excluded from the suggestions below.   
 
There are differences in how the EUTR is applied in the EU, especially in terms of 
enforcing the penalties and product coverage, which hinders the development of a 
level playing field in the EU and the effective implementation of the law. This must be 
improved to support responsible businesses who take their obligations seriously. A 
uniform and binding EU framework can be one instrument that can deliver a level 
playing field between operators and enforcement agency in the EU timber sector.  
 
                                                          
613Brexit Guidance for Businesses, Trading CITES-listed Specimens through UK Ports and Airports if there's a No-
Deal Brexit <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/trading-cites-listed-species-through-uk-ports-and-airports-after-
brexit> 
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EUTR has the potential to create a level playing field that ensures fair competition and 
fair prices, and higher incentives for investment in sustainable forest management. 
The EUTR can contribute to a healthier economy, benefit the forestry sector and 
strengthen the rights of indigenous community both inside and outside of the EU. 
Profound effects of the EUTR such as systemic reform and governance improvement 
can and will only be felt when operators bring their timber trading activities in 
compliance with the EUTR and competent authorities are effectively and uniformly 
enforcing it across the EU. It remains to be seen when the European Union addresses 
the weaknesses identified in 2016 consultation to ensure effective implementation of 
the EUTR to stop the flow of illegal timber into the EU market. 
 
(A) Competent Authority 
 
There can be more transparency on enforcement checks made by the competent 
authority and that checks are performed regularly and cover a representative 
percentage of operators (importers, national operators as well as traders). Where 
shortcomings are identified by the Competent Authority, they should follow this up with 
penalties. From the survey, it has been noticed that UK competent authority (CA) 
reports to the UK government’s Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA) every 6 months. DEFRA should at least annually publicize the activities 
undertaken by the competent authority and their enforcement achievements. 
 
The UK competent authority should be more transparent about the process for 
substantiated concerns raised by third parties and ensure that this process is simple 
and readily available. One of the survey respondent mentioned that UK competent 
authority does not provide an open channel to submit substantiated concerns or 
communicate the scale, scope and outcomes of enforcement. A centralised online 
system can be developed to raise the concerns which can alert all the competent 
authorities in EU member states. The substantiated concern raised by the NGOs 
should be communicated to the relevant authorities such as customs department, 
border agencies and intelligence agencies.  
 
Concerns raised should be treated in a timely manner with a response made detailing 
whether and why further action is taken. Competent authorities can engage in a 
204 
 
transparent dialogue with complainants on the basis of reliable procedural standards. 
Regular reporting on substantiated concerns including total number received, 
allocated remedial actions, and number followed up on where no remedial action was 
determined is necessary.  
 
For effective law enforcement, it would seem more logical for customs to be directly 
involved in the EUTR enforcement. Controls are more precise and productive when 
they happen when the shipment and bill of lading are together and when (forensic) 
verification techniques can be employed to see whether they correspond, rather than 
afterwards, via documents or during an inspection at a timber company, as is still 
common EUTR practice. 
 
The timber trade associations and their members across the UK can play a significant 
role with both awareness and implementation of EUTR. The competent authority 
should encourage these associations to report annually to competent authority with 
the status of EUTR compliance and issues encountered amongst their member 
companies. Engagement by the competent authority with operators helps to clarify the 
requirements of the regulation. More feedback from the competent authority would 
help persuade resistant operators to engage more fully with their due diligence 
obligations. 
 
(B) Timber Industry 
 
In section 6.7 of this chapter, it is mentioned that Timber Regulation Enforcement 
Exchange has been established to assemble enforcement officers from EU Member 
States, Australia and the US to provide support to a coordinated effort to address the 
trade in illegal timber. A similar platform for operators would facilitate greater access 
to national legal requirements that would help ensure better compliance. Even though 
some operators may have set up a reasonable control on their supply chain, much 
remains to be done to ensure that only legal or sustainable timber is entering the EU 
market. 
 
During the survey, it has been noted that some members of timber industry think that 
EUTR brings extra administrative costs to their businesses but EUTR should not be 
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seen as a burden. It is the first step that must be further developed towards more 
sustainable supply chains that can bring more confidence into the timber market. The 
temporary or permanent change of suppliers or geographic supply sources is a small 
price to pay compared to the long-term benefits that it will generate for the forestry 
sector and society as a whole. The EUTR obliges the operator to apply due diligence 
as a first placer of wood products on the EU market which can create complacency 
regarding the awareness on illegal timber trade amongst other actors further down the 
supply chain. It is always of good support if all market actors are informed better about 
the objectives, the content and the procedures of the EUTR. That would raise 
awareness and acceptance of the EUTR and lead to a better implementation.  
 
Operators should pay attention to various sources of information that can inform risk 
assessments including independent monitor and NGO reports. They should also 
publish through their website a purchasing policy that prohibits illegal timber entering 
into their supply chains and demands sustainable timber and timber product 
purchasing. If an operator changes its supplier relating to timber illegalities, the 
operator should inform the respective competent authority about the concern so that 
the competent authority can keep an eye for other operators importing or buying wood 
from the same supplier. 
 
(C) Expansion of product scope 
 
The current scope of the EUTR is not comprehensive enough to stop illegal timber 
from being placed on the UK market. Currently, the EUTR advantages some operators 
dealing in timber products over others, creating an uneven and unfair market in the 
EU. An approach covering all products related to timber would not only improve this 
situation but furthermore simplify the due diligence process for those companies 
trading in products that are out of scope. Broadening of product scope would ensure 
all suppliers in all countries are captured by the EUTR.  
 
The traders buying large volumes of un-verified out of scope timber products from 
multiple operators that are not being checked by national competent authorities need 
to be covered by the EUTR. The European Commission should review the product 
scope of the regulation by inviting the proposal for studies or consider existing studies 
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(mentioned in section 6.3 of this chapter) to identify the feasible options of expanding 
the product scope so that all wood-based products are covered. 
 
(D) Monitoring Organisations (MOs) 
 
The biggest challenges for monitoring organisations and the competent authorities 
who are monitoring their systems are the providing an effective due diligence system 
and the avoidance of conflicts of interest. Clear criteria and standards need to be 
applied when addressing these problems, as well as competent authorities should 
check monitoring organisations regularly and thoroughly that no conflict of interest 
occurs which would risk the effectiveness of the EUTR. It remains unclear what are 
the criteria or standards applied by the commission in the process to recognise 
monitoring organisation. Greater transparency is requested and required to ensure 
EUTR is seen to be enforced and therefore effective. 
 
The role of monitoring organisations is to help operator develop an EUTR-compliant 
due diligence system and conduct regular due diligence performance evaluations. In 
the UK, there are options available for operators to develop due diligence system 
without taking help from MOs. The UK Timber Trade Federation (TTF) is not a 
monitoring organisation but has its own due diligence system which is being used by 
its members. Monitoring organisations do not provide a service that the importers 
cannot provide themselves and they don’t seem to provide any added value for 
companies which reflects on the low level of their uptake.  
 
Even after four years of EUTR, there is no sufficient information available on actions 
of UK monitoring organisations which certainly affects the acceptance of the concept 
amongst the operators. The competent authorities should annually report to the 
commission on checks carried out and activities of monitoring organisation and If, from 
the report, the concept doesn’t seem to be working, then the commission should take 
a call to remove this concept. 
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7.9 Future developments of research 
 
The EUTR is a measure adopted by timber consumer countries so its impact on timber 
producer developing countries considering forest governance, the timber industry and 
on livelihoods of a country needs to be studied to get a holistic approach of EUTR. 
The comparison between before and after EUTR scenarios in the developing countries 
can reflect the actual effects of EUTR. The assessment of how transnational policy 
efforts of combatting illegal logging have helped to control agricultural conversion, 
whether formally legal or illegal. Similarly, the impact of EUTR and risk assessment 
studies for different industry sectors (such as building and furniture) both in timber 
producer developing countries and timber consumer developed countries can 
generate a good amount of data. These type of studies can help a particular industry 
to understand their carbon footprint, risk identification, mitigation and complying with 
regulatory mechanisms. The element of Brexit in this type of studies can enhance the 
knowledge and help, both the private industries and government agencies, in 
identifying the areas that need further clarification. 
 
The more in-depth research is needed to develop the mechanisms that deal with 
regime complexity issue especially in the field of transnational business governance. 
The measures need to be developed to understand the connections and interactions 
across international regimes. So that the mechanisms to streamline the cooperation 
with different institutions developed and further disintegration through overlapping can  
be prevented. 
 
More accurate data about illegal forest activities is needed. Research/Methods are 
needed to develop on how to engage forest communities in detecting and reporting 
situational forest crime. Research is needed to effectively apply forensics to extract 
high-quality DNA from timber which can help the enforcement agencies during 
investigating the timber species. The mapping tools of GIS and remote sensing should 
be developed and provided to the developing countries to monitor the forest activities 
and record data.  
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